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ABSTRACT 
Securitisation has been viewed as a key bank funding, risk management and 
performance improvement tool over the last two decades. However, the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 has shown that engagement in securitisation might create significant 
financial problems for banks and consequently lead to widespread problems in the 
financial sector. This, therefore, has underlined the importance of understanding banks’ 
securitisation activities, the benefits and risks inherent, and the consequences for the 
financial system. 
This thesis comprises empirical research on the effects of securitisation on banks. 
The work is presented in three essays. The first essay investigates whether banks 
improve their performance through the use of the securitisation market by applying a 
propensity score matching approach. Specifically, we attempt to assess whether the 
access to the securitisation market led to lower cost of funding, less credit risk exposure, 
and higher profitability. Using US commercial bank data from 2001 to 2008, we first 
test these hypotheses using univariate analysis and find that securitising banks are, on 
average, more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure, and higher cost of 
funding. However, the propensity score matching analysis does not provide evidence to 
suggest that securitisation had a significant impact upon bank performance. In other 
words, the analysis shows that securitisers would have had comparable cost of funding, 
credit risk, and profitability had they remained non-securitising. This evidence leads us 
to conclude that securitisation does not seem to outperform alternative funding, risk 
management, and profitability improvement techniques used by non-securitising banks 
that have ex-ante similar characteristics to those securitising.  
The second essay investigates the impact of securitisation on the credit-risk taking 
behaviour of banks. Using US bank holding company data from 2001 to 2007, we find 
that banks with a greater balance of outstanding securitised assets choose asset 
xii 
 
portfolios of lower credit risk. Examining securitisations by the type of underlying 
assets, we find that the negative relationship between outstanding securitisation and risk 
taking is primarily driven by securitisations of mortgages, home equity lines of credit, 
and other consumer loans. Securitisations of all other types of assets, on the other hand, 
seem to have no significant impact on bank credit-risk taking behaviour. We attribute 
these results to the recourse commonly provided in securitisation transactions, as it 
might alter the risk-taking appetite of the issuing banks across asset classes. Therefore, 
we conclude that the net impact of securitisation on the riskiness of issuing banks, and 
consequently on the soundness of the banking system, is ambiguous and will depend on 
the structure of transactions. In particular, it will depend on the relative magnitude of 
credit support provided by banks.  
The third essay examines the relationship between banks’ off-balance sheet 
securitisation structures and insolvency risk, with a particular focus on credit and 
liquidity support provided by these banks. Additionally, it examines the risk effect of 
credit-enhancing facilities and liquidity commitments provided by banks to 
securitisation structures of other institutions. Using US bank holding company data for 
the period from 2002 to 2007, we first find that credit enhancements provided by 
originating banks in their securitisation structures have a significant positive effect on 
insolvency risk of the banks. Second, examining credit enhancements by the form of 
underlying facility, we find that among credit-enhancing interest-only strips, 
subordinated securities, and standby letters of credit, the latter have the greatest positive 
association with bank insolvency risk. In contrast, liquidity provisions are found to have 
a significant risk-reducing effect. Finally, examining credit and liquidity support 
provided by banks to third-party securitisation structures, we find that credit enhancing 
third-party securitisations reduces insolvency risk of the banks, while liquidity 
provisions are found to be highly positively associated with their insolvency.  
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Summarising the main findings, the first essay finds no evidence of significant 
causal effects of securitisation on performance of securitising banks. The second essay 
finds evidence to suggest that outstanding securitisation has a negative impact on the 
credit-risk taking behaviour of banks; while the third essay finds that the interests 
retained by banks in connection to securitised assets significantly increase their 
insolvency risk. This shows that the net risk transfer for originating banks through 
securitisation might be ambiguous; however banks do account for the retained exposure 
to the securitised assets reducing credit risk taking. Taken together, the evidence from 
the three studies suggests that banks predominantly use securitisation for financing 
purposes rather than as a risk management or performance improvement mechanism.  
This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the motives for and 
consequent implications of securitisation and provides valuable findings for the ongoing 
discussion of how to redesign the securitisation model and to reform the supervision and 
regulation of banks’ engagement in securitisation activities in response to the recent 
financial crisis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Securitisation has been a key bank funding, risk management, and performance 
improvement tool over the last two decades. It began with structured financing of 
mortgage loans in the 1970s and has expanded remarkably in types of securitised assets, 
securitising firms, and investors in securitised products since the 1980s.  
The decade preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2009 witnessed a tremendous 
growth of the market maintained by growing search for investment opportunities as a 
result of global imbalances, persistent demand from institutional investors for low-risk 
liquid asset-backed securities, unusually low interest rates and associated credit boom 
feeding in turn the property and stock markets. As shown in Figure 1.1, the market for 
US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) increased from $2.5 trillion in 1996 to $8.6 
trillion at year-end 2006. The outstanding volume of asset-backed securities (ABS) 
reached $2.1 trillion at year-end 2006 from $0.4 trillion in 1996.  
Following the period of extensive credit origination and its subsequent 
distribution via securitisation markets, concerns over losses on US subprime mortgage 
loans and an associated collapse in investor risk appetite triggered broad-based distress 
in markets for securitised instruments in June 2007. The problems started with subprime 
mortgage-related instruments, which experienced severe credit quality deterioration as 
the period of appreciating house prices in the US came to the end. Losses were 
magnified by increasingly illiquid markets and worsened further with a global loss of 
confidence following the failure of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 and subsequent signs of global recession. As a result, spreads on securitised 
products soared freezing activities across global securitisation markets.  
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Figure 1.1 Outstanding US Secur itisation 1996-2009 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
$ Trillions
ABS
MBS
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) 
Currently securitisation markets remain weak with almost no public placement 
taking place and the most of new issues being retained by banks and used as collateral 
in government refinancing operations. However, policy-makers and market practitioners 
acknowledge the potential benefits of securitisation including credit risk transfer and 
diversification and attempt to restart securitisation market by introducing changes to the 
securitisation model in terms of simplicity and standardisation (ECB, 2009).  
Further, reflecting the need to strengthen the regulation and supervision of bank 
securitisation activities raised by the financial crisis, the Basel Committee has recently 
finalised its proposals for enhancing the Basel II framework in the area of securitisation 
(2009). Specifically, proposals mainly focus on: (i) higher risk weights to securitisation 
exposures and, hence, higher minimum capital standards (Pillar I); (ii) addressing the 
bank’s on- and off-balance sheet securitisations within the frameworks of internal 
capital adequacy assessment process and supervisory review and evaluation process 
(Pillar II); and (iii) strengthening disclosure requirements with regard to securitisation 
activities and off-balance sheet vehicles to enhance transparency (Pillar III). These 
3 
 
measures are deemed necessary to revive securitisation; however it will take time to 
restore the confidence in the market and induce investors to make new investments in 
securitised products. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework for  the Research 
In general, securitisation can be defined as a structured process whereby a bank 
transforms its illiquid assets, traditionally held until maturity, into marketable securities. 
A typical securitisation transaction involves the pooling of homogenous assets with 
fixed or nearly fixed cash flows and transferring the pool to a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), a bankruptcy-remote entity that in turn finances the purchase through the 
issuance of securities backed by the pool. In the most common case, the SPV employs 
tranching by issuing securities of different risk, duration, and other characteristics with 
the senior tranche of investment grade being supported by mezzanine tranches, which in 
turn are supported by an unrated subordinated equity tranche. This tranching technique 
enables the SPV to split the credit risk and place it with parties that are willing or best 
able to absorb it. To ensure high credit rating for asset-backed securities from rating 
agencies, the SPV obtains credit enhancements, most of which typically come from the 
originating bank and can be provided in various forms from standby letters of credit to 
the purchase of the most subordinated securities issued by the SPV. 
In theory, the benefits of securitisation from the originating bank’s perspective 
can be substantial. Specifically, by using securitisation, a bank may be able to: (i) 
diversify its loan portfolio (Pavel and Phillis, 1987); (ii) focus on activities in which it 
has a comparative advantage (Karaoglu, 2005; Pavel and Phillis, 1987; Thomas, 1999); 
(iii) finance both ongoing operations and the purchase of new assets (Flannery, 1994; 
James, 1988; Karaoglu, 2005; Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera, 1996); (iv) reduce 
funding costs (Pennacchi, 1988; Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988); (v) manage credit risk 
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(Cantor and Rouyer, 2000); and (vi) improve overall performance (Boot and Thakor, 
1993; Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera, 1996; Wolfe, 2000). 
However, it has been shown that in practice securitisation might have adverse 
implications through a number of indirect channels, and these may include: (i) quality 
of assets securitised and of those retained on the balance sheet, which in turn might be 
driven by the regulatory capital arbitrage and earnings management motives (Ambrose, 
LaCour-Little and Sanders, 2005; Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003; Karaoglu, 2005); (ii) 
contractual and non-contractual credit enhancements, which might result in the 
originating bank retaining significant interests in the securitised asset pool (Landsman, 
Peasnell and Shakespeare, 2006; Niu and Richardson, 2006; Standard and Poor's, 2001; 
Wolfe, 2004); and (iii) post-securitisation lending behaviour in terms of both risk taking 
and the volume of credit supply (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Loutskina and Strahan, 
2006; Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010; Purnanandam, 2009).  
Summarising the previous research, the securitisation process offers substantial 
economic benefits for originating banks; however the realisation of these benefits will 
depend on the practical implementation of securitisations and the post-securitisation 
behaviour of banks. Therefore, the impact of securitisation on banks remains 
controversial. 
1.3 Objectives and Contr ibutions 
This research attempts to provide further insights into banks’ securitisation 
activities. It comprises empirical work on securitisation presented in three essays.  
The first essay aims to assess whether banks improve their performance through 
the use of the securitisation market. The study makes two main contributions to the 
empirical literature on securitisation. First, it examines the impact of accessing the 
securitisation market on banks’ performance in terms of the cost of funding, credit risk, 
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and overall profitability. Second, it attempts to gauge the impact of securitisation on 
bank performance by comparing securitising banks with non-securitising banks using a 
propensity score matching approach. To our knowledge, this methodology has not been 
employed in the past in this context.   
The second essay aims to investigate the impact of securitisation on the credit-risk 
taking behaviour of banks. Specifically, it attempts to answer the following question: if 
banks retain significant exposure to the securitised assets through contractual and/or 
non-contractual arrangements, does the outstanding securitisation representing this 
exposure affect the credit-risk taking behaviour of the banks? The study makes two 
main contributions to the literature. First, it examines whether the aggregate outstanding 
securitisation affects banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Second, it investigates whether the 
effect differs across securitisations of different asset classes. 
The third essay aims to examine the relationship between banks’ off-balance sheet 
securitisation structures and insolvency risk focusing on different forms of credit 
enhancement and liquidity support provided by the banks. Additionally, it attempts to 
examine the risk effect of credit-enhancing facilities and liquidity commitments 
provided by banks to securitisation structures of other institutions. The study makes 
three main contributions to the literature. First, it examines the risk effect of different 
credit enhancements including credit-enhancing interest-only strips, retained 
subordinated securities, and standby letters of credit. Second, it analyses additional 
contractual arrangements such as liquidity support and seller’s interest in their effect on 
the risk of the originating bank. Finally, it examines the risk effects of credit and 
liquidity support provided by banks to other institutions’ securitisation structures.  
1.4 Data 
For the empirical analysis we use data for US bank holding companies and 
commercial banks. The data are obtained from the banks’ regulatory reports that contain 
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the complete balance sheet, income statement, and detailed supporting schedules, 
including a schedule of off-balance sheet securitisation activities. These forms are filed 
by all US banks on a quarterly basis and have been compiled in a database by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago since 1986.  
Starting in June 2001, US regulation requires banks to provide more detailed 
information on their securitisation activities in the reporting forms. Specifically, banks 
are required to report outstanding securitisation, performance of the securitised assets 
including past due amounts, charge-offs and recoveries, and credit and liquidity support 
provided to their own and other institutions’ securitisation structures. This securitisation 
data are to be reported broken down according to the underlying assets into seven 
categories: 1-4 family residential loans; home equity lines; credit card receivables; auto 
loans; other consumer loans; commercial and industrial loans; and all other loans, all 
leases, and all other assets. The introduction of the new securitisation data in the 
regulatory reports determines year 2001 as the start date for our analyses. 
1.5 Empir ical Design and Main Findings 
In the first essay we evaluate whether banks improve their performance in terms 
of the cost of funding, credit risk, and profitability through securitisation using US 
commercial bank data. The sample spans from 2001 to 2008 and contains 9,748 banks 
including 9,290 non-securitisers and 458 securitisers. We first test the hypotheses using 
univariate analysis of securitisers and non-securitisers and find that securitising banks 
tend to be more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure, and higher cost 
of funding. We then use a propensity score matching analysis to estimate the causal 
effect of securitisation. To do so, we focus on the sub-sample of non-securitisers and 
176 first-time securitisers extracted from the group of securitisers. Applying propensity 
score matching, we build a control group from the non-securitisers to assess what would 
have happened to the first-time securitisers had they not securitised. We find that the 
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first-time securitisers would have had comparable cost of funding, credit risk, and 
profitability had they remained non-securitising. This leads us to suggest that 
securitisation does not seem to outperform alternative funding, risk management, and 
profitability improvement techniques used by non-securitising banks that have ex-ante 
similar characteristics to those securitising. 
In the second essay we investigate the impact of securitisation on the credit-risk 
taking behaviour of banks using US bank holding company data. We use data for bank 
holding companies rather than for commercial banks because risk and capital 
management are typically administered at the highest level of the financial group. The 
sample covers the period from 2001 to 2007 and contains 2,190 banks including 1,960 
non-securitisers and 230 securitisers. Applying fixed effects regression analysis on the 
sub-sample of securitisers, we first find that banks with a greater balance of outstanding 
securitised assets choose asset portfolios of lower credit risk. Examining securitisations 
by the type of underlying assets, we find that the negative relationship between 
outstanding securitisation and risk taking is primarily driven by securitisations of 
mortgages, home equity lines of credit, and other consumer loans. Securitisations of all 
other types of assets, on the other hand, seem to have no significant impact on bank 
credit-risk taking behaviour. We attribute these results to the recourse commonly 
provided in securitisation transactions, as it might alter the risk-taking appetite of the 
issuing banks across asset classes. Therefore, we conclude that the net impact of 
securitisation on the riskiness of issuing banks is ambiguous and will depend on the 
structure of the transactions. In particular, it will depend on the relative magnitude of 
credit support provided by banks. 
In the third essay we use US bank holding company data to examine (i) the 
relationship between banks’ securitisation structures and insolvency risk focusing on 
credit and liquidity support provided by these banks in their transactions, and (ii) the 
risk effect of credit-enhancing facilities and liquidity commitments provided by banks 
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to securitisation structures of other institutions. The selection procedure determined by 
the empirical design of the study leaves us with a sample of 194 securitising banks 
covering the period from 2002 to 2007. Using fixed effects regression analysis, we first 
find that credit enhancements provided by originating banks in their securitisation 
structures have a significant positive effect on insolvency risk of these banks. Second, 
examining credit enhancements by the form of underlying facility, we find that among 
credit-enhancing interest-only strips, subordinated securities, and standby letters of 
credit, the latter have the greatest positive association with bank insolvency risk. In 
contrast, liquidity provisions are found to have a significant risk-reducing effect. 
Finally, examining credit and liquidity support provided by banks to third-party 
securitisation structures, we find that credit enhancing third-party securitisations reduces 
insolvency risk of the banks, while liquidity provisions are found to be highly positively 
associated with bank insolvency.  
1.6 Conclusion 
Summarising the main findings, the first essay finds no evidence of significant 
causal effects of securitisation on performance of banks. In other words, securitising 
banks would have had comparable cost of funding, credit risk, and profitability had they 
not securitised. The second essay suggests that outstanding securitisation has a negative 
impact on the credit-risk taking behaviour of banks. The third essay shows that the 
interests retained by banks in connection to securitised assets significantly increase their 
insolvency risk. This result coupled with the finding of the second essay suggests that 
the net risk transfer for originating banks through securitisation might be ambiguous 
due to retained interests; however banks do account for the consequently arising 
exposure reducing credit risk taking. Taken together, the evidence from the conducted 
research suggests banks predominantly use securitisation for financing purposes rather 
than as a risk management or performance improvement mechanism. 
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This work contributes to a deeper understanding of the motives for securitisation 
and consequent implications for banks and thereby the banking system. It provides 
findings that are particularly valuable in light of the ongoing policy debate on 
redesigning the securitisation model and reforming the supervision and regulation of 
banks’ engagement in securitisation activities in response to the recent financial crisis.  
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents 
background on securitisation. First it provides the market overview including a brief 
history of its development. It then discusses in detail the securitisation process including 
the participants and their roles, the mechanics of a securitisation transaction, the benefits 
offered to the major parties in the transaction, and the risks inherent in securitisation.  
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on securitisation. Specifically, it 
organises the literature in three strands. The first strand examines the motives for 
securitisation, analyses its potential benefits, and examines its effects. The second 
strand relates to the motives for and implications of credit enhancements in 
securitisation. The third strand investigates the impact of securitisation on bank lending 
behaviour in terms of risk taking and the volume of loan supply. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 contain the empirical analysis of the thesis presented in three 
essays. Specifically, Chapter 4 presents the first essay on securitisation and bank 
performance. The study attempts to evaluate whether banks improve their performance 
in terms of the cost of funding, credit risk, and profitability through the use of the 
securitisation market. 
Chapter 5 presents the second essay on securitisation and credit risk taking. The 
study aims to investigate the impact of securitisation on the credit-risk taking behaviour 
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of banks and to examine whether the impact differs across securitisations of different 
asset classes. 
Chapter 6 presents the third essay on securitisation and bank insolvency. The 
study attempts to empirically examine the relationship between banks’ off-balance sheet 
securitisation structures and insolvency risk focusing on different forms of credit 
enhancement and liquidity support provided by the banks. Additionally, it examines the 
risk effect of credit and liquidity support provided by banks to securitisation structures 
of other institutions.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It summarises the main findings of the 
three studies, discusses the contribution of the conducted analysis, and suggests scope 
for future research. 
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2 BACKGROUND ON SECURITISATION 
2.1 Definition and a Br ief History of Secur itisation 
In general, securitisation can be defined as a structured process whereby 
homogenous financial assets are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of asset-
backed securities. This structured finance technique allows credit originators to manage 
credit and concentration risks, diversify funding sources, reduce funding costs, and 
improve performance indicators. 
Securitisation began in the 1970s with the structured financing of mortgage loans 
by a US government-sponsored agency, the Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae). As a result, investors were offered a new type of bond – a 
mortgage pass-through that passes the principal and the interest payments on mortgages 
to the holders of the security. Ginnie Mae was followed by private corporations 
chartered by the federal government, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which 
issued mortgage-backed securities in the early 1980s. These government-sponsored 
enterprises were to increase homeownership in the US by fostering secondary mortgage 
market. The guarantees provided by the government assured investors of the payment of 
principal and interest on the securities backed by mortgages and thereby promoted the 
growth of the agency securitisation (see Figure 2.1).  
Government agencies and government-sponsored enterprises remained the main 
issuers in the market until the 1990s when other financial and non-financial institutions 
entered the market issuing mortgage-backed securities that in many cases deviated from 
the conforming structure of the government-sponsored securitisations. While the first 
private mortgage pass-through backed by conventional loans was issued by Bank of 
America in 1977, other institutions showed little interest in the area until the 1990s. 
However, from 2000 the issuance of private mortgage securitisation steadily ascended 
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up until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 closely reaching the agency issuance 
around year 2006 (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.1 US Agency Mortgage-Backed Secur ities Issuance 1970-2009 
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Figure 2.2 US Mortgage-Related Secur ities Issuance 1996-2009 
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As for asset-backed securitisation, the first transaction dates to 1985 and was 
backed by automobile loans, the most straightforward type of collateral due to the 
relatively short maturities of the loans that made the timing of cash flows more 
predictable and their statistical histories of performance that gave investors confidence. 
Auto loan securities were followed by the first issuance of credit card securities in 1986 
which was the cornerstone of the asset-backed securitisation due to the revolving nature 
of credit card debt and related complications in structuring the transaction. Since then, 
the process and the structure of securitisation have evolved significantly, including the 
development of private credit enhancements such as over-collateralisation, third-party 
and structural enhancements. This expanded the list of securitised assets from three in 
1985 to twenty three by 1996 including non-consumer loans and financial securities 
(Murray, 2001) and fostered the growth of the asset-backed securities issuance (see 
Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3 US Asset-Backed Secur ities Issuance 1996-2009 
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As a whole, the US securitisation market experienced a tremendous growth from 
the mid-1990s and up until the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The market for mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) increased from $2.49 trillion in 1996 to $9.19 trillion 
outstanding at year-end 2009. The outstanding volume of asset-backed securities (ABS) 
reached $2.43 trillion at year-end 2009 from $0.4 trillion in 1996 (see Figure 1.1 on 
page 2). Along with the size, the market remarkably expanded in terms of the types of 
securitised assets, the issuing firms, and the investor base. 
In contrast to the US securitisation market, the development of the European 
securitisation market started at the end of the 1990s and was triggered not by 
government agencies, but the increased demand from institutional investors, 
technological and financial innovation, and the introduction of euro (Altunbas, 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2009).  
The EU market experienced a strong issuance growth from 2001 onwards (see 
Figure 2.4). The outstanding volume of mortgage-backed securities reached €1.21 
trillion at year-end 2008, while €0.19 trillion for asset-backed securities (Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)). However, as shown in Figure 
2.5, the use of securitisation remains heterogeneous across European countries with the 
UK dominating the market. 
After the extended period of growth, global securitisation markets collapsed 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, where securitisation was named as one of the 
primary causes of the credit market turmoil. Reflecting the generalised loss of investor 
confidence, most of the issuance from the mid-2007 onwards has been in the US agency 
sector and in European securitisations used for refinancing activities with the European 
Central Bank. 
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Figure 2.4 European Total Secur itisation Issuance 2000-2009 
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Figure 2.5 European Total Secur itisation Issuance by Country in 2007 
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The development of securitisation over the past three decades has had a 
remarkable impact on the world financial system. It has modified the functioning of the 
banking markets from the traditional “originate-to-hold” model to the “originate-to-
distribute” model, thereby significantly increasing the reliance of financial 
intermediaries on the capital market as a source of finance. Despite the weaknesses in 
the securitisation process revealed by the crisis, policy-makers as well as market 
practitioners acknowledge the potential of securitisation in credit risk transfer and 
diversification and attempt to revive securitisation by increasing transparency in the 
market and introducing standardisation and simplicity of transactions.  
2.2 Secur itisation Process 
2.2.1 Par ticipants and their  Roles 
A typical securitisation transaction involves the pooling of assets with fixed or 
nearly fixed cash flows that are then transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a 
bankruptcy-remote entity that in turn finances the purchase through the issuance of 
securities backed by the pool. This process involves a number of participants: borrower, 
originator, servicer, special purpose vehicle, credit enhancer, underwriter, trustee, and 
investor (see Figure 2.6).  
Borrower 
The borrower is the originator’s debtor whose debt is transferred to the SPV; the 
customer relationship between the borrower and the originator is usually maintained as 
the former does not realise that his/her loans have been sold. As the borrower is 
responsible for the payment on the loan underlying the securitisation transaction, his/her 
credit standing determines the ultimate performance of the asset-backed securities.   
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Figure 2.6 Secur itisation Transaction 
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Originator 
The originator is an entity that creates the assets to be securitised. Originators may 
include finance companies, commercial banks, insurance companies, computer 
companies, airlines, manufacturers, etc. 
Servicer 
The servicer is an agent that collects regular payments on the underlying assets 
and transfers the proceeds to the special purpose vehicle. This servicing function is 
typically retained by the originator for a fixed servicing fee. 
Special Purpose Vehicle 
The special purpose vehicle (SPV) is a bankruptcy-remote entity set up by the 
originator for the specific purpose of the securitisation(s).  
Trustee 
The trustee is a third party retained for a fee to administer the trust that holds the 
underlying assets supporting asset-backed securities and is primarily concerned with 
preserving the rights of the investor. Generally, the trustee monitors the compliance by 
all the parties to the transaction with the pooling and servicing agreement and oversees 
the allocation of cash flows as prescribed by the agreement. The trustee is also 
responsible for reviewing periodic information on the performance of the underlying 
asset pool received from the originator/servicer and for declaring an event of default or 
amortisation based on the observed pool performance indicators. 
Credit Enhancer 
The credit enhancer is a third party that provides guarantees protecting investors 
in the event that cash flows from the underlying assets are insufficient to pay in a timely 
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manner the interest and principal due for the securities. This third-party credit support is 
used to improve the credit rating and thereby the pricing and marketability of the 
securities, which requires the credit enhancer to have a rating at least as high as the 
rating sought for the securities. Therefore, third-party credit enhancement is often 
provided by a highly rated bank or insurance company.  
Rating Agency 
The rating agency performs a critical role in the process - evaluating the credit 
quality of the transaction. The credit rating for the asset-backed securities assigned by 
the agency depends on the quality of underlying assets, the strength of the 
originator/servicer, the soundness of the structure, and the extent of provided credit and 
liquidity support.  
Underwriter 
The underwriter in the securitisation transaction is responsible for advising the 
originator on the structure of the asset-backed securities as well as the pricing and 
marketing them to investors.  
Investor 
The investors in asset-backed securities may include individual and institutional 
investors; the largest investors are typically fund managers, pension funds, insurance 
companies, and commercial banks.  
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2.2.2 Secur itisation Mechanics 
The primary difference between securitisation and loan sales is the structuring 
process. Before loan pools can be transformed into securities, they must be pooled and 
structured to modify the risks and returns to the investors. The structure of a transaction 
is governed by the terms of a pooling and servicing agreement, which is the main 
contractual document between the originator and the trustee.  
The structuring process includes five major stages: (i) segregating the assets from 
the originator; (ii) creating a special purpose vehicle and transferring the asset pool to be 
securitised to the SPV; (iii) credit enhancing the asset pool; (iv) issuing securities 
backed by the pool; and (v) allocating cash flows. 
2.2.2.1 Segregating the Assets 
In the first stage of the process, the originator designates the accounts’ receivables 
to be sold to the SPV so that to create a portfolio whose performance is consistent with 
the target quality of the sought securities. To do so, it first determines which accounts 
will be “designated” as those from which receivables may be included in the pool. The 
selection criteria might include the default performance, geographic location, maturity 
date, size of the credit, or age of the account relationship. It then selects the accounts’ 
receivables to be securitised either on a random basis, in order to create selections that 
are representative of the total portfolio, or on an inclusive basis, so that all qualifying 
receivables are sold.1
2.2.2.2 Creating a Special Purpose Vehicle and Transferring the Assets 
  
In the second stage, the originator creates a special purpose vehicle for the single 
purpose of holding the transferred underlying assets and the subsequent issuance of 
                                                 
1
 In a random selection, the originator determines how many accounts are needed to meet the target value 
of the securities; then the accounts are selected randomly. 
21 
 
asset-backed securities. The legal form of the SPV may be a limited partnership, a 
limited liability company, a trust, or a corporation. Typically, the SPV is thinly 
capitalised; it has no independent management or employees; the administrative 
functions are performed by the trustee and the assets are serviced via a servicing 
arrangement; and finally, the legal structure of the SPV eliminates bankruptcy.2
2.2.2.3 Credit-Enhancing the Asset Pool 
  
Having created an SPV, the originator transfers the designated assets onto the 
SPV’s balance sheet. The transfer of assets must be in form of a “true sale”, where the 
transferor (i.e., the originator) surrenders control over the financial assets and can, 
therefore, remove the assets from its balance sheet. This true sale condition serves as a 
protection of the SPV’s and eventually investors’ rights on the cash flows generated by 
the underlying receivables in the case of the originator’s bankruptcy. 
In the third stage, the SPV obtains credit enhancements in order to reduce credit 
risk for investors, thereby increasing the credit rating of asset-backed securities. The 
nature and the amount of contractual credit enhancements required to obtain a specific 
credit rating for asset-backed securities are determined by the rating agency and 
underwriter depending on characteristics of underlying assets.3
  
 These credit 
enhancements may take different forms and can be provided internally, externally, or a 
combination of both; revolving loan securitisation also incorporate early amortisation 
triggers as additional investor credit risk protection.  
                                                 
2
 See Gorton and Souleles (2005) for a discussion of special purpose vehicles. 
3
 The expected performance of a specified pool of assets is typically based on credit scores, credit limits, 
outstanding balances, underwriting and collection practices, geographic diversification, historic 
performance, and the structure of the transaction. The ratings are assigned to each class in the series based 
on the credit quality of the pool of assets, the type of credit enhancement, and the structure of the series 
(FDIC, 2007). 
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Internal Credit Enhancements 
Internal contractual credit enhancements are those generated by the cash flows 
from the underlying assets, by the structure of the transaction, and those provided by the 
originating bank. Examples of internal contractual arrangements include excess spread, 
spread accounts, subordinated securities, over-collateralisation, and standby letters of 
credit; liquidity provisions might also serve as a credit-enhancing facility if they provide 
credit support to the structure.  
Excess Spread  
Excess spread is a general feature of securitisation structures as the yield on the 
underlying loan portfolio for a given month generally exceeds the expenses of the SPV 
including the interest paid on the asset-backed securities, servicing costs, and expected 
losses. The excess spread is typically held on the originator’s balance sheet in the form 
of interest-only (IO) strips. IO strips represent, in effect, the present value of the future 
expected income that the bank expects to receive on the securitised assets. The 
accounting requirement for recording the IO strip typically results in a gain on the sale 
of the sold assets since the originating bank is allowed to recognise future expected cash 
flows at the time of the sale. This gain in turn is recognised as income, thereby 
increasing the bank's capital position (FDIC, 2007). 
IO strip is defined as credit-enhancing (CE IO) if it provides credit support to the 
securitisation structure, that is, its value declines with credit losses on underlying assets. 
In other words, CE IO strips are subordinated securities with no principal that receive 
the interest at a strip rate over time and are recorded as “other assets” on the originator’s 
balance sheet and as “credit-enhancing interest-only strips” on the off-balance sheet 
securitisation schedule. 
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Subordinated Securities  
Securitisations typically have a senior/subordinated or the so called tranched 
structure, where the senior tranche of investment grade is supported by mezzanine 
tranches, which in turn are supported by an unrated subordinated equity tranche. The 
latter is the most risky tranche of the securitisation transaction as it absorbs first losses 
and is commonly held by the originating bank as retained interest in the structure.4
Seller’s Interest 
  
In securitisation structures with both CE IO strips (which are present in every 
structure) and retained subordinated securities, typically the subordinated securities bear 
losses after the CE IO strips are exhausted. 
Another form of credit enhancing the securitised pool is over-collateralisation; 
this represents bank’s ownership interest, or the so called seller’s interest, in the SPV’s 
assets that has not been securitised and is, therefore, not pledged to back the issued 
securities. The principal amount of the seller’s interest in a structure is defined as the 
total principal amount of assets included in the securitisation structure less the principal 
amount of assets attributable to investors in the form of issued securities. The size of the 
seller’s interest is determined by the rating agency and is to ensure that there will be 
sufficient assets available to support the issued asset-backed securities.5
In respect of subordination, the holders of asset-backed securities and the holder 
of the seller’s interest have the same priority on claims on the underlying assets; charge-
 Seller’s interest 
can be held in the form of loans and/or securities, reported accordingly on the 
originator’s balance sheet.  
                                                 
4
 The retained subordinated assets are reflected as “other assets” on the bank’s balance sheet. 
5
 Seller’s interest absorbs fluctuations in the outstanding principal balances of the designated accounts. It 
is also available to ensure that sufficient assets exist following non-cash deductions in balances (dilution) 
due to charge reversals, such as merchandise returns, disputes, and fraudulent charges (FDIC, 2007). 
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offs are typically shared pro-rata between the seller’s interest and the investors’ 
securities (FDIC, 2007). 
Liquidity Facility  
Liquidity facility represents any arrangement, including servicer cash advances, in 
which the issuing entity is obliged to provide funding to the securitisation structure to 
ensure investors of timely payments on asset-backed securities or to ensure investors of 
payments in the event of market disruptions.  
Typically, advances under liquidity facility are reimbursed from subsequent 
collections from the securitisation structure and are not subordinated to other claims on 
the cash flows from the underlying assets and, therefore, should generally not be 
construed as a form of credit enhancement. However, if the advances under such a 
facility are subordinated to other claims on the cash flows, the facility constitutes a 
credit enhancement (FDIC, 2010). 
Standby Letter of Credit  
A letter of credit provided to a securitisation structure presents an unfunded 
commitment that guarantees limited protection against losses, typically catastrophic 
losses, on the underlying assets. Issuers of letters of credit are obliged to honour 
demands for payment up to the specified amount. The latter is normally set at a fixed 
percentage of the asset-backed securities and is usually determined by the perceived 
credit risk in the underlying assets.  
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Implicit Recourse 
Implicit recourse presents a non-contractual credit enhancement that originating 
institutions tend to provide in securitisation structures, the so called implicit recourse to 
the originator. The provision of implicit recourse violates the “true sale” requirement; 
however, it allows originators to maintain their reputation in the securitisation market 
for repeated sales.  
From the regulatory perspective, recourse in securitisation would require the 
originator to hold capital against the entire amount of assets transferred. Therefore, 
implicit recourse in securitisation provides scope for regulatory capital arbitrage and is, 
consequently, of paramount concern for regulators. In an attempt to control implicit 
recourse practices, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a practical 
guidance, OCC Guidance 2002-20, “Interagency Guidance on Implicit Recourse in 
Asset Securitisations” (OCC, 2002). The document states that “banking organisations 
typically have provided implicit recourse in situations where the originating 
organisation perceived that the failure to provide this support, even though not 
contractually required, would damage its future access to the asset-backed securities 
market”.  
According to the OCC guidance, implicit recourse might include the originator: (i) 
selling assets to the SPV at a discount from the price specified in the securitisation 
documents; (ii) purchasing assets from the SPV at an amount greater than fair value; 
(iii) exchanging performing assets for non-performing assets in the SPV; and (iv) 
funding credit enhancements beyond contractual requirements.6
  
   
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of implicit recourse also see Gorton and Souleles (2005), Higgins and Mason (2004), 
Vermilyea, Webb and Kish (2008). 
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External Credit Enhancements 
External credit enhancements presents credit support provided to the securitisation 
structure by other institutions and may include a third-party letter of credit, cash 
collateral account, and surety bonds.  
Third-Party Letter of Credit 
A third-party letter of credit is similar to the standby letter of credit discussed 
earlier except that it is provided by a third-party institution. The advantage the external 
letter of credit is the additional analysis of the transaction by the third-party credit-
enhancement provider, while the downside is the risk that issued asset-backed securities 
will be downgraded when the provider of the letter of credit is downgraded. 
Cash Collateral Account 
Cash collateral account presents a segregated trust account typically funded by a 
loan from a third-party bank at the issuance of the asset-backed securities. Cash 
collateral account is used to cover shortfalls in interest, principal, or servicing expenses 
if the excess spread falls below zero. The size of the loan is determined by the rating 
agency depending on the credit ratings sought for the securities; the loan is generally 
priced using a specified index plus a fixed spread and is subordinated in the repayment 
to the issued asset-backed securities. 
Surety Bond 
Finally, a surety bond is a guarantee issued by a third party, usually a highly rated 
mono-line insurance company. Surety bonds typically guarantee the principal and 
interest payments for specified asset-backed securities tranches. The premium paid to 
the surety bond issuer is determined by its perceived credit risk in the underlying assets 
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and is offset by the lower interest rate paid to the investors holding the insured securities 
tranches. 
Early Amortisation Protection 
In addition to the common credit enhancement techniques, revolving 
securitisations, as those backed by credit card receivables or home equity lines of credit, 
also use early amortisation triggers as a form of investor credit protection.  
Early amortisation allows accelerating the repayment of investors’ principal 
payments ahead of the scheduled maturity if the performance of the asset pool 
deteriorates. Early amortisation triggers are typically defined in the pooling and 
servicing agreement and may include events as: (i) the average excess spread for three 
preceding months below the required monthly amount; (ii) the seller’s interest below a 
specified required amount; (iii) failure of the originator, servicer, or the credit enhancer 
to perform as required by the pooling and servicing agreement (OCC, 1997). In the 
accelerated repayment period following an early amortisation event, the investors’ share 
of all principal collections is returned immediately as it is received by the SPV. This 
allows protecting the investors from prolonged exposure to deteriorating performance of 
the underlying assets or the default of the servicer.  
In general, securitisation structures may contain any of the credit-enhancing 
facilities discussed above. The choice is typically determined by the costs and market 
placement factors. Aside from the coupon rate paid to investors, the cost of credit 
enhancements tends to be the largest expense. As a result, originating banks are 
constantly trying to minimise the costs associated with providing credit protection, 
which might be achieved through a greater reliance on the internally provided 
enhancements. This, in effect, may result in the banks retaining significant credit risk 
exposure in connection to the securitised portfolios through both explicit and implicit 
arrangements. 
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2.2.2.4 Issuing Interest in the Asset Pool 
In the fourth stage, the SPV issues asset-backed securities. In the most common 
case, the securities are issued in tranches of different risk, duration, and other 
characteristics with the senior tranche of investment grade being supported by 
mezzanine tranches, which in turn are supported by an unrated subordinated equity 
tranche. The latter is the most risky tranche of the securitisation transaction and is 
commonly retained by the originating bank on its balance sheet. This tranching 
technique enables the SPV to split the credit risk and place it with parties that are 
willing or best able to absorb it.  
2.2.2.5 Cash F low Allocation 
Finally, the last stage of the securitisation process includes allocation of the cash 
flows received from the securitised assets among the holders of asset-backed securities. 
The payment distribution depends on the type of issued securities, which is in turn 
determined by the nature of underlying loans.   
Pass-Through Securities 
The payment distribution for securities backed by instalment loans (“pass 
through” securities) is closely tied to the cash flows of the underlying loans. 
Specifically, the interest on the pass-through securities is paid monthly, while the 
principal included in each payment depends on the amortisation schedule and 
prepayment rate of the underlying loans. 
Pay-Through Securities 
The payment distribution for securities backed by revolving loans such as credit 
cards and home equity lines of credit (“pay through” securities) has two phases: (i) 
revolving period, and (ii) amortisation period. 
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During the revolving phase, monthly interest payments on the underlying assets 
are used to pay the SPV’s expenses including interest payments on the asset-backed 
securities, while the principal collections are used to purchase new receivables 
generated in the designated accounts or to purchase a portion of the seller’s interest. In 
the following amortisation phase, the principal collections are used to pay down the 
outstanding principal amount of the asset-backed securities. 
2.3 Benefits 
Securitisation offers substantial benefits to each of the major parties in the 
transaction, which explains the growth of the market over the past two decades. 
For Originators 
Securitisation provides financial institutions with a means to: (i) reduce regulatory 
capital requirements by transferring originated assets off the balance sheet; (ii) obtain an 
additional source of funding; (iii) lower the cost of  funding as the issued asset-backed 
securities are typically assigned a higher credit rating than that of the originator; (iv) 
diversify portfolio by reducing firm-specific exposure, sectoral and geographic 
concentrations; (v) improve credit risk management by shifting  the credit risk of the 
originated assets to external credit enhancers and investors; and (vi) enhance financial 
ratios as a result of the above and the fee income received for continuing loan 
origination and the commonly retained servicing function. 
For Investors 
Investors benefit from asset-backed securities issued in securitisation as they: (i) 
offer higher yields compared to other financial instruments of a similar credit quality7
                                                 
7
 Higher yields are offered as a compensation for a possible prepayment risk and restricted secondary 
market for these securities. 
 
and generally better credit risk protection by means of credit enhancements; (ii) provide 
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a measure of flexibility as the payment streams can be structured to meet an investor’s 
particular requirements; and (iii) release investors from the need to gain a detailed 
understanding of the underlying assets as a result of structural credit enhancements and 
diversified asset pools. These features of asset-backed securities meet the requirements 
of pension funds, insurance companies, and other institutional investors for safe fixed-
income securities with specific payment stream and attractive yields and, therefore, 
boost institutional investor demand. 
For Borrowers 
Securitisation also benefits borrowers by: (i) increasing credit supply as a result of 
lenders being able to raise additional capital for new loans via the market; (ii) reducing 
borrowing expense, that is, the capital raised by lenders via the market typically has a 
lower cost which, in turn, can be passed onto the borrowers in the form of lower interest 
rates; and (iii) increasing availability of credit on terms that lenders may not have 
provided had they kept the loans on their balance sheets. As an example for the latter, 
the existence of securitisation markets may allow lenders to extend fixed rate debt 
preferred by many borrowers over variable rate debt without exposing themselves to 
interest rate risk.  
2.4 Risks 
Realisation of the benefits offered by securitisation requires prudent management 
of the risks inherent in the process.  The risks arising for a bank from securitisation and 
their levels depend on the roles the bank plays in the transaction and the quality of 
assets it originates and/or services.  
The primary risks associated with bank securitisation activities are identical to 
those that banks face in their lending activities and include credit risk, liquidity risk, 
capital risk, and reputation risk.  
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2.4.1 Credit Risk 
Credit risk arises from the borrowers’ failures to repay their debts. Securitisation 
structures are designed to reduce the credit risk of the originator by transferring the 
unexpected portion of the default risk to credit enhancers and investors. However, the 
originator typically retains exposure to the securitised pool through credit-enhancing 
interest-only strips (CE IO), retained subordinated securities, or other types of credit 
enhancement. As the pool performance deteriorates and charge-offs increase, excess 
spread and, thus, the value of the CE IO strip decline. Once the excess spread is 
exhausted, the risks of credit default then shift to the other credit enhancements, 
including those retained by the bank, such as subordinated securities. Therefore, the 
originator bears, in effect, a significant portion of the default risk of the securitised 
assets.  
In addition, poor credit quality and performance of the asset pool may limit the 
bank’s future access to the securitisation market, affecting the terms of subsequent 
issues or impacting costs from alternative funding sources. Therefore, to maintain its 
reputation with the market, the originator may be prone to securitise better quality assets 
while retaining lower quality assets on the balance sheet, the process often referred to as 
“cherry-picking”.8
                                                 
8
 Selecting receivables of higher or the highest quality for securitisation. 
 Further, the originator often retains an additional degree of credit 
risk in the form implicit recourse. This may result in the originator absorbing more 
losses or providing credit enhancements beyond the contractual requirements.   
Finally, credit risk exposure can arise from providing credit enhancements to 
third-party securitisations. Credit enhancing third-party securitisations exposes a bank 
to the credit risk of loans it did not originate and, therefore, requires a thorough 
understanding of the transaction structure and the underwriting policies. 
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2.4.2 Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk arises from a bank’s inability to manage unplanned changes in 
funding sources or in meeting its obligations without incurring significant losses. While 
securitisation can provide a bank with an attractive alternative funding source, 
significant reliance on securitisation may increase liquidity risk.  
The primary liquidity risk arises from the possibility that the securitised asset pool 
may require balance sheet funding at unexpected times; in revolving securitisations this 
arises from the possible return of receivables to the balance sheet as a result of early 
amortisation. The second concern is the risk of a bank not being able to sell new 
receivables and the need to fund them on-balance sheet. Finally, liquidity risk may arise 
from the bank’s failure to recognise changes in market conditions that may impact its 
ability to liquidate assets quickly and with minimal loss. 
2.4.3 Capital Risk 
Capital risk arises from the possibility that the bank’s capital may be insufficient 
to absorb or protect against losses arising from credit and other factors. This implies 
having sufficient capital to: (i) possibly fund new receivables if access to the 
securitisation market is hindered; (ii) withstand additional costs associated with funding 
in poor market conditions; and (iii) support unplanned balance sheet growth related to a 
complete withdrawal from the securitisation market. 
2.4.4 Reputation Risk 
Reputation risk is the risk to liquidity, earnings, and capital arising from negative 
market perception. The reputation of a bank in a securitisation market is of great 
importance and depends mainly on the quality of the underlying receivables and the 
efficiency at which the bank can service those receivables. Poorly performing assets or 
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servicing failures on existing securitisations may increase the costs and decrease the 
profitability of future transactions.  
2.5 Summary 
To summarise, securitisation presents a complex structured process involving 
transactions among participants with diverse incentives. Banks may engage in 
securitisation through a wide range of activities realising the benefits provided to each 
of the roles in the process. They may act as an originator of the assets to be securitised, 
as a servicing agent, and as a credit enhancer in their own securitisation structures. 
Banks may also engage in third-party securitisations acting as a trustee, as a provider of 
credit enhancement or liquidity support, as an underwriter of the issue, or as an investor 
in asset-backed securities. 
However, engagement in securitisation activities also exposes banks to substantial 
risks and, if not implemented prudentially, might create significant financial problems 
for banks and consequently lead to widespread problems in the financial sector as has 
been shown by the recent market turmoil. Therefore, it is crucial to fully understand and 
evaluate the risks inherent in the process and manage them adequately while gaining 
from the benefits offered by securitisation. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are three main strands in the literature on securitisation that are related to 
our research. The first strand examines the motives for securitisation, analyses and 
examines its effects. The second strand relates to the motives for and implications of 
credit enhancements in securitisations. The third strand investigates the impact of 
securitisation on bank lending behaviour including risk taking and the volume of loan 
supply. 
3.1 Motivation for  Secur itisation 
The research on motivations for securitisations can be divided into two distinct 
streams. The first stream examines the economic reasons behind securitisation decision 
such as diversification, financing, and risk management. The second stream relates to 
the securitisation motives emerging from the accounting treatment of transactions and 
includes regulatory capital arbitrage and earnings management. 
3.1.1 Economic Motivations 
Previous studies have found evidence indicating that firms securitise assets to: (i) 
diversify portfolio; (ii) focus on activities in which they have comparative advantages; 
(iii) finance both ongoing operations and the purchase of new assets; (iv) reduce 
funding costs; (v) improve performance indicators; and (vi) manage credit risk. 
3.1.1.1 Diversification 
Evidence supporting the diversification motive is found in an early study by Pavel 
and Phillis (1987). Using US commercial bank data for 1983-1985, the authors find that 
undiversified banks are more likely to sell or securitise loans. Specifically, the results 
show that the average sample bank has a 61.1 per cent probability of selling loans, and 
this probability would rise by more than 7 percentage points if the bank’s level of 
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diversification decreases by one standard deviation. The authors also find evidence to 
suggest that loan sales did increase the diversification of the sample banks. 
3.1.1.2 Comparative Advantage 
 Thomas (1999) suggests that banks may have a comparative advantage in 
originating and servicing loans relative to funding and may prefer to outsource, on an 
ongoing basis, the activity of comparative disadvantage while maintaining the 
origination and possibly servicing functions. Consistently, Pavel and Phillis (1987) and 
Karaoglu (2005) find that US banks are more likely to sell loans if they are more 
efficient in loan origination as suggested by their lower ratio of non-interest expense to 
total loans. Pavel and Phillis also find that a bank’s comparative advantage in 
originating and servicing loans has the largest impact on determining the amount of 
loans that the bank decides to sell. 
3.1.1.3 Financing 
Michalak and Uhde (2009) find evidence to suggest that securitisation is 
predominantly used by banks as a source of funding; the study uses data on cash and 
synthetic securitisation transactions by European banks between 1997 and 2007. Based 
on the analysis of collateralised loan obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks 
from 1997 to 2004, Bannier and Haensel (2007) in turn suggest that securitisation is an 
appropriate funding tool for banks with high risk and low liquidity.  
Using US bank holding company data for 1997-2000, Karaoglu (2005) finds that 
banks that sell or securitise loans tend to have a higher loan-to-deposit ratio, higher 
growth expectations (measured by the market-to-book ratio), and stronger motives to 
avoid underinvestment problem (measured by the interaction between the market-to-
book ratio and debt-to-equity ratio). The role of securitisation in mitigating the 
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underinvestment problem of financial intermediaries is also suggested by James (1988), 
Flannery (1994), and Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996).  
Pais (2005) empirically examines the financing hypothesis for the use of 
securitisation against the comparative advantage hypothesis.  The analysis based on a 
sample of UK banks for 1990-1997 provides evidence in support of the financing 
hypothesis; that is, the use of securitisation by banks is driven by their financing needs 
rather than by a loss of their comparative advantage in performing the intermediary role.  
Evidence supporting the financing hypothesis is also found in Minton, Sanders 
and Strahan (2004). The authors hypothesise that financial firms facing greater financial 
distress, for example those with high leverage and risky assets, should be more active in 
securitisation that other firms; further, banks and savings institutions ought to be less 
likely to securitise assets as they can borrow without bearing any financial distress costs 
due to government deposit insurance. Testing the hypotheses on US financial company 
data for 1993-2002, they find supporting evidence indicating that unregulated finance 
companies and investment banks are more likely to securitise than banks and that risky 
and highly leveraged financial institutions are more likely to engage in securitisation 
than the safer ones; at the same time, highly leveraged banks are found to be less likely 
to securitise than the better capitalised banks.  
3.1.1.4 Cost of Funding  
Pennacchi (1988) suggests that funding through loan sales is less expensive for 
banks compared with traditional equity or deposit financing as it avoids costs associated 
with required capital and reserves. Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) argue that 
securitisation offers banks a way of lowering their cost of funding by separating the 
credit risk of securitised assets from the risk of the originating firm. Consistently, 
Gorton and Souleles (2005) suggest that securitisation reduces financing costs as the 
off-balance sheet debt issued via a special purpose vehicle does not include a premium 
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reflecting expected bankruptcy costs due to its legal isolation. Further, as suggested by 
Minton, Sanders and Strahan (2004), securitisation of low-risk assets may be less costly 
compared to the securitisation of riskier assets as the latter are harder for outside 
investors to value and are, therefore, more likely to be discounted due to the lemons 
problem (Akerlof, 1970).  
3.1.1.5 Profitability 
Theoretical work by Boot and Thakor (1993) shows that, in the presence of 
asymmetric information, pooling assets and issuing multiple financial claims with 
different risk characteristics against the pool cash flow enables the issuer to increase its 
expected revenue. Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996) note that the cash inflow 
from asset-backed securities issuance can be used to retire existing debt which in turn 
reduces interest expense and increases reported earnings. In a theoretical analysis, 
Wolfe (2000) shows that the establishment of an asset-backed securitisation pipeline 
will enable banks to improve their return on capital if they: (i) can securitise any asset 
they originate obtaining a fair market value; (ii) face capital adequacy requirements; (iii) 
face fixed rate deposit insurance premiums; and, finally, (iv) are concerned with the risk 
of insolvency. 
Empirical evidence consistent with the profitability-enhancing motive for 
securitisation is found by Bannier and Haensel (2007); in a study of collateralised loan 
obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks from 1997 to 2004, the authors find 
that lowly performing banks are more likely to engage in securitisation. Consistently, 
Pais (2005) finds that poor performing institutions are more likely to engage in 
securitisation using a sample of UK banks for the period between 1990 to 1997. Affinito 
and Tagliaferri (2010) also find that less profitable institutions are more likely to 
securitise assets analysing Italian bank data for the pre-crisis period from 2000 to 2006; 
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they also find evidence to suggest that, once securitised, banks seem to reach higher 
profits. 
3.1.1.6 Risk Management 
Evidence supporting the credit risk transfer motive for securitisation is found in 
Pais (2005), Bannier and Haensel (2007), and Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010). Using 
UK, European, and Italian bank data, respectively, the studies find that banks with 
higher credit risk exposure are more likely to securitise their loans.  
However, using Moody’s analytical approach for securitisation, Cantor and 
Rouyer (2000) show that the credit risk position of the originator will improve if the 
riskiness of the securities sold to investors is higher than that of the originator prior to 
the securitisation; otherwise, the transaction might intensify the originator’s net 
exposure to the default risk of its assets. The authors conclude that in many cases, due 
to the structure of transactions, the transfer of credit risk through securitisation is 
relatively insignificant in comparison to the other risks retained by the lender.  
Empirical evidence on the efficiency of securitisation in risk transfer is 
controversial. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) investigate whether active management of 
credit risk exposure through loan sales market leads to lower risk.  The study examines 
US commercial bank data for the 1988-1993 period and uses risk measures based on 
profits (time-series standard deviation of a bank’s return on equity and return on assets) 
and loan losses (time-series standard deviation of a bank’s loan loss provisions to total 
loans and of non-performing loans to total loans). The empirical results indicate a strong 
relationship between activities in the loan sales market and the profit–risk measures; 
however, the effect depends on the controls for capital structure and lending. 
Specifically, the results show that without the controls, banks active in risk management 
via loan sales market exhibit higher risk exposure than other banks; when controlling 
for capital structure and lending activities, these banks are found to be safer than their 
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peers, banks that have similar capital structures and loan portfolios but do not manage 
credit risk through loan sales market. The authors, therefore, conclude that active 
management of credit risk exposure through loan sales market does lead to lower risk; 
however, banks seem to use the achieved risk reduction to take on new risks. 
Evidence consistent with the risk-reducing effect of securitisation is found by 
Jiangli and Pritsker (2008); using data on US bank holding companies from 2001 to 
2007, the study estimates the effect of securitisation on bank insolvency risk measured 
by a time deposit premium. The study employs three different methodologies: the first 
approach assesses what would happen if securitisers had to take their securitised assets 
back on the balance sheet; the second approach compares average performance of banks 
that securitise with those of comparable size but not securitising; the final approach uses 
instrumental variable regression. The evidence from the three methodologies used is 
fairly consistent suggesting that mortgage securitisation reduces bank insolvency risk. 
Overall, the authors suggest a positive role for mortgage securitisation and attribute the 
turmoil in mortgage credit and securitisation markets during the recent crisis to excesses 
in those markets. 
Other studies have found contradictory evidence on the risk effect of 
securitisation. In particular, Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) investigate the relationship 
between securitisation and credit risk estimating a system of equations on a sample of 
Canadian banks for the period between 1988 and 1998. Using two alternative credit risk 
measures, provisions for uncoverable loans to total assets and total risk-weighted assets 
to total assets, they find evidence indicating that securitisation activity tends to increase 
bank risk.  
Consistent results are found by Michalak and Uhde (2009). Using a sample of 743 
securitisations issued by 55 stock listed European banks over the period from 1997 to 
2007, they find that credit risk securitisation has a negative impact on the financial 
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stability of banks measured by a z-score. Further, investigating the impact of credit risk 
securitisation on single components of the z-score measure, they find a positive impact 
of securitisation on bank leverage and return volatility and a negative relationship 
between securitisation and profitability.  
Further, Krahnen and Wilde (2006) show that, under certain assumptions about 
bank reinvestment behaviour and capital structure choice, the issuance of collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs) in true sale transactions can lead in theory to an increase in the 
issuing intermediary's systematic risk. Consistently, Franke and Krahnen (2005) suggest 
that expanding the loan business through securitisation should increase the granularity 
of a bank’s loan portfolio and, therefore, expose the bank relatively more to the 
macroeconomic risks than to idiosyncratic risks. They hypothesise that, given a strong 
correlation between credit spreads and the market return, the issuance of securitisation 
and reinvestment of proceeds in new loans should raise the bank’s systematic risk 
measured by stock beta. They find supporting evidence using event study methodology 
on a data set 75 collateralised debt obligations issued by 27 European banks in 2003.  
Haensel and Krahnen (2007) find supporting empirical evidence examining the 
systematic risk effect of credit securitisation on a data set of 178 ABS-transactions 
undertaken by European banks in the period between 1997 and 2004. Using event study 
methodology on the ABS-issue announcements, they find that credit securitisation tends 
to increase the systematic risk of the issuing bank measured by equity beta. The 
evidence also suggests that the beta-increasing effect of securitisations is more prevalent 
for large financial institutions that engage repeatedly in securitisations.9
                                                 
9
 The authors suggest that this may be because these large financial institutions are more likely to 
systematically alter their loan portfolio as a consequence of their access to the capital market. 
 Further, in a 
cross-sectional analysis, the authors find that the issuer’s beta rises significantly more if 
the bank is financially weak and is domiciled in a bank-based financial system.  
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3.1.2 Accounting-Based Motivations 
The second type of motivation for securitisation is associated with the sale 
treatment of the transfer of financial assets. The sale accounting treatment of 
securitisations provides a means to reduce regulatory capital, a process often referred to 
as regulatory capital arbitrage, and to manage reported earnings. Research has provided 
evidence supporting each of these motivations. 
3.1.2.1 Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
Jones (2000) defines regulatory capital arbitrage as a process where banks reduce 
their regulatory capital with little or no corresponding reduction in their overall 
economic risk and argues that securitisation and other financial innovations of recent 
years have provided banks with unprecedented opportunities to do so. Jones  argues that 
regulatory capital arbitrage is driven by significant divergences between underlying 
economic risk and measures of risk embodied in regulatory capital ratios, which allows 
unbundling and repackaging of portfolio risks so to reduce the effective capital 
requirement per unit of economic risk pertained by a bank.  
Calomiris and Mason (2004) empirically examine the regulatory capital arbitrage 
motivation for securitisation. Using US credit card bank data for 1996-2000, they find 
evidence to suggest that securitisation with implicit recourse provides an important 
means of avoiding minimum capital requirement. Further, Calomiris and Mason 
examine two views of the motivation for regulatory arbitrage, “safety net abuse” and 
“efficient contracting”, by analysing characteristics of securitising banks and their 
capital structure. They find that securitising banks tend to maintain their capital 
adequately with the market perception of their asset risk while in excess of their 
minimum regulatory requirements. The authors find this behaviour of securitising banks 
to be more consistent with the efficient contracting rather than with the safety net abuse 
view of securitisation with implicit recourse. 
42 
 
Using data on Canadian banks for the period between 1988 and 1998, Dionne and 
Harchaoui (2003) find evidence to suggest that regulation might encourage banks to 
hold more risky assets and to securitise their lower risk assets. Supporting the results of 
Dionne and Harchaoui (2003), Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2005) find that, in 
response to regulatory capital incentives, lenders tend to retain riskier loans in their 
portfolios while selling safer loans to the secondary market. In particular, using data on 
US mortgage loans originated from 1995 and 1997 and observed through 2000, the 
authors find that securitised loans experienced lower ex-post defaults that those retained 
in banks’ portfolios.  
Contradictory evidence is found by Carey (1998); this study shows that the default 
rates on the loans kept by the originator are lower than the default rates on the loans 
sold to investors. Similarly, studies by Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010) and Mian 
and Sufi (2009) find evidence to suggest that in the last decade US banks securitised 
their worst mortgage loans.  
In conclusion, Jones (2000) suggests that regulatory capital arbitrage is not the 
only incentive to engage in securitisation and that a bank will also securitise to benefit 
from increased economies of scale, to reduce the costs of debt financing, and to 
diversify funding sources. Pavel and Phillis (1987) also find that the regulatory 
motivation is dominated by the comparative advantage in originating and servicing 
loans and by the level of sophistication of banks in their decision to sell loans. Finally, 
Bannier and Haensel (2007) and Minton, Sanders and Strahan (2004) find evidence to 
undermine the view that securitisation market is driven by regulatory arbitrage and to 
support the efficient contracting  hypothesis.  
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3.1.2.2 Earnings Management 
Karaoglu (2005) examines whether banks use securitisations to manage earnings 
using US bank holding company data for 1997-2000. He finds that banks tend to use 
gains from loan transfers to influence reported earnings. Specifically, the evidence 
suggests that banks do so by choosing which loans to securitise and by biasing the 
estimated fair vales of retained interests. In addition, the use of securitisations for 
financial statement management is found to be positively associated with the degree of 
managerial discretion in financial reporting. 
Consistently, Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) find evidence to suggest 
that managers use the discretion afforded under fair value accounting rules to manage 
reported securitisation gains. Specifically, using data for a broad range of industries and 
examining the period from 2000 to 2005, they find that firms are more likely to report 
larger securitisation gains when pre-securitisation income is low or below the level of 
the previous year. Further, Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare examine the discount rate 
used by firms to determine the fair value of the retained interests as a means of earnings 
management through securitisation. They find that the sample firms use lower discount 
rates when reporting securitisation losses compared to securitisation gains; this allows 
increasing the fair value of retained interests and thereby reducing securitisation losses. 
In addition, Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) argue that managers have incentives 
to time their securitisations in order to maximise the window-dressing benefits offered 
by the securitisation accounting rules such as reducing leverage, increasing profits, and 
improving efficiency ratios. Consistent with this view, the authors find, for a sample of 
securitisations undertaken between 1987 and 2005, that transactions occur with greater 
frequency in the last few days of each month and in the last few days of each quarter.  
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3.2 Credit Enhancements 
Other studies have analysed the motives for credit enhancements in securitisations 
and consequent implications for originators’ performance.  
3.2.1 Motives for  Credit Enhancements 
In a theoretical work, Pennacchi (1988) shows that banks’ ability to sell loans is 
constrained by a moral hazard problem that arises from the banks having less incentive 
to efficiently monitor and service loans after they have been sold; however, banks can 
mitigate this problem through an incentive-efficient loan sales contract, and, therefore, 
maximise their loan sales volume and hence profitability.  
Consistent with this view, Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) consider two possible 
features of bank loan sales which could reduce the moral hazard problem, in particular: 
(i) offering an implicit guarantee on the value of the loan, and (ii) retaining a portion of 
the loan on the bank’s balance sheet. The authors argue that in these cases a bank retains 
some of the default risk of loans and, therefore, there still remains an incentive for the 
bank to screen and monitor borrowers. The theoretical model of the study suggests that: 
(i) banks will sell larger proportions of loans if they face greater internal funding cost as 
this is the direct cost of funding the retained loans; (ii) they will retain a greater 
proportion of more risky loans as for these loans the provision of bank credit services is 
more vital and loan buyers demand higher default premium; (iii) in addition, as the 
implicit guarantee substitutes the retention of a loan fraction as a means of committing 
to efficient credit screening, the lower the quality of this guarantee, or the higher the 
bank’s insolvency probability, the greater the proportion of loans that the bank needs to 
retain. Gorton and Pennacchi test the model using a sample of over 800 US loan sales. 
The obtained empirical evidence strongly supports the model’s proposition that a bank 
will retain a greater proportion of more risky loans, those with higher equilibrium loan 
sale yield. As a whole, the evidence suggests that a loan selling bank must retain a 
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portion of loans to convince the buyers of its commitment to the credit screening of the 
borrowers.  
Further, Gorton and Souleles (2005) show, in a theoretical analysis, that an 
originator’s ability to finance off-balance sheet via the debt of an SPV critically depends 
on the implicit guarantee contract between the originator and investors. The authors 
examine this by empirically testing the hypothesis that investors incorporate the risk of 
the originator’s strength in pricing the debt of the SPV. Using a data set of credit card 
securitisation issues between 1988 and 1999, they find that the spread on the issued 
asset-backed securities does reflect the originator’s ability to provide implicit recourse 
captured by the originator’s senior unsecured bond rating. 
Finally, Fender and Mitchell (2009a) theoretically examine the power of different 
contractual mechanisms to influence an originator’s effort to screen borrowers when the 
originator plans to securitise the loans. The authors consider three potential 
mechanisms: (i) holding a “vertical slice” (i.e., share of the portfolio without 
subordinated features); (ii) holding an equity tranche of a structured transaction; and 
(iii) holding a mezzanine tranche. The results suggest that the screening effort 
associated with the contractual mechanisms depends on the realisation of a systematic 
factor. In particular, the equity tranche can be dominated by either a vertical slice or a 
mezzanine tranche if the probability of a downturn is likely and if the equity tranche is 
likely to be exhausted in a downturn. A vertical slice may dominate either the equity 
tranche or the mezzanine tranche; however, it is unlikely that a vertical slice will 
dominate both of these alternatives unless the vertical slice is very thick. Fender and 
Mitchell also note that if the choice of the magnitude and the form of retained interests 
is left to the originator, the retention mechanism chosen may well lead to suboptimal 
screening effort. 
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3.2.2 Implications of Credit Enhancements 
It is argued in Standard and Poor's (2001) that if an originating firm retains a 
subordinated piece of a securitisation or a level of recourse close to the expected level 
of loss, essentially all of the economic risk remains with the firm.  
Wolfe (2004)  particularly highlights the importance of an equity tranche, referred 
to as “equity toxic waste”, due to the fact that all the default risk of the issue is absorbed 
by this tranche, and emphasises the need to ensure that banks treat the equity tranche in 
compliance with regulatory requirements and truly transfer credit risk when disposing 
of this unrated component of the transaction. Using a sample of 103 US credit card bank 
observations for years 1996 and 2000, Calomiris and Mason (2004) find that in credit 
card securitisations risk remains with securitising banks as a result of provided implicit 
guarantees. 
Further, Niu and Richardson (2006) find evidence consistent with the perception 
that originating banks retain most of the risk related to the transfer of assets. In 
particular, they examine 535 securitisation disclosures of US originators from 1997 to 
2003 and show that off-balance sheet debt related to securitisation has, on average, the 
same risk-relevance for explaining market measures of risk as on-balance sheet debt. 
This evidence supports the view that securitisations present, in substance, secured 
borrowings rather than sales and suggests that investors view off-balance sheet 
liabilities to be equivalent to the on-balance sheet leverage. Niu and Richardson also 
show the economically significant differences in leverage ratios arising from the sale 
accounting treatment of securitisations as opposed to secured borrowing treatment. 
Specifically, they find that the average outstanding amount of transferred receivables 
minus the related credit enhancements (retained interests) is about 4.3 times the market 
value of equity of the transferors. In other words, for their sample, the mean debt-to-
equity ratio of 5.9 reported using sale accounting would have increased to 10.2 had the 
47 
 
transferors accounted for the transfers as secured borrowing. They also find that the 
association between securitisation gains and stock returns is lower for firms with a 
greater off-balance sheet securitisation volume; this suggests that investors assign lower 
valuation to securitisation-related earnings for firms with a higher perceived level of 
off-balance sheet risk. 
 Consistent evidence is found in Landsman, Peasnell and Shakespeare (2006). 
Examining securitisation disclosures of 112 US firms over the 2000-2004 period, the 
authors find that the market views the SPV’s assets and liabilities as belonging to the 
originator. The study also examines whether the amount of interest retained in 
securitisation transactions affects the market’s perception of the degree to which risk 
has been transferred to the SPV. The results show that the market does view 
securitisation transactions by originating firms with relatively high and low amounts of 
retained interest differently. In particular, whereas the market views asset securitisations 
with low retained interest as sales (i.e., risk transfer has taken place), asset 
securitisations with high retained interest are viewed as secured borrowings (i.e., risk 
transfer is incomplete). 
Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008) examine characteristics of loan securitisations that 
determine the extent to which banks retain the risks of the off-balance sheet securitised 
loans. Using US bank holding company data for 2001-2006 in a risk-association 
analysis, the authors find that banks retain more risk in connection to securitised assets 
when: (i) the types of loans have larger and/or less externally verifiable credit risk; (ii) 
the loans are closed-ended and banks retain larger contractual interest in the loans; and 
(iii) the loans are closed-ended and banks retain types of contractual interests that more 
strongly concentrate the risk of the securitised loans.  
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Further, Standard and Poor's (2001) discusses the implicit or “moral” recourse, 
defining it as a moral obligation of the originator to support a troubled securitisation 
without legal requirement to do so, and argues that institutions that depend on 
securitisation as a funding source may be especially prone to providing this form of 
support.  
Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008) find that banks have more incentive and ability to 
provide implicit recourse in revolving loan securitisations, such as credit card 
securitisations; the magnitude and type of retained contractual interests in these 
securitisations are found to be not risk-relevant. Similarly, Higgins and Mason (2004) 
highlight the importance of implicit recourse in credit card securitisations; the authors 
argue that providing implicit recourse in credit card securitisations allows banks to 
maintain their reputation for consistent credit quality over repeated securitisations while 
still taking advantage of removing assets off the balance sheet. Consistent with this 
view, Gorton and Souleles (2005) find that implicit recourse exists for the entire amount 
of transferred assets, especially for frequent securitisers concerned about their 
reputation with investors.  
Vermilyea, Webb and Kish (2008) are first to develop a model of implicit 
recourse in securitisations. The model is based on the assumption that fraud losses on 
securitised assets are generally incurred by the originating bank, while credit losses are 
potentially borne by the owner of the securitised assets, that is, by the SPV and thus 
potentially by the ABS investors. Testing the model on US commercial bank data for 
2001-2006, the authors find that banks that securitise credit card receivables are more 
likely to claim fraud losses and that banks with poorly performing securitisation 
portfolios are more likely to claim fraud.  
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Beneficial effects of implicit recourse are found in Higgins and Mason (2004). 
The study investigates the effects of the recourse to the originator by examining 
originators’ short and long-term stock returns, long-term operating performance, and 
subsequent terms of securitisation using credit card securitisation data for 17 discrete 
recourse events that took place during the 1990s. The results suggest that recourse to 
securitised debt may benefit short- and long-term stock returns and long-term operating 
performance of originators. However, it appears that originators may face abnormal 
post-recourse delays before returning to the securitisation market, which the authors 
find to be similar to the commercial paper market. 
3.3 Lending Behaviour  
Other studies have analysed the impact of securitisation on bank lending 
behaviour in terms of risk taking and credit supply. 
3.3.1 Risk Taking 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) suggest that banks use the risk reduction achieved 
through securitisation to engage in more profitable, but higher risk activities and to 
operate with greater financial leverage. The authors conclude that the benefit of 
advances in risk management in banking may be greater credit availability rather than 
reduced risk in the banking system. 
Consistently, Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2009) find that banks’ increased 
ability to securitise loans appears to have affected lending standards. Using US 
individual mortgage loan application data for  the period from 2000 to 2006, the authors  
find that in geographical areas with a greater proportion of originated loans being sold 
within one year from origination denial rates are lower. The evidence suggests that, 
during the period from 2000 to 2003, this effect is more pronounced for the prime 
mortgage market than the subprime market; however, during the period from 2004 to 
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2006, when securitisation of subprime loans increased dramatically, the effect becomes 
more pronounced for the subprime mortgage market. Securitisation also appears to have 
favoured the expansion of overall credit with a positive and significant effect of 
securitisation rates at the geographical level on the loan-to-income ratio of originated 
loans. This evidence partially supports the view that securitisation provides lenders with 
incentives to extend riskier loans. 
Consistent evidence is found by Panetta and Pozzolo (2010). Using a sample of 
12,830 banks from 140 countries that originated issues of asset-backed securities, 
mortgage-backed securities, collateralised loan obligations, or collateralised debt 
obligations in the period between 1991 and 2007, the study finds evidence to suggest 
that banks securitise to modify their asset portfolios, taking up riskier profit 
opportunities. 
Purnanandam (2009) finds that, during the period from 2006 to 2008, US banks 
used the proceeds from securitisations to issue loans with higher than average default 
risk. The evidence shows that banks that participated in the originate-to-distribute 
mortgage market to a larger extent before the 2007 subprime crisis had significantly 
higher mortgage charge-offs after the crisis. The author concludes that the lack of 
screening incentives coupled with leverage-induced risk-taking behaviour significantly 
contributed to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
3.3.2 Credit Supply 
Goderis, Marsh, Vall Castello and Wagner (2006) find evidence to suggest that 
engagement in securitisation significantly increases banks’ loan supply. Using data on 
161 collateralised loan obligations issued by 64 banks between 1995 and 2004, they 
find that banks that adopt advanced credit risk management techniques experience a 
permanent increase in their target loan levels of around 50 per cent. The authors note 
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that equity capital would have to increase by around 60 per cent to have a similar impact 
on the target loan levels. 
Hirtle (2008) also finds that greater use of credit risk transfer (CRT) techniques is 
associated with an increase in bank credit supply; however the author suggests that the 
impact of the growth of CRT might be narrow and primarily affect the terms of lending 
rather than the volume. In particular, using a data set of commercial and industrial loans 
originated by a sample of US commercial banks between 1997 and 2006, he finds 
evidence that as banks obtain additional credit risk protection through credit derivatives, 
they increase the supply of large term loans (newly negotiated loans to large corporate 
borrowers); however not for previously negotiated commitment lending.  
Using US commercial bank data for 1976-2003,  Loutskina (2005) also finds 
evidence to suggest that, by providing banks with an additional source of funding, 
securitisation increases banks’ willingness to supply loans across sectors; in particular, 
banks’ ability to securitise liquid mortgages tends to increase their willingness to supply 
illiquid business loans. The evidence also indicates that securitisation makes bank 
lending less sensitive to cost of fund shocks and, therefore, weakens the link from the 
monetary policy to bank lending. 
Using European securitisation data for 1999-2005, Altunbas, Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2009) also find that securitisation has strengthened the capacity of 
banks to supply new loans by providing banks with a source of additional funding and 
capital relief;  however, this capacity is found to change over time and to depend on the 
business cycles and the banks’ risk position. Consistent with Loutskina (2005), 
Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez suggest that asset securitisation reduces the 
efficacy of monetary policy via the bank lending channel.  
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Finally, a study by Loutskina and Strahan (2006) shows that securitisation reduces 
the impact of bank financial condition on credit supply. Using data on US mortgage 
applications and originations from 1992 to 2003, the authors find that low-cost funding 
and increased balance-sheet liquidity from securitisation raise banks’ willingness to 
approve hard-to-sell mortgage loan applications (the so called jumbo mortgages), while 
having no impact on their willingness to approve easy-to-sell mortgages. Consistent 
with Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2009) and Loutskina (2005), 
Loutskina and Strahan (2006) conclude that, by extension, securitisation has weakened 
the link from bank funding conditions to credit supply in aggregate, thereby mitigating 
the real effects of monetary policy. 
3.4 Summary of the Liter ature and Motivation for the Research 
To summarise, previous research provides evidence that securitisations are 
undertaken to provide economic benefits. Specifically, it has been shown that by using 
securitisation a bank may be able to diversify its portfolio, to focus on activities of its 
comparative advantage, to raise funding, and to reduce funding costs, to better manage 
credit risk, and to improve performance. However, it has also been shown that in 
practice securitisation might have adverse implications for bank performance through a 
number of indirect channels, and these may include: (i) quality of assets securitised and 
of those retained on the balance sheet, which in turn might be driven by the regulatory 
capital arbitrage and earnings management motives; (ii) credit enhancement, which 
might result in the bank retaining significant interests in the securitised asset pool; and 
(iii) post-securitisation lending behaviour in terms of both risk taking and the volume of 
credit supply. Therefore, the previous research suggests that the net impact of 
securitisation might be ambiguous. 
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This research provides further insights into banks’ securitisation activities and 
makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature on securitisation by addressing 
issues that have not been studied previously. Specifically, the first essay attempts to 
assess whether banks improve their performance in terms of the cost of funding, credit 
risk, and profitability through the use of the securitisation market. The second essay 
attempts to answer the following question: if banks retain significant exposure to the 
securitised assets through contractual and/or non-contractual arrangements, does the 
outstanding securitisation representing this exposure affect the credit-risk taking 
behaviour of the banks? Finally, the third essay attempts to empirically examine the 
relationship between banks’ off-balance sheet securitisation activities and insolvency 
risk analysing different forms of credit enhancement and liquidity support provided by 
the banks to their own and third-party securitisation structures. 
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4 ESSAY I: SECURITISATION AND BANK PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
In theory, the benefits of accessing the securitisation market from the originating 
bank’s perspective can be substantial. By using securitisation, a bank may be able to: (i) 
lower its cost of funding; (ii) improve risk management; and (iii) increase profitability. 
However, the key to the realisation of these potential benefits of securitisation lies in the 
quality of the underlying receivables, which in turn is directly related to the 
underwriting and credit risk management employed. Therefore, in practice securitisation 
might have both positive and adverse implications for bank performance. 
Specifically, for the cost of funding, securitisation allows banks to borrow funds 
from capital markets at a lower cost as the securities issued via an SPV can have a 
higher credit rating than that of the originator. This stems from the fact that the credit 
rating assigned to these securities by a rating agency is independent of the credit risk of 
the originating bank and is based on the expected performance of the underlying asset 
pool and provided credit enhancements (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988). Further, having 
established itself in the securitisation market, a bank has a broader choice of funding 
sources and can choose the best option based on the all-in-cost comparison (OCC, 
1997). However, poorly performing receivables may hinder the bank’s access to the 
market, require higher credit risk enhancements to achieve investment grade ratings 
and, therefore, considerably increase the cost of this funding source. Plus, continuing 
reliance on securitisations for raising funds may result in a bank outgrowing other 
funding alternatives, such as traditional borrowing facilities, and, therefore, present 
significant liquidity issues if this funding source becomes unavailable (FDIC, 2007). 
Further, securitisation allows banks to reduce credit exposure by transferring the 
unexpected portion of the default risk to credit enhancers and outside investors (OCC, 
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1997; Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988).10 However, management’s incentive to ensure the 
performance of the securitised pool may result in “cherry-picking”11
Therefore, the net impact of securitisation remains ambiguous and needs to be 
investigated empirically. Using US commercial banking data from 2001 to 2008, in this 
study we attempt to assess whether individual banks improve their performance in terms 
of cost of funding, credit risk, and profitability through the use of the securitisation 
market. We estimate the causal effect of securitisation on bank performance by applying 
a propensity score matching approach, which allows us to build the counterfactual and 
 when designing the 
securitisation transaction or providing implicit recourse during the lifetime of the 
structure (Gorton and Souleles, 2005; Higgins and Mason, 2004; Vermilyea, Webb and 
Kish, 2008). Securitisation may also trigger lax origination and monitoring processes 
(Diamond, 1984; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig, 2010). 
This could eventually lead to a lower quality balance sheet and higher default rates on 
loans in future. 
Finally, securitisation enables banks to increase profitability through a number of 
channels including a better choice of funding sources and risk management discussed 
above. Further, in terms of operating choices, securitisation allows a bank to outsource, 
on an ongoing basis, activities of comparative disadvantage, e.g., funding, while 
maintaining activities of comparative advantage, e.g., origination and possibly servicing 
(Karaoglu, 2005; Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera, 1996; Pavel and Phillis, 1987). 
Plus, retaining the servicing function on the transferred assets allows the originating 
bank to enhance fee income (FDIC, 2007). Furthermore, the additional capital released 
through securitisation can be used by a bank for expansion purposes or to retire existing 
debt, which in turn might increase earnings (OCC, 1997). 
                                                 
10 The expected losses of the portfolio absorbed by the equity tranche are typically borne by the 
originator. 
11
 Selecting receivables of higher or the highest quality for securitisation. 
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evaluate the performance of securitising banks had they not securitised. Specifically, we 
look at the change in the performance of first-time securitisers to capture the effect of 
securitisation. If securitisation has a positive impact on bank performance, this should 
improve once banks start to securitise. 
This study makes two main contributions to the empirical literature on 
securitisation. First, we examine the impact of accessing the securitisation market on 
banks’ performance in terms of the cost of funding, risk, and overall profitability. 
Second, we attempt to gauge the impact of securitisation on bank performance by 
comparing securitising banks with non-securitising banks using a propensity score 
matching approach.  To our knowledge, this methodology has not been employed in the 
past in this context.  Additionally, we conduct this analysis using a comprehensive and 
updated data set that includes the latest available data on US commercial banks.  
The results of the univariate analysis first show that securitising banks tend to be 
more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure, and a higher cost of 
funding than non-securitising banks. However, the propensity score matching analysis 
does not provide evidence to suggest that securitisation had a beneficial impact upon 
bank performance.  We find instead that, for non-securitising banks that have similar ex-
ante characteristics to securitising banks, alternative forms of funding and the use of 
other profit-enhancing techniques had a similar impact upon performance.  Therefore 
the results presented in this study show that, as well as leading to an increase in 
systemic risk, securitisation seems not to have improved the performance of individual 
banks compared to adequately matched non-securitising banks in the lead up to the 
crisis; rather it allowed the banks to maintain their risky and more profitable activities. 
The rest of this essay is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses 
methodological issues in estimating the effects of securitisation on bank performance 
and describes the design of the study used to address these issues; Section 4.3 provides 
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theoretical background to the propensity score matching approach employed for the 
analysis; Section 4.4 presents the data and preliminary univariate analysis; Section 4.5 
presents the practical implementation of the propensity score matching approach; 
Section 4.6 presents the results of the propensity score matching analysis; finally, 
Section 4.7 discusses the findings and concludes the essay. 
4.2 Methodological Issues in Estimating Secur itisation Effects  
The analysis of the effects of securitisation on bank performance involves several 
methodological issues. First, comparing securitising banks with non-securitisers might 
yield biased estimates of the securitisation effect if the difference in performance comes 
from other observable or unobservable characteristics of the banks, rather than the 
securitisation status. Therefore, if securitisers are found to perform better, on average, 
than non-securitisers, the difference may be due to the effect of having accessed the 
securitisation market or due to differences in bank characteristics prior to securitisation.  
Second, considering securitising banks only eliminates the possibility of a hypothetical 
benchmark, that is, the performance that banks would have had had they not securitised. 
Furthermore, the observed change in performance might be due to unobservable shocks 
affecting all banks equally. 
In this study, we focus on first-time securitisers in an attempt to assess the 
securitisation effect on bank performance. To understand the logic underlying the 
analysis conducted in this paper, consider the following three types of banks:  
(i) “securitisers”, i.e., banks that have at least one securitisation transaction 
conducted at the beginning of the observation period;  
(ii) “non-securitisers”, i.e., banks that never engage in securitisation throughout 
the period; and  
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(iii) “first-time securitisers”, i.e., banks that switch from non-securitisers into 
securitisers at time t by conducting their first securitisation transaction.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the theoretical trajectories of average performances of the 
three types of banks and their relative positions. Recall that the proponents of 
securitisation argue that, when used properly, it should allow banks to improve their 
performance through a number of channels as discussed earlier. Therefore, the 
securitising banks are assumed to perform better than the non-securitising banks. This is 
reflected in the figure by drawing the performance trajectory of securitisers above the 
performance trajectory of non-securitisers. However, as noted above, this could be 
because securitisers were better performers prior to securitisation and/or the 
consequence of using the securitisation market.  
Looking at first-time securitisers might help to capture the securitisation effect. In 
particular, if securitisation has a positive impact on bank performance, the latter should 
improve once these banks start to securitise. As shown in Figure 4.1, the performance 
trajectory of the first-time securitisers should become steeper and closer to the one of 
the securitisers after time t.  
To test this hypothesis empirically, we need to know what would have happened 
to the performance of the first-time securitisers had they not securitised. As it is 
impossible to observe the same bank in both states, we need to find an appropriate 
proxy for the counterfactual performance of first-time securitisers. Referring to Figure 
1.1, we need to find a proxy for the dotted lines. 
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Figure 4.1 Performance Trajector ies 
 
Average 
Performance 
t+1 t-1 t 
Securitisers 
Non-Securitisers 
First-Time Securitisers A 
First-Time Securitisers B 
Benchmark: 
Hypothetical 
trajectory if first-
time securitisers 
had not securitised 
Note: The graph illustrates theoretical trajectories of average performances for: (i) securitisers, i.e., banks 
that have at least one securitisation transaction conducted at the beginning of the observation period (t-1); 
(ii) non-securitisers, i.e., banks that never engage in securitisation throughout the period (from t-1 to t+1); 
and (iii) first-time securitisers, banks that switch from non-securitisers into securitisers by conducting 
their first securitisation transaction at time t. The first-time securitisers consist of First-Time Securitisers 
A and First-Time Securitisers B, which are better and worse performers, respectively, compared to non-
securitisers at time t-1.  
Good candidates for the counterfactual are the non-securitising banks. The 
trajectory of the non-securitisers after time t could be considered as a proxy for the 
dotted lines.  However, this comparison would still entail a selection problem (Heckman 
and Smith, 1995) - first-time securitisers might be ex-ante different from those that 
never access the securitisation market. These banks might be either better or worse 
performers at time t-1 compared to non-securitisers, which is reflected by the 
trajectories “First-Time Securitisers A” and “First-Time Securitisers B”, accordingly. 
To overcome this issue and estimate the securitisation effect, the ex-post 
performance of first-time securitisers (time t+1) should be compared with that of non-
securitisers that are ex-ante as similar as possible to the former. This implies building a 
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control group from the non-securitisers whose trajectory of the ex-ante performance lies 
as close as possible to that of the first-time securitisers (time t-1). To carry out this 
analysis, we apply a propensity score matching approach.  
4.3 Propensity Score Matching Approach 
Matching has become a popular non-parametric approach for estimating causal 
effects and it is widely used in policy impact analysis. It is however relatively new to 
the finance literature: there are applications of the method to seasoned equity offerings 
in Cheng (2003), diversification in Villalonga (2004), and foreign investment in Girma, 
Gorg and Wagner (2009) and Navaretti and Castellani (2004).  
The idea and methodology of matching can be applied in any evaluation study 
where it is possible to identify: (i) a treatment; (ii) a group of treated individuals; and 
(iii) a group of untreated individuals (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In this study, we 
apply propensity score matching (PSM) to gauge the causal effect of securitisation on 
bank performance with the first securitisation considered as the treatment, the first-time 
securitisers as the group of treated units, and the non-securitisers as the group of 
untreated units.12
To estimate the effect of securitisation, we need to know what would have 
happened to the performance of securitising banks had they not securitised. To do so, let 
S be a variable indicating securitisation activity and taking a value equal to one if bank i 
conducts a securitisation transaction for the first time in period t (time interval between 
t-1 and t). Let 
 
1
1, +∆ tiy  be the performance gain achieved by bank i at time t+1 after 
having securitised assets in period t and 0 1, +∆ tiy  be the hypothetical performance gain of 
                                                 
12
 The terms “cause” and “treatment” can be used interchangeably. In the context of our study, the first 
securitisation is the cause or treatment while the effect of the first securitisation is considered as the 
causal or treatment effect. 
61 
 
the same bank i at the same time t+1 had it not securitised assets in period t (where 
, 1 , 1 , 1i t i t i ty y y+ + −∆ = − ).   
Therefore, the effect of securitisation on the performance of bank i, known in the 
evaluation literature as the average treatment effect on the treated, can be expressed as 
follows: 
)1|()1|( 0 1,1 1, =∆−=∆= ++∧ SyESyE titiα
 
(4.1)               
In equation (4.1), )1|( 0 1, =∆ + SyE ti , which represents the counterfactual mean or 
the hypothetical performance gain of a first-time securitiser had it not securitised, is 
unobservable. This constitutes the fundamental problem of causal inference in 
evaluation studies (Holland, 1986).   
To overcome this problem, we need to find a proxy for the counterfactual mean
)1|( 0 1, =∆ + SyE ti . Using the mean outcome for non-securitisers 0, 1( | 0)i tE y S+∆ =
 
as a 
proxy for the counterfactual mean, equation (4.1) becomes: 
1 0
, 1 , 1( | 1) ( | 0 )i t i tE y S E y Sα∧ + +=∆ =− ∆ =     
(4.2) 
Unless 0 0
, 1 , 1( | 1) ( | 0 )i t i tE y S E y S+ +∆ ==∆ = , equation (4.2) is a biased estimator of 
equation (4.1) as it would yield estimates of the securitisation effect plus selection bias 
(Heckman and Smith, 1995). Here the selection bias stems from the unit heterogeneity, 
or the fact that first-time securitisers and non-securitisers might be systematically 
different prior to the securitisation period t (that is, at time t-1).  
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In experimental studies the selection problem is dealt with by random assignment 
of treatment; this ensures that every individual has the same ex-ante chance of receiving 
treatment (Ravallion, 2003). In non-experimental studies the selection problem is of 
paramount concern as there is no direct estimate of the counterfactual mean analogous 
to the one based on randomisation (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005).  
 In general, there are three broad classes of estimators that allow reducing and 
possibly eliminating the selection bias in estimation of average treatment effects in a 
non-experimental context: (i) instrumental variables estimator; (ii) Heckman's (1979) 
two-stage estimator; and (iii) matching estimator.  
The instrumental variables method requires the existence of at least one 
instrumental variable satisfying the following requirements: (i) it determines the 
treatment; and (ii) it is unrelated to unobserved heterogeneity. A number of studies have 
applied the instrumental variables estimator in the securitisation context with bank size 
commonly used as an instrument for securitisation decision (e.g., Jiangli and Pritsker, 
2008). However, the instrument choice might create a potential issue with the 
application of the instrumental variables method. Specifically, in the treatment 
evaluation problem, it might be difficult to find a variable that satisfies the two 
requirements above (Blundell and Dias, 2000). 
 The Heckman selection estimator is a two-step method that uses an explicit model 
of the selection process to control for the part of the participation decision that is related 
with the error term in the outcome equation. It relies on exclusion restrictions for the 
identification of the average treatment effect. That is, the main assumption is the 
existence of at least one additional regressor in the treatment decision model that is 
related to the treatment decision and independent of unobserved heterogeneity. Panetta 
and Pozzolo (2010) have applied the two-stage Heckman procedure to control for the 
selection bias in estimation of securitisation effects. The Heckman selection estimator is 
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more robust than the IV estimator; however it is more demanding on the assumptions 
about the structure of the model (Blundell and Dias, 2000).  
Finally, the matching method is a non-parametric approach to identifying the effect 
of the treatment on the outcome. The main idea behind the matching approach is to find 
a control group that is similar to the treatment group in all respects except with respect 
to the exposure to the treatment (Ravallion, 2003). It is more general as it assumes no 
particular specification and eliminates the selection bias by assuming that treatment 
assignment is a function of observable variables only. Thus, conditional on the observed 
variables, assignment can be taken to be random and the unconditional effect can be 
estimated as the expectation of the conditional effects over the distribution of the 
conditioning covariates in the treated group (Villalonga, 2004). 
The matching method has not been employed in the securitisation context in the 
past. Applying this approach to the case of securitisation, we build the control group 
from non-securitisers that are similar to the first-time securitisers in all relevant pre-
securitisation characteristics. 
Therefore, the effect of securitisation could be presented as: 
),0|(),1|( 1,0 1,1,1 1, −+−+∧ =∆−=∆= titititi XSyEXSyEα
         
(4.3)           
where ),1|( 1,1 1, −+ =∆ titi XSyE
 
is the mean performance gain of the first-time securitisers at 
time t+1 after securitising in period t; ),0|( 1,0 1, −+ =∆ titi XSyE
 
is the mean performance 
gain of the control group at the same time t+1; and 
, 1i tX −  is a vector of observed 
conditioning covariates. 
The implementation of the matching approach may be complicated when the set 
of conditioning covariates X  is large. However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest 
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that dimensionality can be significantly reduced by using a propensity score, or the 
probability of receiving the treatment conditional on the relevant pre-treatment 
covariates.  
Using the propensity score, the equation for the average securitisation effect 
becomes: 
))(,0|())(,1|( 1,0 1,1,1 1, −+−+∧ =∆−=∆= titititi XpSyEXpSyEα
  
(4.4) 
where p  is a propensity score conditional on 
, 1i tX − .  
In other words, the average securitisation effect is estimated as the difference 
between the mean performance gain of the first-time securitisers after their first 
securitisation and that of the banks that had ex-ante similar likelihood of securitising but 
did not. 
For consistent estimates of the securitisation effect, two key assumptions must 
hold: first, the conditional independence assumption and, second, the overlap 
assumption.  The conditional independence assumption requires the mean outcomes to 
be independent of the treatment after conditioning on a set of observable covariates 
(Smith and Todd, 2005) and can be formally stated as13
0 1
, 1 , 1 , 1( , ) |i t i t i ty y S X+ + −∆ ∆ ⊥
: 
, or 
0 1
, 1 , 1 , 1( , ) | ( )i t i t i ty y S p X+ + −∆ ∆ ⊥  
(4.5) 
In other words, it assumes that there are no unobservable differences between 
first-time securitisers and non-securitisers after conditioning on 
, 1i tX − , so that any 
systematic differences in outcomes can be attributed to the securitisation effect.   
                                                 
13
 Symbol ⊥ stands for orthogonality between two variables. 
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This is a strong assumption as there may be systematic differences between the 
first-time securitisers and non-securitisers outcomes, even after conditioning on the 
observables. Such discrepancies may arise, for example, because of differences in 
performance across geographical markets the first-time securitisers and non-securitisers 
operate in. However, in this study we estimate the securitisation effect on the change in 
the performance of banks measured as the difference in outcomes before and after 
securitisation (∆ InterestExpense/Liabilities, ∆NPL, and ∆ROA). This is known as a 
difference-in-difference or double-difference matching strategy, where the first 
difference removes the unobserved heterogeneity and restores conditional independence 
and the second produces the impact estimate (Essama-Nssah, 2006; Smith and Todd, 
2005). As suggested by Smith and Todd (2005), the difference-in-difference matching 
estimator is the most robust. 
The overlap, or common support, assumption requires an overlap in the 
distribution of covariates between the treated units and the control group members to 
make matching possible and can be formally stated as: 
1)|1Pr(0 1, <=< −tiXS
   
(4.6) 
This assumption imposes a positive probability of either securitising (S=1) or not 
securitising (S=0) to ensure the existence of potential matches for each first-time 
securitiser among non-securitisers. 
When the conditional independence and overlap assumptions are satisfied, the 
mean outcome observed for the matched non-participant group can be substituted for 
the missing counterfactual mean for the participants (Smith and Todd, 2005). In other 
words, if the two assumptions hold, we can use the mean outcome for the matched non-
securitisers as a proxy for the performance gain that the first-time securitisers would 
have had had they not securitised (that is, )1|( 0 1, =∆ + SyE ti  in equation (4.1)). 
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4.4 Data and Preliminary Univar iate Analysis 
The data used in the empirical analysis of this essay are obtained from the Federal 
Reserve’s Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) that are filed by insured 
commercial banks on a quarterly basis and contain a complete balance sheet, income 
statement, and detailed supporting schedules, including a schedule of off-balance sheet 
items. Starting from June 2001, US banks are required to provide detailed information 
on securitisation activities in their regulatory forms. Therefore, we use Call Reports 
from 2001:Q2 to the latest available of 2008:Q4 and average the data on a yearly basis 
to build the final data set of annual observations; the securitisation status of a bank is 
based on the quarterly data. The final data set contains 65,696 bank-years from 9,748 
banks during 2001-2008.  
As a preliminary step to the propensity score matching analysis (which is based 
on sub-samples of first-time securitisers and non-securitisers, as described above), we 
begin with a cross-sectional analysis of the full sample and compare the characteristics 
of banks that securitise with those that do not securitise. In this part, the first-time 
securitisers are included in the group of securitisers as we analyse the differences 
between banks that never securitise and those that securitise at least once throughout the 
sample period.  
Table 4.1 presents the results of these comparisons and reports the means and 
standard deviations for the full sample.14 There are 9,748 banks in the sample, of which 
9,290 are non-securitisers and 458 are securitisers. Despite the significantly smaller 
percentage (4.7 % of the sample), securitisers account for nearly 68% of the sample 
total assets.15
                                                 
14
 Details on the construction of the variables are provided in 
   
Appendix A. 
15
 Calculated as the sum of the cross-sectional mean total assets of securitising banks over the sum of the 
cross-sectional mean total assets of all sample banks. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for all Sample Banks and Univar iate Tests of 
Differences in Character istics between Secur itisers and Non-Secur itisers 
 All Banks Non-Secur itisers Secur itisers Diff in Means  
Var iable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev (abs)  (% ) p-values 
 
         Balance Sheet Structure          
Total Assets ($ billions) 1.1100 17.3223 0.3731 1.9786 16.0572 78.0081 15.6841 4203.73% 0.0000 
Liquidity Ratio 0.2676 0.1421 0.2687 0.1426 0.2459 0.1302 -0.0228 -8.49% 0.0003 
Loan Ratio 0.6339 0.1520 0.6330 0.1521 0.6517 0.1495 0.0187 2.95% 0.0093 
Deposits/Assets Ratio 0.8023 0.1173 0.8056 0.1130 0.7341 0.1709 -0.0715 -8.88% 0.0000 
Equity/Assets Ratio 0.1280 0.0904 0.1288 0.0915 0.1116 0.0625 -0.0172 -13.35% 0.0000 
 
         Loan Por tfolio          
Real Estate Loan ratio 0.6556 0.1971 0.6569 0.1938 0.6284 0.2544 -0.0285 -4.34% 0.0184 
C&I Loan Ratio 0.2275 0.1594 0.2292 0.1595 0.1943 0.1548 -0.0349 -15.23% 0.0000 
Consumer Loan Ratio 0.0969 0.1147 0.0948 0.1068 0.1388 0.2165 0.0440 46.41% 0.0000 
Other Loan Ratio 0.0200 0.0650 0.0191 0.0637 0.0385 0.0855 0.0194 101.57% 0.0000 
Loan HHI 0.5834 0.1555 0.5821 0.1537 0.6083 0.1873 0.0262 4.50% 0.0034 
          Regulatory Capital          
Tier I Leverage Ratio 0.1375 0.1883 0.1391 0.1921 0.1055 0.0685 -0.0336 -24.16% 0.0000 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital 
Ratio 
0.2103 0.3218 0.2137 0.3286 0.1429 0.0930 -0.0708 -33.13% 0.0000 
Total Risk-Based Capital 
Ratio 
0.2217 0.3211 0.2249 0.3279 0.1578 0.0910 -0.0671 -29.84% 0.0000 
 
         Cost of Funding          
Interest Expense/ 
Liabilities 
0.0159 0.0109 0.0159 0.0112 0.0165 0.0043 0.0006 3.77% 0.0033 
 
         Risk Character istics          
NPL Ratio 0.0108 0.0171 0.0107 0.0174 0.0112 0.0095 0.0005 4.67% 0.3468 
RWATA Ratio 0.6851 0.1413 0.6819 0.1287 0.7503 0.2914 0.0684 10.03% 0.0000 
Charge-Off Ratio 0.0055 0.2398 0.0029 0.0291 0.0566 1.0985 0.0537 1851.72% 0.2967 
Loan Loss Allowance 
Ratio 
0.0146 0.0132 0.0146 0.0129 0.0162 0.0173 0.0016 10.96% 0.0502 
Loan Loss Provision 
Ratio 
0.0052 0.2262 0.0028 0.0220 0.0537 1.0389 0.0509 1817.86% 0.2948 
 
         Operating Perfor mance          
Return on Assets 0.0041 0.0123 0.0039 0.0123 0.0071 0.0116 0.0032 82.05% 0.0000 
Return on Equity 0.0683 1.2898 0.0684 1.3211 0.0663 0.0701 -0.0021 -3.07% 0.8814 
Net Interest Margin 0.0229 0.0067 0.0229 0.0065 0.0233 0.0105 0.0004 1.75% 0.3938 
Interest Income/  
Net Operating Revenue 
0.8363 0.1211 0.8414 0.1088 0.7324 0.2464 -0.1090 -12.95% 0.0000 
Noninterest Income/ 
Net Operating Revenue 
0.1637 0.1211 0.1586 0.1088 0.2676 0.2464 0.1090 68.73% 0.0000 
Revenue HHI 0.7768 0.9089 0.7784 0.9043 0.7442 0.9974 -0.0342 -4.39% 0.4724 
          
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for: (i) all sample banks (9748 banks); (ii) non-securitisers (9290 
banks); and (iii) securitisers (458 banks). Mean and Std Dev stand for the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation 
values of the individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. The last three columns report the comparison 
analysis of bank-specific characteristics between securitisers and non-securitisers (the former include the first-time 
securitisers). Diff in Means is calculated as the difference between securitisers’ and non-securitisers’ means, in 
absolute and percentage values, with the p-values of the tests on the equality of means reported in the last column. 
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The first panel of Table 4.1 shows the balance sheet structure of the banks in our 
sample – total assets, liquidity ratio, loan ratio, deposit ratio, and equity capital. The 
most significant difference is bank size, with the mean value of total assets for 
securitisers ($16.1 billion) being approximately 42 times larger than that for non-
securitisers ($0.4 billion). This finding is consistent with previous research that 
documents that larger banks are more likely to securitise (Bannier and Haensel, 2007; 
Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008; Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007; Minton, Sanders and 
Strahan, 2004; Minton, Stulz and Williamson, 2008; Uzun and Webb, 2007). Further, 
securitisers tend to hold less liquid assets (25% versus 27% of total assets), which is 
consistent with them having better access to external funding and thus needing a smaller 
liquidity buffer compared to non-securitisers. The loan ratio is higher for securitisers 
with the mean value of 65% versus 63% for non-securitisers. 
We turn next to the liability side of the balance sheet. Both securitisers and non-
securitisers are mainly financed by deposits; however non-securitisers rely on this 
source of funding to a larger extent (81% of total assets versus 73% for securitisers). 
Further, 13% of total assets are funded by equity capital in the case of non-securitisers, 
while only 11% for securitisers. 
The second panel of Table 4.1 contains information on banks’ loan portfolio. The 
securitisers’ loan portfolio is different in terms of both concentration and composition. 
In particular, it tends to be more concentrated, as indicated by the mean value of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 0.61 versus 0.58 for non-securitisers, with real 
estate loans constituting more than 60% of total loans in both samples. Despite the 
similar relative distribution, there are differences in terms of the loan share values 
between securitisers and non-securitisers. Specifically, securitisers tend to hold less real 
estate (63% versus 66%)16
                                                 
16 Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) find similar evidence using US bank holding company data. 
 and commercial and industrial loans (19% versus 23%) and 
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more consumer loans (14% versus 10%) and other loans (4% versus 2%) on the balance 
sheet. 
Comparing the regulatory capital, we see that securitisers have significantly less 
capital, on the risk-adjusted basis, than non-securitisers; nonetheless, they are 
overcapitalised in terms of regulatory requirements. For example, the mean total risk-
based capital ratio for securitisers is 16% compared with 23% for non-securitisers. 
Securitisers also have lower Tier 1 leverage ratio than non-securitisers (11% versus 
14%).17
The last three panels in 
 This finding is consistent with Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) who find that 
banks that sell loans hold less capital. Similarly, Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) 
find evidence that risk-adjusted capital ratios are lower for the net buyers of credit 
protection.  
Table 4.1 are of a particular interest for this study as they 
include the performance indicators that we consider in the propensity score matching 
analysis, that is, the cost of funding, risk, and profitability.  First, the cost of funding, 
measured as interest expenses over liabilities, is significantly higher for securitisers 
(1.7% versus 1.6% for non-securitisers). This finding is inconsistent with the efficient 
contracting hypothesis that suggests that funding costs should fall in the presence of 
securitisation. 
We also compare the risk profiles of securitisers and non-securitisers using five 
measures of risk that are presented in Table 4.1, including the non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratio employed in propensity score matching analysis. We find that securitisers 
are more risky in all measures used with statistical significance for the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets (RWATA) and for the loan loss allowance ratio. The 
difference in the charge-offs (5.7% of total assets for securitisers versus 0.3% for non-
securitisers) and loan loss provisions (5.4% versus 0.3%, accordingly) is striking, 
                                                 
17
 Minton, Sanders and Strahan (2004) find similar results using US financial company data. 
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although not statistically significant. Similar results are found by Jiangli and Pritsker 
(2008) and Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) with provisions, charge-off and non-
performing loan ratios higher for securitisers.18
Finally, the last panel in 
 The greater degree of risk inherent in 
the balance sheets of securitising banks might also explain the observed higher funding 
costs reported above. 
Table 4.1 reports some indicators of operational 
performance of the banks in our sample. We find that return on assets, the profitability 
measure employed in the propensity score matching analysis, is significantly higher for 
securitisers (0.7% versus 0.4% for non-securitisers). As for the operating revenue 
structure, the main source of revenue for both securitisers and non-securitisers is interest 
income (over 70%); however the non-interest income share is significantly higher for 
securitisers (27% versus 16% for non-securitisers). The latter is consistent with 
securitisers having an additional source of income in the form of servicing fees and 
possibly more trading revenue.19
                                                 
18
 Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) suggest that this could reflect securitisation and/or size effect in allowing 
banks to extend loans with higher expected losses. 
19 Using US bank holding company data from 1999 to 2005, Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) find 
that the net buyers of credit protection have dramatically more trading revenue than other banks. 
  
Taken together, the cross-sectional comparisons suggest that securitisers improve 
their profitability through expanding riskier and hence more profitable loans in their 
portfolios while paying a higher cost of funds for the excessive risk taking; securitising 
banks are also found to hold less equity capital and increase their non-interest income 
through fees and trading revenues. 
71 
 
4.5 Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
4.5.1 First-Time Secur itisers and Non-Secur itisers 
To estimate the causal effect of securitisation in the propensity score matching 
analysis, we focus on two groups of banks: (i) first-time securitisers and (ii) non-
securitisers. Given that securitisation is a recurring activity, we focus on the first 
observed transaction to build the sub-sample of first-time securitisers from the sample 
of securitising banks.20
Therefore, the treatment group for the propensity score matching analysis consists 
of banks that conduct first securitisation in any year from 2002 to 2007. The control 
group is built from banks that do not securitise over the 2001-2008 period (i.e., from the 
sample of non-securitisers used in the univariate analysis in section 
 We drop the first-time securitisers of 2001 and 2008 as for these 
cases we are not able to collect pre- and post-securitisation information, accordingly.  
4.4).  This gives 198 
first-time securitisers and 46,903 bank-years in the control group of non-securitisers 
over the 2002-2007 period. Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the statistics on the final 
unmatched sample by year. 
4.5.2 Implementation of the Propensity Score Matching  
For example, looking at year 2004 in the table, the 23 first-
time securitisers are banks that do not securitise in 2001, 2002, 2003 and securitise in 
2004; while the 7,845 non-securitisers are banks that do not securitise throughout the 
whole sample period from 2001 to 2008. 
The implementation of the propensity score matching approach can be broken 
down into three steps: (i) estimating propensity scores for first-time securitisers and 
non-securitisers; (ii) matching first-time securitisers with non-securitisers; and, finally, 
(iii) estimating the average securitisation effect.  
                                                 
20
 First securitisation during the lifetime of a bank in the sample. 
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Table 4.2  Statistics on the Number  of First-time Secur itisers and Non-Secur itisers 
First, to estimate the propensity scores, we use a probit regression of a dummy 
variable that has a unit value for the first securitisation, and zero otherwise.21
*y
 For the 
probit model, suppose that a latent variable  follows: 
*y x ei i iβ= +
 
(4.7) 
where ie  is independent of ix , β is a vector of parameters, and (0,1)ie N .  
Instead of observing *iy , we observe only a binary variable indicating the sign of
*
iy : 
*1     if  0
*0     if  0
yiyi yi

>= ≤   
(4.8) 
                                                 
21
 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest that logit and probit models are preferable among the discrete 
models and usually yield similar outcomes for binary treatment case. 
 
Year  
Panel A. Unmatched Sample Panel B. Matched Sample 
Fir st-Time 
Secur itiser s 
Non-Secur itiser s Total Fir st-Time 
Secur itiser s 
Non-Secur itiser s Total 
2002 30 8119 8149 24 24 48 
2003 41 7983 8024 38 38 76 
2004 23 7845 7868 22 22 44 
2005 36 7758 7794 30 30 60 
2006 25 7659 7684 24 24 48 
2007 43 7539 7582 38 38 76 
Total 198 46903 47101 176 176 352 
Note: The table reports the statistics on the number of first-time securitisers and non-securitisers. Panel A 
shows the number of banks that conduct first securitisation in any year from 2002 to 2007 and their 
unmatched control group of non-securitisers. Panel B reports the statistics on the matched sample, i.e., 
first-time securitisers and their matches that have data for pre- and post-securitisation years and satisfy the 
common support condition. 
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We can easily obtain the distribution of iy  given ix : 
*( 1 | ) ( 0 | ) ( 0 | )
                    ( | ) 1 ( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
P y x P y x P x e x
P e x x x x
ββ β β= = > = + >= > − = −Φ = Φ
 
(4.9) 
According to the matching literature, the regressors included in the model should 
reflect both the institutional settings of banks and the theoretical and empirical 
background on the determinants of banks decision to securitise. It is also worth noting 
that the main purpose of the propensity score estimation is not to predict the treatment, 
but to balance all the covariates between the two groups (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001). 
To do so, we define five sets of bank-specific variables. The first set reflects 
general characteristics of bank balance-sheet structure including bank size.22  From the 
asset side, we include measures of bank liquidity, loans, and loan portfolio composition.  
The latter is captured in terms of both the breakdown of loans into four major categories 
(real estate, commercial and industrial, consumer, and other loans23
The next four sets of variables reflect the most commonly cited motivating factors 
for securitisation: regulatory capital relief, lower cost funding, risk management, and 
operating performance improvement. First, with respect to the regulatory capital relief 
hypothesis, we include the Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Bannier and Haensel, 2007; 
Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Minton, Stulz and Williamson, 2008; Uzun and Webb, 
2007). The lower cost of funding hypothesis is captured by the average cost of debt 
calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total liabilities (Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 
) and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated using the four named loan shares. From the liability 
side, we include deposit and equity ratios.  
                                                 
22
 Bank size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. A few studies show that large banks are 
more likely to securitise because of the economies of scale enjoyed by large banks in underwriting and 
securitisation, or because of the diseconomies of scale in funding through deposits (Bannier and Haensel, 
2007; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Loutskina (2005) notes that only large banks have a sufficient number 
and homogeneity of loans to access securitisation market independently of other financial intermediaries. 
23
 Other Loan Ratio is dropped from the probit model due to collinearity. 
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2007). To reflect the risk management hypothesis, we use the non-performing loan ratio 
(Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007; Minton, Stulz and Williamson, 2008; Pais, 2005). 
Finally, we capture bank operating performance by using a profitability measure such as 
return on assets (Bannier and Haensel, 2007; Minton, Sanders and Strahan, 2004; 
Minton, Stulz and Williamson, 2008; Pais, 2005).  
One of the required conditions in the propensity score matching analysis is that 
the variables included in the model should not be affected by the treatment. To ensure 
this, the bank-specific variables employed in our propensity score model are lagged one 
year: 
, , 1 , 1( 1 | , , )i t i t i t iP S X Z St− −=  
(4.10) 
where 
,i tS
 
is a first-securitisation dummy, 
, 1i tX −
 
is a vector of general balance sheet 
characteristics (Sizei,t-1, Liquidity Ratioi,t-1, Loan Ratioi,t-1, C&I Loan Ratioi,t-1, Consumer Loan 
Ratioi,t-1, Other Loan Ratioi,t-1, Loan HHIi,t-1, Deposits/Assets Ratioi,t-1, Equity/Assets Ratioi,t-1), 
, 1i tZ −  is a vector of variables capturing the four hypotheses on the motivation for 
securitisation (Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi,t-1, Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi,t-1, NPL  
Ratioi,t-1, Return on Assetsi,t-1), and iSt  are state dummies. 
We estimate the propensity scores for the 198 first-time securitisers and 46,903 
bank-years of non-securitisers reported in Panel A of Table 4.2 running the probit 
model year by year. The Pseudo R-squared of the yearly regressions ranges from 0.08 to 
0.21. For reporting reasons, we reproduce a pooled probit regression for the period from 
2002 to 2007 as it yields qualitatively similar results.24
Table 4.3
 The estimates of the pooled 
regression are reported in , where Model 2 additionally incorporates year and 
state dummies.  
                                                 
24
 The results of the yearly probit regressions are reported in Appendix G. 
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Table 4.3 Determinants of Secur itisation Probability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   Sizei, t-1 0.145*** 0.148*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 0.073 -0.144 
 (0.376) (0.389) 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.238 0.235 
 (0.362) (0.377) 
C&I Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.269 0.288 
 (0.179) (0.216) 
Consumer Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.162 0.265 
 (0.223) (0.228) 
Other Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.564* 0.487 
 (0.286) (0.322) 
Loan HHIi, t-1 0.310 0.281 
 (0.212) (0.231) 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.753*** -0.905*** 
 (0.214) (0.226) 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 0.391 0.323 
 (0.598) (0.601) 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 -0.644* -0.557* 
 (0.287) (0.260) 
Interest  Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 1.092 0.439 
 (0.780) (0.938) 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 -0.835 -1.122 
 (2.669) (3.122) 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 -5.681*** -5.309*** 
 (1.576) (1.512) 
State Dummies No Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes 
   Pseudo R 0.051 2 0.084 
Log Likelihood -1211.53 -1163.67 
Wald Chi-Square Test 139.33 304.17 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 46187 44783 
   
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All explanatory 
variables are lagged one year. Model 1 includes bank-specific characteristics. Model 2 adds state and year 
dummies.  Robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported in parentheses.*, **,*** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Overall, the results are supportive of our predictions, providing significant 
evidence for the funding, regulatory capital relief, and performance improvement 
hypotheses. In particular, we find that a bank is more likely to securitise if it has lower 
deposits to total assets, lower regulatory capital, and is less profitable. These results 
along with the significant positive estimate for the size variable are consistent with 
previous studies on banks’ propensity to securitise. 
Having estimated the propensity scores, we proceed to match first-time 
securitisers with non-securitisers. We employ nearest-neighbour matching where the 
unit chosen from the non-securitisers (i.e., unit j from the control group) as a match for 
the first-time securitiser (i.e., unit i from the treated group) is the one closest in terms of 
the propensity score25
|}|min{|||
}0{
ki
Sk
ji pppp −=− =∈
: 
  
(4.11) 
To avoid the risk of bad matches entailed in this approach, we impose a 1% 
tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance allowed (the so called 
caliper).26
The empirical setting requires restricting the initial unmatched sample of first-
time securitisers and non-securitisers to those with data from one year before until one 
 We run nearest-neighbour matching year by year to ensure that each first-
time securitiser is matched with an observation from the non-securitiser group of the 
same year the first securitisation occurs.  
                                                 
25 There is a range of matching estimators available. All of those compare the outcome of the treated units 
with the outcome of the control group members to determine the average treatment effect and differ in the 
way the neighbourhood for each treated unit is defined and the weights assigned to the neighbours 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
26
 Bad matches might occur if the closest neighbour is far away in terms of the propensity score. 
Applying caliper implies that a unit from the control group chosen as a match for a treated unit lies within 
the caliper (“propensity range”) and is closest in terms of the propensity score. In this case, the matching 
quality rises; however, the variance of the estimates may increase if fewer matches can be performed as a 
result of excluding from the analysis the treated units with no matches found within the caliper (Smith 
and Todd, 2005). 
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year after the first-securitisation year. Further, we impose the common support, or 
overlap condition, discussed earlier, by prohibiting the perfect predictability of first 
securitisation given the observed covariates to ensure the existence of potential matches 
in the non-securitisers group.27
The matching procedure leaves us with 176 first-time securitisers and their 176 
controls.  This is the sample used for the estimation of the average securitisation effects. 
Panel B of 
  
Table 4.2 reports the number of completed matches by year.  
To verify the quality of matching, we plot the distribution of the propensity score 
for the first-time securitisers and non-securitisers before and after matching (Figure 
4.2). In the unmatched sample the propensity score distribution of the non-securitisers is 
skewed to the left, while it is very close to that of the first-time securitisers in the 
matched sample.  
Further, since matching is conditioned on the propensity score rather than on all 
covariates, it also has to be checked whether the matching procedure is able to balance 
the distribution of all the relevant variables in both the control and treatment groups 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest a two-sample t-
test for comparing the distributions of the covariates in the treated and matched control 
groups. In other words, we compare the first-time securitisers and non-securitisers 
before and after matching and check if there remain any differences in the balancing 
covariates after conditioning on the propensity score. The results of the tests are 
reported in Table 4.4. We find significant differences before matching, whereas in the 
matched sample the covariates are balanced in both groups suggesting successful 
matching. 
  
                                                 
27
 The analysis is conducted using PSMATCH2 module for Stata developed by Leuven and Sianesi 
(2003). 
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Figure 4.2 Distr ibution of the Propensity Score of First-Time Secur itisers and Non-Secur itisers before and after  Matching 
 
Note: The graphs plot the propensity score distribution of the first-time securitisers and non-securitisers for the 2002-2007 period, before and 
after matching. The propensity score is derived from the estimation of the probit equation (4.10) year by year.   
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Table 4.4 T-Test for  Equality of Means of Covar iates before and after  Matching 
  
 
 
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample 
Var iable Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
       
Sizei, t-1 12.552 11.574 0.978*** 12.339 12.357 -0.018 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 0.256 0.286 -0.029*** 0.255 0.255 0.000 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.661 0.629 0.032*** 0.664 0.669 -0.005 
C&I Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.214 0.235 -0.020* 0.216 0.219 -0.003 
Consumer Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.094 0.103 -0.009 0.089 0.076 0.013 
Other Loan Ratioi, t-1 0.030 0.017 0.013*** 0.021 0.021 0.001 
Loan HHIi, t-1 0.604 0.566 0.038*** 0.595 0.596 -0.001 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 0.776 0.824 -0.048*** 0.801 0.802 -0.001 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 0.111 0.115 -0.004 0.106 0.106 0.000 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 0.154 0.183 -0.028* 0.146 0.151 -0.004 
Interest  Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 0.016 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.015 0.000 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.009 0.007 0.002 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.000 
No. of Observations (Total) 198 45989 (46187) 176 176 (352) 
Note: The table reports the means of various bank-specific characteristic between the treated units (i.e., first-time securitisers) and controls (i.e., non-securitisers), 
before and after matching. The difference in means (column “Diff”) is calculated as the difference between first-time securitisers’ and non-securitisers’ means. *, 
**,*** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The last row shows the number of treated and control units in each group, with the 
total number of observations in a sample reported in brackets. 
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4.6 Empir ical Results 
We now use the matched sample to estimate the effects of securitisation on the 
three indicators of bank performance: cost of funding (interest expense to total liabilities 
ratio), risk (non-performing loans ratio), and profitability (return on assets).   
To do so, we first pool the yearly matched first-time securitisers and non-
securitisers. Second, we calculate the changes in performance using a one-year window 
around the first-securitisation year. Finally, we estimate the average securitisation effect 
as the difference in the mean changes in the performance indicators between the first-
time securitisers and non-securitisers and its statistical significance.  
Testing the statistical significance of the difference in means might entail a bias as 
the estimated variance of the securitisation effect might also include the variance due to 
the estimation of the propensity score and the common support condition. These 
estimation steps might add variation beyond the normal sampling variation (Heckman, 
Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998). To address this, we use a bootstrapping technique. 
The bootstrap is based on 500 bootstrap samples, where each bootstrap draw includes 
the re-estimation of the results, including the first steps of the estimation (i.e., 
propensity score, common support). The distribution of the obtained means should 
approximate the sampling distribution and, thus, the standard error of the population 
mean (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
We run the analysis for the whole 2002-2007 sample with 352 banks in total and 
also split the period into three sub-periods (i.e., 2002-2003, 2004-2005, and 2006-2007) 
to examine possible differences over time. The estimates of the average securitisation 
effects for the four estimation periods are reported in Table 4.5 as “Diff” with statistical 
significance in parentheses, where the latter is calculated based on bootstrapped 
standard errors.  
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Table 4.5 The Effect of Secur itisation on Bank Cost of Funding, Risk, and Profitability 
 
  
Var iable 
2002-2007 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 
Fir st-Time 
Secur itiser s 
Non-
Secur itiser s 
Diff 
(t-stat) 
Fir st-Time 
Secur itiser s 
Non-
Secur itiser s 
Diff 
(t-stat) 
Fir st-Time 
Secur itiser s 
Non-
Secur itiser s 
Diff 
(t-stat) 
Fir st-Time 
Secur itiser s 
Non-
Secur itiser s 
Diff 
(t-stat) 
  
               
Funding Cost -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.01 -0.01 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 
  
  (-0.06)   (-0.08)   (0.00)   (-0.09) 
Risk 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 0.011 0.009 0.002 
  
  (-0.71)   (-1.37)   (-0.72)   (-0.52) 
Profitability 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  
  (-0.42)   (-1.22)   (-0.35)   (-0.45) 
No. of Observations  176 176  62 62  52 52  62 62 
  
Note: The table presents the propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effect of securitisation on the cost of funding, risk and profitability for the 
first-time securitisers. The average treatment effect is the difference in the performance change (i.e., from year t-1 to year t+1 with the treatment in year t) between the 
first-time securitisers and matched non-securitisers. The first-time securitisers are banks that conduct first securitisation in any year during the period of analysis and are 
matched with non-securitisers (i.e., banks that never engage in securitisation throughout the 2001-2008 period) on a year-by-year basis. The average treatment effects 
are reported as “Diff” in the table with t-statistics in parentheses based on bootstrapped standard errors. The first column shows the estimates for the full sample, which 
is further split into three subsamples. The last row reports the number of first-time securitisers and non-securitisers for each estimation period. 
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The interpretation of the estimates is as follows. The effect of securitisation on 
bank performance is positive when: (i) the Diff for cost of funding and risk is negative 
implying a (larger) drop or a smaller rise in the indicators for the first-time securitisers 
compared to non-securitisers; or (ii) Diff for profitability is positive implying a (larger) 
rise or a smaller drop in the profitability for the first-time securitisers compared to non-
securitisers.  
First, for the cost of funding, we find no evidence of the securitisation effect 
across all the periods considered. This may be due to the fact that originating banks may 
be required by investors to provide high credit enhancements in the first issues until 
their reputation in the securitisation market is established. This in turn may significantly 
raise the costs of the first transactions and hinder the potential reduction in the funding 
cost offered by the securitisation market. 
As for the credit risk, we find a positive effect for banks that securitised in any 
year from 2002 to 2005 as compared to their controls, while the result is opposite for 
those that securitised in years 2006 and 2007. However, the estimates are statistically 
insignificant. This finding may be explained by the so-called “cherry-picking”. 
Specifically, as the first issues are crucial for establishing reputation in the securitisation 
market, the originating banks may involve in selecting assets of higher credit quality for 
the transactions to ensure the performance of the receivables. Additionally, implicit 
recourse, commonly provided by originating banks to maintain reputation in the market, 
may result in the originating banks taking the non-performing securitised loans back 
onto the balance sheet and replacing them with better quality loans. Furthermore, 
having approached and established the securitisation market as an additional source of 
loan financing and liquidity, banks may tend to shift their loan portfolios towards higher 
risk assets. This may eventually lead to higher ex-post non-performing loans on the 
banks’ books diminishing the credit risk-reducing effect of securitisation. 
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Finally, the effect of securitisation on profitability is found to be positive for the 
first-time securitisers of 2002-2003 and negative for those banks that securitised in 
2006-2007. However, none of the estimates are statistically different from zero 
providing no evidence for significant impact of securitisation on profitability. This in 
turn reflects the insignificant effect of securitisation on the first-time securitisers’ 
funding cost and credit risk.  
In other words, the results of the propensity score matching analysis suggest that 
the first-time securitisers would have had comparable cost of funding, credit risk, and 
profitability had they remained non-securitisers. 28
4.7 Conclusions 
 Referring to Figure 4.1, according to 
the obtained evidence, the performance trajectories of the first-time securitisers (i.e., 
First-Time Securitisers A and First-Time Securitisers B) might slightly change the trend 
but remain close to the hypothetical trajectories presented by the dotted lines. 
In this essay we conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of securitisation on 
bank performance. The theoretical predictions are that securitising banks should have 
lower cost of funding, lower credit risk exposure, and higher profitability compared to 
banks that do not securitise assets.  Using US commercial bank data from 2001 to 2008, 
univariate analysis reveals that securitising banks do tend to be more profitable 
institutions, but with higher credit risk exposure and higher cost of funding compared to 
non-securitising banks.  
To capture the securitisation effect, we assess what would have happened to the 
securitising banks had they not securitised. We do this by applying a propensity score 
matching approach and estimate the causal effects of securitisation by comparing the 
                                                 
28
 As a robustness test, we also perform radius matching. The basic idea of this variant is to use not only 
the nearest neighbour but all of the comparison units within the caliper. Using an identical caliper of 1%, 
we find that the results remain unchanged. 
84 
 
performance of first-time securitisers with that of banks that had ex-ante similar 
securitisation likelihood but remained non-securitisers.  
We find that the first-time securitisers would have had comparable cost of 
funding, credit risk, and profitability had they not securitised. Consequently, we 
conclude that securitisation as a funding, risk management, and profitability 
improvement technique does not seem to outperform alternative approaches possibly 
used by the adequately matched non-securitising banks.  
The results in this study raise important questions about the motives for banks’ 
increasing securitisation activities over the past decade and consequent implications for 
the banking system and are of a particular interest in light of the recent financial crisis 
and the latest debates about the regulation and ultimate value of securitisation.  
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5 ESSAY II: SECURITISATION AND BANK CREDIT RISK TAKING29
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the two decades leading up to the recent financial crisis banks have been 
operating in increasingly competitive markets, and as such have been forced to take on 
more risks and to seek out higher margin activities. Securitisation has facilitated this 
quest for higher margin business by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into 
marketable securities and, therefore, release capital for other investment opportunities. 
The increasing volume of securitisation activity in the run up to the financial crisis 
raised concerns of researchers as well as those of analysts, investors, and regulators over 
the potential for an increase in systemic risk.  
In general, previous empirical studies of the impact of securitisation on the issuing 
banks have suggested a positive link between securitisation and bank risk (Dionne and 
Harchaoui, 2003; Franke and Krahnen, 2005; Haensel and Krahnen, 2007; Michalak 
and Uhde, 2009). By allowing banks to convert illiquid assets into liquid funds, it has 
been argued that securitisation may well expand credit supply and cause banks to hold 
riskier assets. Evidence supporting the credit expansion hypothesis is found in Goderis, 
Marsh, Vall Castello and Wagner (2006), Hirtle (2008), Loutskina (2005), Loutskina 
and Strahan (2006); Loutskina and Strahan (2006) also show that securitisation reduces 
the influence of a bank’s financial condition on credit supply. However, little evidence 
has been collected on how securitisation affects banks’ willingness to increase the 
proportion of risky assets in their portfolios.  
 
                                                 
29 This study is forthcoming as Casu, Barbara, Andrew Clare, Anna Sarkisyan and Stephen Thomas, Does 
Securitisation Reduce Credit Risk Taking? Empirical Evidence from US Bank Holding Companies, 
European Journal of Finance, Special Issue on Contemporary Issues in Financial Institutions and 
Markets. 
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Since securitisation provides banks with an additional source of loan financing 
and liquidity, it might motivate them to shift their portfolios towards higher risk/return 
assets (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010; Purnanandam, 2009). 
However, originating banks typically retain first-loss contractual interests and/or 
provide implicit recourse in securitisations to mitigate the moral hazard problem that 
arises from the banks having less incentive to efficiently monitor and service loans after 
they have been sold (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Pennacchi, 1988). These 
arrangements mean that the risks inherent in the securitised assets have not been 
transferred to investors and are, in effect, still held by the originating bank, but off-
balance sheet (Chen, Liu and Ryan, 2008; FDIC, 2007; Landsman, Peasnell and 
Shakespeare, 2006; Niu and Richardson, 2006; Standard and Poor's, 2001; Wolfe, 
2004).  
Therefore, outstanding securitisation exposes the issuing bank to the credit risk 
associated with the transferred assets. Assuming that the risk exposure arising from the 
securitised pool is understood by the bank, we hypothesise that this should have an 
impact on its risk-taking behaviour. In particular, greater outstanding securitisation, and, 
therefore, greater credit risk exposure arising from the pool, should make banks more 
risk-averse and motivate them to shift their portfolios towards assets of lower credit 
risk.  
This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by assessing the impact of 
securitisation on the credit-risk taking behaviour of US bank holding companies. We 
first examine whether the aggregate outstanding securitisation affects banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour. Second, we test whether the effect differs across securitisations of different 
asset classes using new data on banks’ securitisation activities mandated by changes to 
regulatory forms in 2001, whereby banks report securitisation by type of underlying 
assets.  
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Our results show that bank credit-risk taking behaviour is negatively associated 
with securitisation, suggesting that banks with a greater balance of securitised assets 
outstanding choose asset portfolios of lower risk. Examining securitisations by type of 
underlying asset reveals that the negative relationship between outstanding 
securitisation and risk taking is primarily driven by securitisations of mortgages, home 
equity lines of credit, and other consumer loans. Securitisations of all other types of 
assets, on the other hand, seem to have no significant impact on bank credit-risk taking 
behaviour.  We explain these results with reference to the “recourse hypothesis”, that is, 
the credit risk retained by the issuing banks in connection to the securitised assets, 
through the recourse explicitly and/or implicitly provided in securitisation transactions.  
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows: Section 5.2 describes the data 
and provides brief descriptive statistics of the sample; the empirical specification is 
presented in Section 5.3; Section 5.4 reports the results of the analysis; finally, Section 
5.5 discusses the findings and concludes the essay. 
5.2 Data and Descr iptive Statistics 
5.2.1 Data and Sample Selection 
To study the effect of securitisation on bank credit-risk taking behaviour we use 
US bank holding company (BHC) data from Y-9C forms, which are filed on a quarterly 
basis by all BHCs and have been compiled in a data set by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago since 1986. We use data for bank holding companies rather than for 
commercial banks because risk and capital management are typically administered at 
the highest level of the financial group. In addition, securitisation may involve several 
subsidiaries of a BHC and affect capital and liquidity planning for the whole group 
(Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; Thomas and Wang, 2004).  
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The Y-9C reports collate basic financial data from banks on a consolidated basis 
in the form of a balance sheet, an income statement, and detailed supporting schedules, 
including a schedule of off-balance sheet items. Since June 2001, US banks have been 
required to provide more detailed information on their securitisation activities in the 
regulatory forms. Specifically, Schedule HC-S of Y-9C form reports the breakdown of 
securitisation into seven categories: 1-4 family residential loans; home equity lines; 
credit card receivables; auto loans; other consumer loans; commercial and industrial 
loans; and all other loans, all leases, and all other assets. Securitisations are reported as 
an outstanding principal balance of the corresponding assets sold and securitised with 
servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements. The 
incorporation of the new data into FR Y-9C determines the start date of the sample 
period, which yields 27 quarters from the second quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 
2007.  
When constructing the data set, we excluded banks with missing information on 
total assets, total loans, capital, and securitisation activities for any quarter of the sample 
period. When banks go through a merger or an acquisition, we maintain the code of the 
acquiring BHC while the acquired bank is eliminated from the sample.30
                                                 
30
 This might still entail a bias. In particular, a merger or an acquisition might cause significant changes 
in the acquiring bank’s balance sheet composition and, therefore, have an impact on the analysis results. 
We control for this by imposing outliers limits on bank asset and loan growth, however, we acknowledge 
that it might still have an impact on the observed results through other bank-level characteristics. 
 To prevent the 
possibility of outliers driving the results, we exclude all bank-quarters with asset growth 
over the last quarter exceeding 50% and loan growth exceeding 100%.  We also exclude 
banks in any quarters for which total loan-to-asset ratio is less than 0.1 or loan-to-
deposit ratio exceeds 10. The final data set contains 42,685 bank-quarters for 2,190 
BHCs.  
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5.2.2  Descr iptive Statistics 
Before turning to the main analysis, we compare securitisers and non-securitisers 
along five dimensions: (i) balance sheet structure; (ii) loan portfolio; (iii) regulatory 
capital; (iv) risk; and (v) operating performance.31
Table 5.1
 Given that securitisation is a 
recurring activity, we assign a bank to the group of securitisers if we observe 
securitisation activity in any quarter of the bank’s lifetime in the sample. This yields 
230 securitisers and 1,960 non-securitisers in total for the period from 2001:Q2 to 
2007:Q4. We use the quarterly data to calculate time-series averages for each BHC and 
then compare the averages in cross-sectional tests. The results of these comparisons are 
presented in , where we report means and standard deviations for all banks, 
securitisers, and non-securitisers, and the difference in means between the latter two 
with its statistical significance.32
Looking at the first panel of 
  
Table 5.1, the average amount of total assets for the 
sample BHCs is $5.3 billion. This is the most significant difference between securitisers 
and non-securitisers; the mean value of total assets for securitisers ($41billion) is 
approximately 41 times the mean size of non-securitisers ($1 billion). This finding is 
consistent with previous research that documents that larger banks are more likely to 
securitise (Bannier and Haensel, 2007; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008; Martín-Oliver and 
Saurina, 2007; Minton, Sanders and Strahan, 2004; Minton, Stulz and Williamson, 
2008; Uzun and Webb, 2007). Further, securitisers tend to hold less liquid assets (25% 
versus 27% of total assets), which is consistent with having a better access to external 
funding and thus needing a smaller liquidity buffer compared to non-securitisers. 
                                                 
31
 The construction of the variables is described in detail in Appendix B. 
32
 In the regulatory reporting forms income statement items are reported on a year-to-date basis. 
Following Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), to make measures of risk and profitability more familiar 
(charge-off ratio, loan loss provision ratio, return on assets and equity), we annualise the quarterly flow 
variables by multiplying by four. 
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Originated loans on average constitute 66% of BHC’s total assets with no significant 
difference between securitisers and non-securitisers. 
We turn next to the liability side of the balance sheet. Both securitisers and non-
securitisers are mainly financed by deposits.  However, non-securitisers rely on this 
source of funding to a larger extent (69% of total assets versus 62%). The capitalisation 
of the sample BHCs constitutes 9%, with no distinguishable difference between 
securitisers and non-securitisers.  The proportion of loans to deposits is significantly 
higher for securitisers (1.12 versus 0.98). 
The second panel of Table 5.1 contains information on bank loan portfolios. The 
securitisers’ loan portfolio is different in terms of both concentration and composition. 
In particular, it tends to be more diversified, as indicated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of 0.56 versus 0.59 for non-securitisers.33 Further, securitisers tend to hold 
significantly less real estate loans (67% versus 71%)34
                                                 
33
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated using four loan categories: (i) real estate loans, (ii) 
commercial and industrial loans, (iii) consumer loans, and (iv) other loans; a higher value indicates higher 
loan portfolio concentration. 
34
 Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) find similar evidence. 
 while keeping more consumer 
(10% versus 8%) and other loans (7% versus 5%) on the balance sheet. 
Looking at the regulatory capital, one can see that the sample BHCs are on 
average relatively highly capitalised (e.g., 14.8% for the total risk-based capital ratio). 
Comparing securitisers and non-securitisers, we find that securitisers are less capitalised 
than non-securitisers on the risk-adjusted basis; however, the difference is not 
statistically significant. This is consistent with Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) and 
Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008), who find that banks that are engaged in credit 
risk management tend to hold less capital.  
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics for  all Sample Banks and Univar iate Tests of 
Differences in Character istics between Secur itisers and Non-Secur itisers 
 
All Banks Secur itisers Non-Secur itisers Diff in Means p-values 
Var iable N Mean StdDev N Mean StdDev N Mean StdDev (abs) (% )  
            
 Balance Sheet Structure             
Total Assets ($ billions) 2190 5.254 52.286 230 40.961 156.486 1960 1.064 5.001 39.897 3749.7% 0.000 
Liquidity Ratio 2190 0.263 0.123 230 0.247 0.111 1960 0.265 0.124 -0.018 -6.8% 0.029 
Loan Ratio 2190 0.664 0.125 230 0.660 0.123 1960 0.665 0.125 -0.005 -0.8% 0.577 
Deposits/Assets Ratio 2190 0.681 0.088 230 0.621 0.124 1960 0.688 0.079 -0.067 -9.7% 0.000 
Loans/Deposits Ratio 2190 0.999 0.289 230 1.122 0.380 1960 0.984 0.273 0.138 14.0% 0.000 
Equity/Assets Ratio 2190 0.091 0.032 230 0.092 0.036 1960 0.091 0.032 0.001 1.1% 0.588 
             Loan Por tfolio             
Real Estate Loan Ratio 2190 0.708 0.151 230 0.674 0.174 1960 0.712 0.148 -0.038 -5.3% 0.002 
C&I Loan Ratio 2190 0.160 0.095 230 0.165 0.086 1960 0.159 0.095 0.006 3.8% 0.373 
Consumer Loan Ratio 2190 0.080 0.085 230 0.096 0.115 1960 0.078 0.081 0.018 23.1% 0.018 
Other Loan Ratio 2190 0.053 0.081 230 0.065 0.099 1960 0.051 0.079 0.014 27.5% 0.042 
Loan HHI 2190 0.585 0.150 230 0.560 0.156 1960 0.588 0.150 -0.028 -4.8% 0.009 
             Regulatory Capital             
Tier I Leverage Ratio 2190 9.324 3.822 230 9.274 7.506 1960 9.330 3.120 -0.056 -0.6% 0.910 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital 
 
2190 13.327 6.636 230 12.743 12.168 1960 13.395 5.644 -0.652 -4.9% 0.423 
Total Risk-Based Capital 
 
2190 14.836 6.943 230 14.612 12.742 1960 14.862 5.906 -0.250 -1.7% 0.769 
 
            Risk Character istics             
RWATA Ratio 2190 0.712 0.118 230 0.728 0.137 1960 0.710 0.115 0.018 2.5% 0.054 
NPL Ratio 2190 0.009 0.008 230 0.010 0.007 1960 0.009 0.008 0.001 11.1% 0.038 
Charge-Off Ratio 2190 0.003 0.007 230 0.005 0.012 1960 0.003 0.006 0.002 66.7% 0.017 
Loan Loss Provision Ratio 2190 0.004 0.007 230 0.006 0.014 1960 0.004 0.005 0.002 50.0% 0.050 
             Operating performance             
Return on Assets 2190 0.011 0.007 230 0.012 0.013 1960 0.011 0.005 0.001 9.1% 0.076 
Return on Equity 2190 0.124 0.076 230 0.123 0.126 1960 0.124 0.068 -0.001 -0.8% 0.970 
Revenue HHI 2190 0.697 0.094 230 0.644 0.098 1960 0.703 0.092 -0.059 -8.4% 0.000 
Interest Income/ 
Net Operating Revenue 
2190 0.792 0.108 230 0.713 0.154 1960 0.801 0.097 -0.088 -11.0% 0.000 
             Secur itisation Activity             
Securitised Assets/ 
Loans Ratio    230 0.144 0.515       
Securitised Assets/ 
Assets Ratio    230 0.084 0.299       
Credit Enhancements/ 
Securitised Assets Ratio 
   
196 0.068 0.190 
      
Credit Enhancements/ 
Assets Ratio    230 0.003 0.010       
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for: (i) all BHCs (2,190 banks); (ii) securitisers (230 banks); and (iii) 
non-securitisers (1,960 banks). Mean and Std Dev stand for the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation values of 
the individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. The last three columns report the comparison analysis of bank-
specific characteristics between securitisers and non-securitisers. Diff in Means is calculated as the difference 
between securitisers’ and non-securitisers’ means, in absolute (abs) and percentage (%) values, with the p-values of 
t-tests on the equality of means reported in the last column. 
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Further, we consider four risk characteristics of the banks: (i) risk-weighted assets 
relative to total assets (RWATA); (ii) non-performing loans35; (iii) charge-offs36
Finally, we compare performance measures. The results suggest that securitisers 
have a higher return on assets compared to non-securitisers (1.2% versus 1.1%) with the 
difference being statistically significant.
; and 
(iv) loan loss provisions.  For the average BHC in the sample, the non-performing loans 
and charge-offs constitute 0.9% and 0.3% of total loans, respectively. The loan loss 
provisions constitute 0.4% relative to total loans. Comparing securitisers and non-
securitisers, we find that securitisers are more risky according to all the measures used, 
with the differences being both economically and statistically significant. Similar results 
are found by Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) and Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) with 
provision, charge-off, and non-performing loan ratios higher for securitisers; Jiangli and 
Pritsker suggest that this could reflect securitisation and/or size effect in allowing banks 
to extend loans with higher expected losses.  
37
 As for the revenue structure, the interest 
income constitutes the main source of revenue for both securitisers and non-securitisers 
(over 70%); however concentration across the sources is lower for securitisers (two-part 
revenue HHI of 0.64 versus 0.7 for non-securitisers) due to a higher share of non-
interest income in their net operating revenue. The latter is consistent with securitisers 
having an additional source of income in the form of servicing fees and possibly more 
trading revenue.38
                                                 
35
 Non-performing loans are defined as loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing interest, and 
nonaccrual loans. 
36
 Net charge-offs are defined as charge-offs minus recoveries. 
37
 We find no significant difference in the return on equity between securitisers and non-securitisers, 
which implies that securitisers have relatively higher equity capital. 
38
 Using US bank holding company data from 1999 to 2005, Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2008) find 
that the net buyers of credit protection have dramatically more trading revenue than other banks. 
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Taken together, these comparisons suggest that securitisers improve their 
profitability through holding riskier and, hence, more profitable loans in their portfolios 
and earning a higher share of revenue from non-interest income.  
The last panel of Table 5.1 reports statistics on securitisation activities for the 
sample of securitising banks. The average amount of outstanding securitised assets 
equals 14.4% of bank’s total loans, or 8.4% of total assets. The contractual credit 
enhancements provided by the banks to securitisation structures constitute, on average, 
6.8% of securitised assets, or 0.3% of bank’s total assets; these include credit enhancing 
interest-only strips, subordinated securities and other residual interests, and standby 
letters of credit. 
Figure 5.1 shows the volume of outstanding balances of securitisation for the 
sample banks broken down into asset-backed and mortgage-backed securitisation for 
year-ends 2001-2007. It illustrates a general upward trend in total securitisation over the 
2001-2007 period, with slight downturns in 2003 and 2007. It is worth noting that the 
value of securitised mortgages has been fluctuating over the period in general, with the 
maximum amount of around $1.37 trillion reached at the year-end 2006. However, the 
value of asset-backed securitisation has been growing steadily throughout the period, 
with the maximum value of $614 billion reached at year-end 2007 during the crisis of 
the US subprime mortgage markets. 
Figure 5.2 presents a breakdown of securitisation by asset type. It shows that 
mortgage-backed securitisation makes up the majority (i.e., 65%) of total 
securitisations. All other loans and leases and credit card receivables, major classes in 
asset-backed securitisation, constitute merely 10% each in total securitisation. As for 
commercial and industrial loans, auto loans, home equity lines of credit, and other 
consumer loans, their shares are relatively low and amount to 2-5% of total 
securitisation.  
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Figure 5.1 Year ly Values of Secur itised Assets 
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Note: The figure presents the total balance of outstanding securitisation for the sample BHCs for year-
ends 2001-2007. Total value of assets securitised is presented as the sum of MBS and ABS values; MBS 
stands for the value of mortgages securitised, while ABS indicates the value of securitised receivables 
other than mortgage loans, such as credit card receivables, auto loans, commercial and industrial loans, 
and home equity lines of credit. The values are in US$ trillions. 
Figure 5.2 Secur itisation Breakdown by Asset Type 
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Note: The figure illustrates the percentage distribution of securitisation by the type of assets securitised 
derived from the mean values for the sample BHCs. The asset categories are: (i) mortgages; (ii) home 
equity lines of credit; (iii) credit cards; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases. 
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5.3 Empir ical Specification 
We now turn to the empirical analysis to test whether outstanding securitisation 
has an impact on the risk-taking behaviour of the issuing bank. Our empirical model 
includes a number of control variables for bank characteristics and activities, which may 
influence bank risk-taking propensity or aversion (Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003; Stiroh, 
2006; Uzun and Webb, 2007). In addition to the bank-specific characteristics, we 
include real GDP growth to control for macroeconomic effects; while time effects are 
captured by introducing quarter dummies.    
The basic regression is:  
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1
' '
,
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
t t i t
CrR Sec Size Loan Cap ROA ChOff
GDPG Quarter
α β β β β β βϕ θ ε− − − − − −∆ = + + + + + + ++ + +  
  
(5.1) 
where β , ϕ , and θ
 
reflect the extent to which the relative factor of the model 
contributes to the change in the dependent variable, and ti,ε  represents the error term for 
bank i in quarter t. The dependent variable, 
,i tCrR∆ , is the change in the credit risk of 
bank i's portfolio in period t; 
, 1i tSec −  is securitisation; , 1i tSize −   is bank size; , 1i tLoan −  is 
loan ratio; 
, 1i tCap −  is equity capital ratio; , 1i tROA −  is return on assets; , 1i tChOff −  is charge-
off ratio; tGDPG  is real GDP growth; and tQuarter  is quarter dummies. The timing 
applied in this model is to ensure that the direction of causality goes from the 
explanatory variables to the dependent variable (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Stiroh, 
2006). The detailed construction of the model variables and their expected signs are 
presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Definition of Model Var iables 
Following Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), Avery and Berger (1990), Berger 
(1995), Berger and Udell (1994), and Shrieves and Dahl (1992), we primarily measure 
the credit risk of a bank’s portfolio (CrR) using a ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets (RWATA).  
Under Basel I, banks assets and off-balance sheet activities are allocated into four 
categories according to their credit risk: (i) assets with zero default risk (e.g., 
government securities, reserves); (ii) low-risk assets (e.g., interbank deposits); (iii) 
assets with medium default risk (e.g., mortgage loans); and (iv) high-risk assets (e.g., 
commercial loans).  Each category is assigned a relative risk weight, ranging from zero 
to one. 
Var iable Definition Construction Expected Sign 
CrR Bank Credit Risk  Risk-Weighted Assets/Total Assets Dependent Variable 
Sec Securitisation  Outstanding Securitised Assets/Total  Assets Negative 
Size Bank Size Ln(Total Assets) Positive 
Loan Loan Ratio Loans /Total Assets Negative 
Cap Capital Ratio  Equity Capital/Total Assets Negative 
ROA Return on Assets Net Income/Total Assets Negative 
ChOff Charge-Off Ratio  Net Charge-Offs/Loans Negative 
GDPG GDP Growth GDP Real Growth Rate  
Note: This table presents definition, construction, and expected signs on the variables used in this study for 
the regression of bank credit risk taking. The bank-level balance sheet data are collected from the Federal 
Reserve’s Y-9C reports (See Appendix B for details).   
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Therefore, a bank’s total risk-weighted assets (RWA) are derived as:  
RWA = 0*Category I + 0.2*Category II + 0.5*Category III + 1.0*Category IV 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) suggest that the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio 
captures two principal features of a bank’s portfolio risk, that is, the allocation of assets 
across risk categories and the quality of loans. Further, Avery and Berger (1990) show 
that the relative risk weights used in the framework of the risk-based capital standards 
correlate with risky behaviour and have an adequate informational value in predicting 
future bank performance problems, such as portfolio losses and bank failures.  
Kim and Santomero (1988) argue that banks might be prompted to shift to more 
risky assets by inefficiencies in regulatory capital requirements. According to this 
argument, bank risk increases due to the low quality of the assets left on the balance 
sheet while regulatory capital requirements remain unchanged, a process commonly 
referred to as “regulatory capital arbitrage”.  
Our study is different from the previous literature as it covers the period of the 
development process of Basel II, which supposedly aligns more closely regulatory 
capital charges on banks’ assets, including securitisation positions, and the underlying 
credit risk. As remarked by Randall S. Kroszner, a member of the Board of Governors 
of Federal Reserve System, on July 12 2007, there has been “significant progress in risk 
measurement and management at many banks in the United States and elsewhere as a 
result of the Basel II development process”.39
                                                 
39
 The Federal Reserve Board Website: 
 Therefore, we hope our results on the 
effect of securitisation on bank risk-taking behaviour are less biased by regulatory 
capital arbitrage than previous empirical work. 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20070712a.htm 
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Securitisation (Sec) is introduced as a bank’s outstanding balance of securitised 
assets scaled by total assets. If the credit risk exposure arising from the securitised pool 
makes banks more risk-averse and motivates them to shift their portfolios towards 
assets of lower credit risk, there should be a negative association between banks’ 
outstanding securitisation and credit risk taking.  
Bank size (Size), measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, is included to 
capture its possible impact on bank risk taking through a number of channels, including 
funding and risk management opportunities. For example, Loutskina (2005) notes that 
only the largest banks in the US can have a sufficient quantity and homogeneity of loans 
to access the securitisation market independently of other financial intermediaries.40
Additional balance sheet and income statement characteristics of each bank are 
introduced into the model to control for their possible impact on bank risk taking. From 
the balance sheet, we include the loan ratio and the capital ratio. The loan ratio (Loan) is 
measured as loans over total assets and reflects the size of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
Considering loans as a bank’s higher risk assets, a bank with a larger loan portfolio is 
expected to be more risk-averse.  
 
Therefore, given better access to external funds and the credit risk transfer market for 
large banks, one could expect a positive relation between bank size and its propensity to 
engage in high risk/return activities.  
Bank capital (Cap) is measured as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. 
Considering capital as a “buffer of uninsured private funds to absorb portfolio losses” 
(Avery and Berger, 1990) yields two views on the nature of the relationship between 
bank capital and risk taking. On the one hand, diversified owners which do not have a 
                                                 
40
 A number of studies document that large banks are more likely to securitise assets (Bannier and 
Haensel, 2007; Karaoglu, 2005; Uzun and Webb, 2007). Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) suggest that this may 
reflect economies of scale for large banks in underwriting and securitisation, or diseconomies of scale in 
funding through deposits.  
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significant fraction of their wealth placed in the bank might tend to advocate more risk 
taking after collecting funds from bondholders and depositors (Esty, 1998; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009).41
                                                 
41
 Stringent regulatory requirements might further contribute to the risk-taking incentives of owners and 
lead to them favouring riskier portfolios to compensate for the loss of utility (Buser, Chen and Kane, 
1981; Koehn and Santomero, 1980).   
 On the other hand, managers with bank-specific human capital and 
private benefits of control might be expected to behave in a risk-averse rather than value 
maximising way (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). As argued by Saunders, Strock and Travlos 
(1990) and Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996), managerial ownership should also 
be taken into account as managers’ incentives to engage in risk taking increase along 
with their shareholdings. However, Anderson and Fraser (2000) show that for US bank 
holding companies managerial shareholdings and risk taking became inversely related 
in the early 1990s following additional regulations (i.e., risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
premium). Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient on the capital ratio variable. 
From the income statement, we include return on assets (ROA) and the charge-off 
ratio (ChOff) to account for the possible impact of present performance of a bank on its 
incentive to take on new risks. Particularly, one could argue that poor-performing banks 
(i.e., ones with a low return on their assets) might pursue risky activities to re-establish 
profitability.  Following this argument, we expect a negative relation between bank 
profitability and risk. A negative relationship could also be expected between the 
charge-off ratio and risk taking. The charge-off ratio reflects the asset quality of a loan 
portfolio. Low quality loans in a preceding quarter (i.e., a high charge-off ratio) should 
discourage the bank manager from taking on extra risk in the following quarter and 
motivate investing in low risk/secure return assets.  
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5.4 Empir ical Results  
5.4.1 Primary Regression Analysis 
We report our results in Table 5.3. The regression analysis is based on the sample 
of securitisers which contains 5,067 observations for 230 BHCs; however, the second 
quarter 2001 observations are lost due to differencing and lagging the model variables, 
which yields 4,837 bank-quarters in the final regression data set.  Each regression uses 
bank fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the BHC level (reported in 
parentheses).42 Quarter dummies are incorporated in all of the regressions, but are not 
reported in the table.43
Further examination of the results reported in 
 
The parameter estimate of most interest in terms of this study is that on 
securitisation. The coefficient on securitisation is found to be negative and significant at 
the 1% level. In other words, a greater outstanding securitisation balance is associated 
with banks choosing to invest in assets with lower credit risk.  This evidence supports 
the proposed hypothesis that securitisation should have a negative effect on the risk-
taking behaviour of the issuing bank as a result of credit exposure arising from the 
securitised pool. 
Table 5.3  reveals that most of the 
control variables included in the model are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs. Beginning with bank size, the evidence suggests that larger banks tend 
to pursue higher risk activities. This is consistent with prior empirical studies and could 
be linked to the size-related diversification effect described by Demsetz and Strahan 
(1997).44
                                                 
42
 
  
Appendix D reports the results of the Hausman specification test. 
43
 The adjusted R-squared in the full model is 0.06, which is in line with previous studies on 
securitisation (e.g., Chen, Liu and Ryan, 2008; Michalak and Uhde, 2009; Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010). 
44
 In particular, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) suggest that large bank holding companies use their 
diversification advantage to operate with greater leverage and to pursue riskier lending. 
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 Table 5.3. Determinants of Bank Credit Risk Taking 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Seci,t-1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Size
 i,t-1  0.005 0.006 
  (-0.004) (0.004)* 
Loan
 i,t-1   -0.118 
   (0.014)*** 
Cap
 i,t-1   -0.01 
   (-0.071) 
ROA
 i,t-1   -0.027 
   (-0.075) 
ChOff
 i,t-1   -0.153 
   (0.092)* 
GDPG
 t 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Constant -0.001 -0.072 -0.015 
 (-0.002) (-0.056) (-0.051) 
No. of Observations 4837 4837 4837 
No. of Banks 230 230 230 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Note: The table presents the results of the regression analysis where the dependent variable is the change 
in credit risk of bank portfolio measured as a change in the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (∆
RWATA). The independent variables are: (i) securitisation ratio; (ii) size; (iii) loan ratio; (iv) equity capital 
ratio; (v) return on assets; (vi) charge-off ratio; (vii) real GDP growth (see Table 5.2 for definitions of the 
variables and the expected signs). Balance sheet measures used are lagged one quarter. The columns 
represent three specifications of the regression model with Model 1 and Model 2 using a reduced form of 
the basic equation (5.1). Fixed effects regressions are run for the full sample of securitisers covering the 
period from 2001:Q2 to 2007:Q4. Quarter dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the BHC-level. *, **,*** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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The parameter estimate on the loan ratio reflects a significant negative impact of 
the size of the loan portfolio on bank risk taking. Not surprisingly, a greater amount of 
loans and, therefore, higher on-balance sheet credit risk exposure makes banks more 
risk-averse. Equity capital has the expected negative effect on bank risk taking; 
however, it is not statistically significant. The link between bank performance measures 
and risk taking is negative, as expected, and is statistically significant for the charge-off 
ratio. This shows that the current performance of a bank influences its risk-taking 
behaviour. In particular, a bank with a lower quality loan portfolio, captured by a higher 
charge-off ratio, is more risk-averse. 
The result of a significant negative effect of securitisation on bank credit risk 
taking discussed above is derived using a broad category of securitisation which 
includes different classes of underlying assets. To examine the impact of securitisation 
in more detail, we decompose the aggregate measure of bank securitisation activities 
into seven categories according to the type of assets securitised, and these are:  (i) 
mortgages; (ii) home equity lines of credit; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; 
(v) other consumer loans; (vi) commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans 
and leases.  
For this part of the analysis, securitising banks are classified in the following way: 
a bank is considered as a mortgage securitiser if we observe outstanding mortgage 
securitisation in any quarter of its lifetime in the sample. The same definition applies to 
securitisers of other types of assets.  We re-estimate equation (5.1) using the outstanding 
amount of securitised assets scaled by total assets for each of the aforementioned loan 
types. A bank is included in each asset-specific regression only if it is considered as a 
securitiser for the relevant asset type. The results of the regressions are presented in 
Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4. Testing Secur itisation by Asset Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Sec
 i,t-1 -0.004***        
 (0.001)        
Mortgages
 i,t-1  -0.004***       
  (0.001)       
Home Equity Lines of Credit
 i,t-1   -0.388***      
   (0.109)      
Credit Card Receivables
 i,t-1    -0.062     
    (0.060)     
Auto Loans
 i,t-1     0.018    
     (0.027)    
Other Consumer Loans
 i,t-1      -0.205**   
      (0.097)   
C&I Loans
 i,t-1       -0.063  
       (0.053)  
Other Loans and Leases
 i,t-1        -0.020 
        (0.053) 
Size
 i,t-1 0.006* 0.009** 0.031*** 0.002 0.010 0.028*** 0.019** 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Loan
 i,t-1 -0.118*** -0.103*** -0.147*** -0.138*** -0.115*** -0.084*** -0.194*** -0.179*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) 
Cap
 i,t-1 -0.010 -0.098 -0.255** -0.168 0.077 -0.273* -0.278** -0.138 
 (0.071) (0.060) (0.111) (0.113) (0.092) (0.147) (0.119) (0.097) 
ROA
 i,t-1 -0.027 0.163 -0.231 0.031 -0.079 -0.434 -0.001 -0.048 
 (0.075) (0.158) (0.470) (0.161) (0.097) (0.336) (0.443) (0.275) 
ChOff
 i,t-1 -0.153* -0.074 -0.026 -0.228 -0.211 -0.121 -0.349 0.094 
 (0.092) (0.252) (0.432) (0.139) (0.253) (0.332) (0.249) (0.326) 
GDPG
 t 0.000 0.000 0.003** 0.001 0.002* 0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.015 -0.058 -0.437*** 0.075 -0.121 -0.433*** -0.157 0.034 
 (0.051) (0.067) (0.137) (0.099) (0.181) (0.126) (0.139) (0.097) 
No. of Observations 4837 3605 542 775 722 453 712 1047 
No. of Banks 230 176 27 37 34 23 32 47 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.049 0.151 0.084 0.090 0.102 0.101 0.120 
Note: The table presents the results of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆RWATA) on securitisation activities 
by type of assets securitised, with the first column reporting the basic regression model. Columns 2-8 represent seven 
specifications of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitised assets: (i) mortgages; (ii) 
home equity lines of credit; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or 
commercial and industrial loans; (vii) all other loans and leases. The sample covers the period from 2001:Q2 to 
2007:Q4; quarter dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the BHC-level. *, **,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Examining securitisations by the underlying asset type shows that they differ in 
their effect on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. In particular, the results suggest that 
securitisations of mortgages, home equity lines of credit, and other consumer loans have 
a negative and statistically significant effect on bank credit risk taking; among these, 
credit risk taking is associated most negatively with securitised home equity lines of 
credit. Similarly, the effect of securitised credit card receivables, commercial and 
industrial loans, and all other loans and leases is negative, however, not statistically 
significant. In contrast, the parameter estimate for securitisations of auto loans is found 
to be positive, but insignificant statistically. 
5.4.2 Robustness Tests 
To verify the evidence of a negative relation between outstanding securitisation 
and credit risk taking presented above, we perform a number of robustness tests that 
either examine sub-samples of the data or use alternative data definitions. Table 5.5 
reports these results, where the first column reports the estimates for the full sample for 
ease of comparison. 
One possible concern is that the results might differ across banks of different size. 
To examine this argument, we split the sample into two sub-samples: small banks and 
large banks. Following Loutskina (2005), we assign a bank-quarter to a group of small 
banks if its size is in the bottom 75% of the size distribution, and to the group of large 
banks if size is in the top 10% of the size distribution.  The sub-samples contain 3,621 
and 486 bank-quarters, accordingly. Beginning with the small banks, the coefficient on 
securitisation changes very little remaining negative and statistically significant. For the 
large banks, the coefficient remains negative; however, it is four times larger than that 
for the full sample and not statistically significant.  
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Table 5.5 Robustness Tests for  the Determinants of Bank Credit Risk Taking 
 
 (1) ∆ RWATA (2) ∆ NPATA (3) ∆ RWATA 
  All Banks Small Banks Large Banks 2001-2006 All Banks All Banks 
Sec
 i,t-1 -0.0036 -0.003 -0.015 -0.0036 -0.0002  
 (0.0009)*** (0.0007)*** (-0.011) (0.0010)** (0.0001)**  
Credit Enhancements
 i,t-1      -0.49 
      (0.1298)*** 
Size
 i,t-1 0.0065 0.0041 0.0288 0.0076 0.001 0.005 
 (0.0036)* (-0.0035) (0.0089)*** (0.0043)* (0.0003)*** (-0.0037) 
Loan
 i,t-1 -0.1178 -0.1297 -0.0928 -0.135 0.0019 -0.1538 
 (0.0141)*** (0.0163)*** (0.0277)*** (0.0171)** (-0.0015) (0.0159)*** 
Cap
 i,t-1 -0.0097 0.0214 -0.4945 0.0183 -0.005 -0.1079 
 (-0.0711) (-0.069) (0.1351)*** (-0.0821) (-0.0049) (0.0380)*** 
ROA
 i,t-1 -0.0268 -0.0857 0.4177 -0.0122 -0.0443 0.1239 
 (-0.0751) (-0.0683) (-0.5776) (-0.0882) (-0.03) (-0.1019) 
ChOff
 i,t-1 -0.1534 -0.1032 -0.281 -0.1143 -0.01 -0.6124 
 (0.0923)* (-0.0892) (-0.4573) (-0.1032) (-0.0164) (0.1263)*** 
GDPG
 t 0.0005 0.0000 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (-0.0004) (-0.0004) (-0.0011) (-0.0004) (0.0000)*** (-0.0004) 
Constant -0.0151 0.0333 -0.4529 -0.0227 -0.0143 0.0446 
 (-0.0514) (-0.0492) (0.1571)*** (-0.0608) (0.0046)*** (-0.0549) 
No. of Observations 4837 3621 486 4271 4837 3483 
No. of Banks 230 181 25 230 230 229 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.06 0.12 0.064 0.039 0.068 
Note: Fixed effects regressions of bank risk taking on the following regressors: (i) securitisation ratio; (ii) 
size; (iii) loan ratio; (iv) equity capital ratio; (v) return on assets; (vi) charge-off ratio; (vii) real GDP growth; 
and (viii) quarter dummies (not reported). All the balance sheet measures are lagged one quarter. Column 1 
represents four specifications of the basic model based on: (i) full sample; (ii) sub-sample of small banks; (iii) 
sub-sample of large banks; and (iv) sub-period 2001:Q2-2006:Q4. Column 2 uses the change in the non-
performing assets to total assets ratio (∆NPATA) as the dependent variable. Column 3 uses a credit exposure 
proxy (Credit Enhancements) as a substitute for the securitisation ratio in the basic regression model. Robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the BHC-level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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A second possible concern is that the results might be affected by the onset of the 
US subprime mortgage crisis. To address this concern, we drop the 2007-year 
observations and re-estimate the regression for the 4,271 observations from the second 
quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2006. The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
A third concern is that the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio might be 
inefficient in capturing the true credit risk position of a bank. As suggested by the 
capital arbitrage hypothesis, banks might shift towards riskier assets within regulatory 
risk bands. To test this argument, we use a ratio of non-performing assets to total assets 
(NPATA) as a measure of bank credit risk; this should reflect the true riskiness of a 
bank’s portfolio given its backward-looking aspect.45
Finally, we test the “recourse hypothesis”: we suggest that the negative 
relationship between outstanding securitisation and credit risk taking may be the result 
of the credit risk exposure arising from the securitised assets through recourse. As 
discussed earlier, recourse can be provided explicitly and/or implicitly. The implicit 
nature of the latter eliminates the possibility of its identification and, therefore, 
measuring its magnitude.  The explicit recourse is, however, reported by US banks and, 
therefore, can be tested. In particular, we use the ratio of credit enhancements provided 
by the originating bank to securitisation structures (i.e., the sum of credit enhancing 
interest-only strips, subordinated securities, and standby letters of credit) scaled by the 
bank’s total assets as a proxy for the credit exposure arising from the securitised assets. 
 The results remain unchanged, 
indicating a negative relation between securitisation and the non-performing assets to 
total assets ratio, and, therefore, confirm our finding that securitisation leads to banks 
choosing portfolios of lower credit risk.  
                                                 
45
 We use non-performing asset ratio (non-performing assets scaled by total assets) rather than non-performing loan 
ratio as we aim to test the change in the riskiness of bank’s total assets and not just loans. The former additionally 
incorporates non-performing debt securities and other assets. See Appendix B for details. 
107 
 
We re-estimate the main regression substituting the credit exposure proxy for the 
outstanding securitisation.  The results show that the credit exposure arising from 
securitised assets has a negative and statistically significant impact on bank risk taking 
and, therefore, provide evidence for the proposed recourse hypothesis.  In addition, the 
variation in the effect of securitisation across different underlying asset classes, found in 
Table 5.4, provides further support for the proposed hypothesis. As suggested by Chen, 
Liu and Ryan (2008), banks are likely to retain less risk, through both contractual and 
non-contractual arrangements, in mortgage-backed securitisations due to relatively low 
and easy externally verifiable credit risk of mortgage loans. This could explain 
mortgage securitisations having a smaller impact on the risk-aversion of the issuers 
compared to securitisations of home equity lines of credit. Additionally, mortgages are 
close-ended loans as opposed to revolving loans, such as home equity lines of credit, 
which makes securitisations of the latter more implicit recourse requiring (Chen, Liu 
and Ryan, 2008; Higgins and Mason, 2004). 
5.5 Conclusions 
This essay investigated the impact of securitisation on the credit-risk taking 
behaviour of US bank holding companies during the period from 2001 to 2007. 
The empirical results indicate a significant negative impact of securitisation on 
bank credit risk taking, suggesting that banks with a greater amount of assets securitised 
are more risk-averse in their activities. Examining securitisation by the type of 
underlying assets suggests that the negative relationship between securitisation and risk 
taking is primarily driven by securitisations of mortgages, home equity lines of credit, 
and other consumer loans; among these, credit risk taking is associated most negatively 
with securitised home equity lines of credit. Securitisations of all other types of assets 
seem to have no significant impact on bank credit-risk taking behaviour. We explain 
these findings by the “recourse hypothesis”. This arises because issuing banks 
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commonly provide recourse, explicitly and/or implicitly, in securitisation transactions, 
which in turn might differ depending on the securitisation structure and, specifically, on 
the underlying assets. 
Taken as a whole, securitisation activities are found to have a negative impact on 
the credit-risk taking behaviour of banks. However, if the proposed recourse hypothesis 
is correct, the credit risk-reducing effect of securitisation might be offset by banks’ 
greater risk arising from the securitised pool. Therefore, the net impact of securitisation 
on the riskiness of issuing banks is ambiguous and will depend on the structure of 
transactions, in particular, on the relative magnitude of credit support provided by 
banks.  
Several recent proposals suggest requiring originating banks to retain exposure to 
securitisations, through a tranche or a vertical slice of the portfolio, to better align the 
incentives in the market.46
                                                 
46
 See Fender and Mitchell (2009b) for discussion. 
 In this regard, this study contributes to the ongoing 
discussions by showing that, while the net risk transfer through securitisation for 
originating banks might be ambiguous due to retained interests, banks do account for 
the consequently arising exposure reducing credit risk taking. 
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6 ESSAY III: SECURITISATION STRUCTURE AND BANK INSOLVENCY 
RISK 
6.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has exposed the risks inherent in securitisation. 
It has shown that the incentive structure of securitisation created adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems, as well as a lack of transparency and assessment of credit risks. 
Lenders lacked incentives to screen and monitor borrowers, as lending decisions were 
made with the assumption that the risks of such transactions would be passed onto third-
party investors. Eventually, this led to widespread problems in the banking sector. 
Proper alignment of incentives in securitisation is likely to remain the key issue 
for policy-makers and market practitioners in their attempt to recover the market from 
the financial crisis. A number of proposals have been issued requiring originating 
institutions to retain some exposure in connection to the assets they securitise, the so 
called skin in the game.47
                                                 
47
 See Fender and Mitchell (2009b) for discussion. 
 However, as has been revealed by the crisis, it is important to 
fully understand the potential risk implications of the retained interest for the 
originating institutions and, thereby for the banking system, along with its potential in 
reducing the incentive problem in the securitisation process. 
This essay aims to examine the relationship between banks’ involvement in their 
off-balance sheet securitisation structures and insolvency risk, with a particular focus on 
credit enhancement and liquidity support provided by the banks. Additionally, it 
examines the risk effect of credit-enhancing facilities and liquidity commitments 
provided by banks to securitisation structures of other institutions. 
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Theoretical studies on interest retention in securitisation mainly focus on the 
impact it has on the monitoring and screening effort by the originating institution. In 
particular, early studies by Gorton and Pennacchi  (1995) and Pennacchi (1988) suggest 
that retention of interest in securitised assets helps to mitigate the moral hazard problem 
arising from originators having less incentive to efficiently monitor and service loans 
after they have been sold. A recent study by Fender and Mitchell (2009a) attempts to 
examine the impact of interest retention on the originator’s screening effort when the 
originator plans to securitise the loans. In a theoretical analysis, the authors find that 
contractual mechanisms, including holding an equity tranche, a mezzanine tranche, or a 
“vertical” slice of the portfolio (a share of the entire portfolio), do affect the screening 
effort by the originating institution; however, the effect varies across the arrangements 
depending on their sensitivities to systemic risk factors.  
Another strand of research has analysed the implications of interests retained in 
connection to the securitised assets for the originating institutions (Calomiris and 
Mason, 2004; Landsman, Peasnell and Shakespeare, 2006; Standard and Poor's, 2001; 
Wolfe, 2004). The evidence across the studies is consistent and suggests that  retention 
of interest, including contractual and non-contractual credit enhancements, leads to the 
risk remaining with securitising banks. However, little research has been done to assess 
the effect that different credit-enhancing arrangements and liquidity provisions provided 
by banks in their securitisations have on the soundness of the banks. Further, to our 
knowledge, the risk effects of credit enhancement and liquidity support provided to 
third-party securitisations have not been studied previously. 
The most related prior study is by Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008), which provides 
evidence that certain general characteristics of banks’ loan securitisations determine the 
extent to which banks retain risks in connection to the off-balance sheet securitised 
assets. In a risk-association analysis applied to US bank holding company data for 
2001-2006, the authors find that banks retain more risk when: (i) the types of loans have 
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higher and/or less externally verifiable credit risk; (ii) the loans are closed-ended and 
banks retain larger contractual interests in the loans; and (iii) the loans are closed-ended 
and banks retain types of contractual interests that more strongly concentrate the risk of 
the securitised loans.48
Specifically, this study attempts to address the following research questions: (i) 
Does outstanding securitisation representing assumed implicit guarantees affect 
insolvency risk of originating banks? (ii) Does credit enhancement provided by 
originating banks to their securitisation structures affect insolvency risk of these banks? 
Does the effect differ across different forms of enhancement? (iii) Does liquidity 
support provided by originating banks to their securitisation structures affect insolvency 
risk of the banks? (iv) Does seller’s interest retained by originating banks in their 
 
Our research is different from that of Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008) in three ways 
that yield the contributions of our study to the literature. First, unlike that study we do 
not attempt to identify the characteristics of banks’ loan securitisations that are 
associated with a market measure of their equity risk and quantify those associations. 
We focus on analysing the relationship between banks’ securitisation activities and 
insolvency risk measured as a bank’s distance to default (a z-score measure). Second, 
we consider a wider range of securitisation characteristics. Specifically, aside from 
credit-enhancing interest-only strips and retained subordinated securities analysed in 
Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008), we additionally examine standby letters of credit, seller’s 
interest, and liquidity provisions. Finally, we examine credit enhancements and liquidity 
commitments provided to other institutions’ securitisation structures. These analyses 
provide wider insights into banks’ securitisation activities and make a valuable 
contribution to the existing research on securitisation. 
                                                 
48
 The three research hypotheses of the study are tested by estimating the association of a measure of 
banks’ equity risk measured as future stock return volatility with the characteristics of their loan 
securitisations. 
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securitisation structures affect insolvency risk of the banks? (v) Does credit 
enhancement provided to securitisation structures of other institutions affect insolvency 
risk of the providing banks? (vi) Does the liquidity support provided to securitisation 
structures of other institutions affect insolvency risk of the providing banks?  
Using US bank holding company data for the period from 2002 to 2007, we first 
find that credit enhancements provided by originating banks in their securitisation 
structures have a significant positive effect on insolvency risk of these banks. Second, 
examining credit enhancements by the form of underlying facility, we find that among 
credit-enhancing interest-only strips, subordinated securities, and standby letters of 
credit, the latter have the greatest positive association with bank insolvency risk, 
statistically significant at one per cent level. In contrast, liquidity provisions are found 
to have a significant risk-reducing effect. Finally, examining credit and liquidity support 
provided by banks to third-party securitisation structures, we find that credit enhancing 
third-party securitisations reduces insolvency risk of banks, while liquidity provisions 
are found to be highly positively associated with bank insolvency. 
The evidence provided in this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the 
risks arising from various forms of banks’ engagement in securitisation activities and 
consequent financial stability implications. The findings are particularly valuable in 
light of the ongoing policy debate on the originating banks’ involvement in 
securitisations.  
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows: Section 6.2 describes the data 
and provides brief descriptive statistics of the sample; the empirical specification is 
presented in Section 6.3; Section 6.4 reports the results of the analysis; finally, Section 
6.5 discusses the findings and concludes the essay. 
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6.2 Data and Descr iptive Statistics 
6.2.1 Data and Sample Selection 
To study the effect of securitisation on bank insolvency risk, we use US bank 
holding company (BHC) data from Y-9C forms obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago.49
Since June 2001, US banks have been required to provide detailed information on 
their securitisation activities in the regulatory forms. Specifically, banks are required to 
report the following items on the securitisation schedule (Schedule HC-S of the Y-9C 
report): (i) securitised assets, as an outstanding principal balance of assets sold and 
securitised with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements; (ii) maximum credit exposure arising from recourse or other seller-
provided credit enhancements provided to the reported securitisation structures in the 
form of (a) credit-enhancing interest-only strips, (b) subordinated securities and other 
residual interests, and (c) standby letters of credit and other enhancements;
 The Y-9C reports are filed by all BHCs since 1986 and collate 
quarterly bank financial data on a consolidated basis in the form of a balance sheet, an 
income statement, and detailed supporting schedules, including a schedule of off-
balance sheet items.  
50
 (iii) 
unused commitments to provide liquidity to securitisation structures; (iv) past due 
amounts, charge-offs, and recoveries on the securitised assets; (v) seller’s interests in 
the form of securities and loans51
                                                 
49
 As in chapter 
; (vi) past due amounts, charge-offs, and recoveries in 
seller’s interests.  
5, we use data for bank holding companies rather than for commercial banks because risk 
and capital management are typically administered at the highest level of the financial group. 
Additionally, securitisation may involve several subsidiaries of a BHC and affect capital and liquidity 
planning for the whole group (Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; Thomas and Wang, 2004). 
50
 Credit-enhancing interest-only strips are reported from the second quarter of 2001; subordinated 
securities and standby letters of credit are reported from the first quarter of 2003. 
51
 Seller’s interest is reported only for mortgage, home equity line, and credit card securitisations. 
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The schedule also provides information on: (i) maximum amount of credit 
exposure arising from credit enhancements provided by the reporting institution to other 
institutions’ securitisation structures (an aggregate measure of credit enhancements 
including standby letters of credit, purchased subordinated securities, and other 
enhancements); and (ii) reporting institution’s unused commitments to provide liquidity 
to other institutions’ securitisation structures.  
The data on securitisation activities are reported broken down into seven 
categories according to the underlying assets: (i) 1-4 family residential loans; (ii) home 
equity lines; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) 
commercial and industrial loans; and (viii) all other loans, all leases, and all other assets.  
The incorporation of the new data into the Y-9C reporting forms and the empirical 
design of this study determine year 2002 as the start date of the sample period, which 
yields 24 quarters from the first quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2007.  
When constructing the data set, we excluded banks with missing information on 
total assets, liquidity, loans, deposits, capital, and securitisation activities for any quarter 
of the sample period. When banks go through a merger or an acquisition, we maintain 
the code of the acquiring BHC while the acquired bank is eliminated from the sample. 
Further, to prevent the possibility of outliers driving the results, we exclude all bank-
quarters with asset growth over the last quarter exceeding 50% and loan growth 
exceeding 100%. We also exclude banks with data for less than 2 full years. We then 
assign a bank as a securitiser if there is a non-zero outstanding securitisation in at least 
one quarter and keep only securitising banks in the final data set. This yields 3,668 
bank-quarters (917 bank-years) for 194 securitising BHCs. 
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6.2.2 Descr iptive Statistics 
Before turning to the main regression analysis, we analyse the sample banks 
along: (i) balance sheet structure; (ii) loan portfolio; (iii) regulatory capital; (iv) risk; (v) 
operating performance; and (vi) securitisation activities.52
Table 6.1
 In doing, so we use quarterly 
data to calculate time-series averages for each BHC, which are then used to obtain the 
statistics for the sample. Results of the descriptive analysis are presented in tables 6.1-
6.3.  
 reports full sample statistics on the balance sheet structure, loan 
portfolio, regulatory capital, risk, and operating performance. Looking at the first panel 
of Table 6.1, we find that the average assets for the sample BHCs have a mean of over 
$47 billion and a wide range from $0.4 billion to $1,541 billion. Further, the sample 
banks hold, on average, 26% of total assets in the form of liquid assets and around 1% 
in the form of trading assets. Originated loans constitute around 64% of BHCs’ total 
assets.  
Looking at the loan composition in the second panel of Table 6.1, we find that 
real estate loans constitute the main asset class in the banks’ loan portfolios (67% of 
total loans), followed by commercial and industrial loans (16% of total loans), while 
consumer and other loans make up around 10% and 8%, accordingly. As a whole, 
banks’ loan portfolios are diversified as suggested by the mean loan Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of 0.56. 53
                                                 
52
 The construction of the variables is described in detail in 
 
  
Appendix B. 
53
 Loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated using four loan categories: (i) real estate loans, 
(ii) commercial and industrial loans, (iii) consumer loans, and (iv) other loans; a higher HHI value 
indicates higher loan portfolio concentration. 
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Table 6.1 Sample Descr iptive Statistics  
  Full Sample 
Var iable Mean StdDev Min Max 
     
Balance Sheet Structure     
Total Assets ($ billions) 47.1847 174.3366 0.0401 1514.0439 
Liquidity Ratio 0.2547 0.1187 0.0426 0.6778 
Loan Ratio 0.6428 0.1414 0.0638 0.8936 
Trading Assets/Assets  Ratio 0.0122 0.0403 0.0000 0.2915 
Deposits/Assets Ratio 0.6083 0.1377 0.0219 0.8472 
Equity/Assets Ratio 0.0970 0.0577 0.0403 0.6684 
     
Loan Por tfolio     
Real Estate Loan Ratio 0.6667 0.1913 0.0004 0.9914 
C&I Loan Ratio 0.1611 0.0838 0.0000 0.5750 
Consumer Loan Ratio 0.0951 0.1177 0.0000 0.9079 
Other Loan Ratio 0.0771 0.1278 0.0000 0.9699 
Loan HHI 0.5627 0.1637 0.2716 0.9830 
     
Regulatory Capital     
Tier I Leverage Ratio 9.9122 9.9193 3.4890 128.5069 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio 13.7379 15.9813 4.0330 209.6163 
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 15.7320 16.6774 5.3355 224.6125 
     
Operating Per formance     
Interest Income/ 
Net Operating Revenue 
0.6954 0.1746 0.0261 0.9718 
Revenue HHI 0.6440 0.0998 0.5005 0.9665 
Interest Margin 0.0215 0.0082 0.0056 0.1106 
ROA  0.0131 0.0164 -0.0194 0.1955 
ROE 0.1206 0.1609 -1.9044 0.5340 
     
Risk Character istics     
RWATA Ratio 0.7339 0.1173 0.4232 1.0498 
NPL/Loans Ratio 0.0099 0.0074 0.0000 0.0426 
Charge-Off Ratio 0.0028 0.0076 -0.0007 0.0988 
Loan Loss Allowance Ratio 0.0148 0.0148 0.0019 0.2074 
Loan Loss Provision Ratio 0.0014 0.0036 -0.0002 0.0473 
Z-Score  47.4968 47.2790 2.3823 444.2055 
RAROA  5.3958 6.1692 -0.8321 58.4938 
StdDevROA 0.0052 0.0097 0.0002 0.0863 
RAROE 5.0489 6.4688 -0.8669 71.6062 
StdDevROE  0.1019 0.6571 0.0021 9.1648 
StdDevNPL 0.0046 0.0047 0.0001 0.0307 
     
No. of BHCs (Bank-Quarters) 194 (3668)    
Note: The table presents general descriptive statistics for the full sample of 194 banks. Mean, Std Dev, 
Min, and Max stand for the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of 
the individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. For the definition and construction of the variables 
see Appendix B. 
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Turning to the liability side, the sample banks are mainly financed by deposits, 
which constitute around 61% of total assets; the capitalisation of the sample BHCs is 
around 10%. Looking at the regulatory capital in the third panel of Table 6.1, we see 
that the sample BHCs tend to be relatively highly capitalised (e.g., 15.7% for the total 
risk-based capital ratio).  
We next consider banks’ performance measures reported in the fourth panel of 
Table 6.1. The results suggest that the interest income constitutes the main source of 
revenue for the sample banks (around 70%) with the two-part revenue HHI of 0.64. As 
for the net income, it constitutes, on average, 12% of equity or 1.3% of total assets of 
the sample banks. 
The last panel of Table 6.1 reports the risk characteristics of the banks. We find 
that for the average BHC in the sample the risk-weighted assets to total assets 
(RWATA) ratio equals 0.73. Non-performing loans and charge-offs constitute 1% and 
0.3% of total loans, respectively, while the loan loss provisions constitute 0.1% relative 
to total loans.  
We next proceed to securitisation statistics for the full sample reported in Table 
6.2. Looking at the first panel of Table 6.2, one can see considerable variation in the 
amount of outstanding securitised assets, ranging from zero to 317% of total assets with 
the mean value of 9%. This magnitude of variation is mainly driven by mortgage 
securitisation, which is also the major securitisation type for the sample (6.6% of total 
assets) followed by credit card securitisations (1.3% of total assets).  
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Table 6.2 Statistics for  Secur itisation Activity 
  Full Sample 
Var iable Mean StdDev Min Max 
     Securitisation Activity 
    Sec/Assets Ratio 9.05 31.56 0.00 317.02 
MortSec/Assets Ratio 6.57 29.12 0.00 316.07 
HELSec/Assets Ratio 0.17 1.20 0.00 15.57 
CCSec/Assets Ratio 1.31 10.26 0.00 133.33 
AutoSec/Assets Ratio 0.22 1.24 0.00 13.79 
OthConsSec/Assets Ratio 0.22 1.59 0.00 18.82 
CISec/Assets Ratio 0.10 0.43 0.00 2.98 
OthSec/Assets Ratio 0.45 3.00 0.00 39.58 
     Credit Enhancements 
    SecExp Ratio 0.25 0.85 0.00 6.91 
CEI Ratio 0.08 0.40 0.00 3.78 
CEIMort Ratio 0.05 0.37 0.00 3.78 
CEIHEL Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 
CEICC Ratio 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.81 
CEIAuto Ratio 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.33 
CEIOthCon Ratio 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.21 
CEICI Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 
CEIOth Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 
SubSec Ratio 0.13 0.52 0.00 5.26 
SubSecMort Ratio 0.03 0.15 0.00 1.67 
SubSecHEL Ratio 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.67 
SubSecCC Ratio 0.05 0.31 0.00 3.82 
SubSecAuto Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 
SubSecOthCons Ratio 0.02 0.20 0.00 2.38 
SubSecCI Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 
SubSecOth Ratio 0.02 0.19 0.00 2.65 
SLC Ratio 0.09 0.64 0.00 7.45 
SLCMort Ratio 0.07 0.64 0.00 7.45 
SLCHEL Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 
SLCCC Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
SLCAuto Ratio 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.23 
SLCOthCons Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
SLCCI Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 
SLCOth Ratio 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.87 
    
 
 
 
 (continued on next page) 
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Table 6.2 (continued) 
  Full Sample 
Variable Mean StdDev Min Max 
     Liquidity Provisions 
    LiqProv Ratio 0.03 0.22 0.00 2.77 
LiqProvMort Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 
LiqProvHEL Ratio 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.49 
LiqProvCC Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
LiqProvAuto Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.18 
LiqProvOthCons Ratio 0.02 0.20 0.00 2.74 
LiqProvCI Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
LiqProvOth Ratio 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.85 
 
   
 Seller's Interest 
    SellerInterest Ratio 0.32 1.84 0.00 20.96 
SellerInterestHEL Ratio 0.02 0.24 0.00 3.32 
SellerInterestCC Ratio 0.29 1.77 0.00 20.44 
SellerInterestCI Ratio 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.19 
     Other Institutions' Securitisations 
    OthersSecExp Ratio 0.04 0.47 0.00 6.54 
OthersSecExpMort Ratio 0.03 0.47 0.00 6.54 
OthersSecExpHEL Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OthersSecExpCC Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
OthersSecExpAuto Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
OthersSecExpOthCons Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
OthersSecExpCI Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
OthersSecExpOth Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.16 
OthersSecLiqProv Ratio 0.02 0.21 0.00 2.97 
OthersSecLiqProvMort Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
OthersSecLiqProvHEL Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OthersSecLiqProvCC Ratio 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.27 
OthersSecLiqProvAuto Ratio 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.35 
OthersSecLiqProvOthCons Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
OthersSecLiqProvCI Ratio 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.51 
OthersSecLiqProvOth Ratio 0.01 0.15 0.00 2.05 
     No. of BHCs (Bank-Quarters) 194 (3668)       
     Note: The table presents statistics on securitisation activities of 194 sample banks. Mean, Std Dev, Min, 
and Max stand for the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values (in %) 
of the individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. For the definition and construction of the 
variables see Appendix B. 
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The second panel of Table 6.2 reports statistics on the credit enhancements 
provided by banks to their own securitisation structures.  The results show that the 
credit exposure arising from credit enhancements constitutes, on average, 0.25% of total 
assets; this includes an average of 0.08% in the form of credit-enhancing interest-only 
strips, 0.13% in the form of subordinated securities and other residual interests, and 
0.09% in the form of standby letters of credit. The next two panels of Table 6.2 show 
that the mean of liquidity provisions is 0.03%, while that of the seller’s interest is 
around 0.3% of total assets.54
The last panel of 
 
Table 6.2 contains information on banks’ engagement in other 
institutions’ securitisation structures. We find that the credit exposure arising from 
credit enhancements provided to other institutions’ securitisations constitutes 0.04% of 
banks’ total assets, which is significantly lower than the exposure arising from banks’ 
own securitisation structures; however, banks’ commitments to provide liquidity to 
third-party securitisations are close in the relative size to those provided to their own 
structures constituting 0.02% of total assets. 
To analyse banks’ securitisation activities not diluted by zero securitisation 
values, Table 6.3 provides statistics for observations with:  (i) non-zero total 
outstanding securitisation; (ii) non-zero mortgage securitisation; (iii) non-zero home 
equity line securitisation; (iv) non-zero credit card securitisation; (v) non-zero auto 
securitisation; (vi) non-zero other consumer loan securitisation; (vii) non-zero 
commercial and industrial securitisation; and (viii) non-zero all other loans, leases, and 
assets securitisation.  
First, looking at the statistics on the number of banks across the securitised asset 
classes in Table 6.3, one can see that most of the sample banks conduct mortgage 
securitisations (140 BHCs), followed by securitisations of other loans and leases (44 
                                                 
54
 Seller’s interest in mortgage, home equity line, and credit card securitisations. 
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BHCs); the number of banks conducting the other types of securitisations is relatively 
similar and ranges from 21 banks for other consumer loan securitisation to 32 banks for 
home equity line and credit card securitisations.55
Examining the results for observations with non-zero total securitisation presented 
in the first column of 
 
Table 6.3, we find that the mean of outstanding securitisation 
constitutes around 13% of banks’ total assets. Mean credit enhancements provided to 
banks’ own securitisations constitute around 0.3% of total assets, or around 6% of 
outstanding securitisation balance. Of those 6%, 2% are attributable to credit-enhancing 
interest-only strips, around 3% are attributable to retained subordinated securities, and 
around 2% are attributable to standby letters of credit. Banks’ commitments to provide 
liquidity to their own securitisations constitute 0.03% of total assets, or 1% of 
outstanding securitisation; ownership (or seller’s) interest carried in the form of 
securities and/or loans is around 0.4% of total assets, or 2% of outstanding 
securitisation. Interestingly, non-performing securitised loans constitute around 0.6%, 
which is lower than the on-balance sheet non-performing loan ratio of 1% (see Table 
6.1); however, the charge-offs on securitised loans of 0.4% are higher than those on the 
on-balance sheet loans of 0.3%. 
This securitisation statistics differs across securitisations of different asset classes 
presented in the following columns 2-8 of Table 6.3. For the outstanding securitisation 
reported as a percentage of total assets in the first panel of Table 6.3, mortgage and 
credit card securitisations stand out with the mean value of 13% and 9%, accordingly. 
This finding suggests that mortgage and credit card securitisations have relatively high 
transaction values. For the rest asset classes, the mean outstanding securitisation values 
relative to total assets are quite similar, ranging from a minimum of 1.6% for home 
equity lines to a maximum of 2.7% for other loans and leases. 
                                                 
55
 It is common for a bank to engage in several types of securitisation (e.g., most of the mortgage 
securitisers in the sample engage in securitisations of other asset classes). 
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Table 6.3 Statistics for  Secur itisation Activity by Asset Type 
 Non-Zero Total 
Securitisation 
Non-Zero 
Mor tgage 
Non-Zero HEL Non-Zero Credit 
Card 
Non-Zero Auto Non-Zero Other  
Consumer  
Non-Zero C&I Non-Zero All 
Other  
Var iable Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev 
                 
Outstanding Secur itisation                
Sec/Assets Ratio 12.47 50.29 13.33 57.20 1.60 3.20 8.47 24.50 1.90 3.73 2.29 4.53 1.64 2.17 2.68 6.17 
Credit Enhancements                 
SecExp Ratio 0.28 0.91 0.21 0.87 0.09 0.15 0.40 0.99 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.36 
SecExp/Sec Ratio 5.63 16.49 5.10 16.59 8.81 13.26 3.44 5.51 8.63 9.57 10.77 21.24 3.76 7.75 8.40 18.55 
CEI Ratio 0.11 0.49 0.09 0.53 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.39 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.03 
CEI/Sec Ratio 2.03 10.56 1.40 9.21 2.61 4.27 0.78 1.58 4.74 4.78 7.86 21.80 1.13 2.46 0.73 1.68 
SubSec Ratio 0.15 0.55 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.84 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.59 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.40 
SubSec/Sec Ratio 2.84 11.52 3.06 13.55 5.03 8.36 3.19 5.01 3.13 5.03 3.39 5.07 2.50 5.50 6.14 16.80 
SLC Ratio 0.09 0.65 0.11 0.77 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 
SLC/Sec Ratio 1.99 10.97 1.95 10.92 2.13 8.62 0.35 1.25 2.63 8.85 0.43 1.05 1.49 3.84 3.28 12.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liquidity Provisions                 
LiqProv Ratio 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.30 
LiqProv/Sec Ratio 1.01 7.29 0.12 0.84 1.22 5.75 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.22 7.38 17.13 1.70 7.24 5.26 20.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seller ' s Interest                 
SellerInterest Ratio 0.35 1.90   0.17 0.67 2.06 4.22     0.10 0.29   
SellerInterest/Sec Ratio 2.10 7.95   7.78 9.75 37.44 83.80     10.97 23.72   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Performing Assets and Charge-Offs                
SecNPL/Sec Ratio 0.64 1.75 0.94 2.82 1.42 2.00 0.98 0.97 0.42 0.54 2.58 2.33 0.38 0.57 0.22 0.50 
SecChargeOffs/Sec Ratio 0.42 1.27 0.17 0.74 0.62 1.09 2.21 2.64 1.51 2.72 1.32 1.85 0.41 0.93 0.10 1.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of BHCs (Bank-Quarters) 194 (1977) 140 (1407) 24 (293) 32 (307)  32 (376)  21 (302) 27 (268)  44 (489)  
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics on securitisation activities for observations with: (i) non-zero total outstanding securitisation; (ii) non-zero mortgage securitisation; (iii) non-zero home equity line 
securitisation; (iv) non-zero credit card securitisation; (v) non-zero auto securitisation; (vi) non-zero other consumer loan securitisation; (vii) non-zero commercial and industrial securitisation; and (viii) non-zero all 
other loan, lease and asset securitisation. Mean and Std Dev stand for the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation values (in %) of the individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. N reports the number of 
observations in the according sub-sample. For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix B. 
123 
 
Analysing credit enhancements across securitisations presented in the second 
panel of Table 6.3, we see that the pattern is changed. Banks tend to retain the greatest 
credit exposure in other consumer securitisations (11% of outstanding securitisation), 
followed by home equity line, auto, and other loan and lease securitisations (from 8% to 
9%). Credit exposure retained in the rest securitisations is relatively small, varying from 
its minimum value of 3% in credit card securitisations to 5% in mortgage 
securitisations. 
We also find that the distribution of the credit exposure across the three forms of 
retained interests (credit-enhancing interest-only strips, subordinated securities, and 
standby letters of credit) differs considerably across securitisations. First, for the credit-
enhancing interest-only strips, the maximum mean value of 8% (relative to outstanding 
securitisation) is observed in other consumer loan securitisations, followed by 5% in 
auto securitisations and 3% in home equity line securitisations. For the rest 
securitisations, the value varies from its minimum of less than 1% in securitisations of 
credit card receivables and other loans and leases to slightly above 1% in securitisations 
of mortgages and commercial and industrial loans. Second, for the subordinated 
securities, the maximum value of 6% (of outstanding securitisation) is observed in other 
loan and lease securitisations, followed by 5% in home equity line securitisations. For 
the rest securitisations, the value is relatively similar, with a slight variation around 3% 
and the minimum value of 2.5% in securitisations of commercial and industrial loans. 
Finally, for the standby letters of credit, we find that this form of credit enhancement 
seems to be most used in other loan and lease securitisations (above 3% of outstanding 
securitisation), followed by auto securitisations with a value of around 3%. The value 
for mortgage, home equity line, and commercial and industrial loan securitisations is 
around 2%, while the minimum mean value of less than 0.5% is observed in 
securitisations of credit card receivables and other consumer loans. 
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We next look at the statistics on liquidity provisions and seller’s interest across 
securitisations presented in the third and fourth panels of Table 6.3. The results suggest 
that liquidity provisions are most used in other consumer loan and other loan and lease 
securitisations constituting 7% and 5% of outstanding securitised assets, accordingly. 
The value for home equity line and commercial and industrial loan securitisations is 1-
2%, while it is significantly less than 1% for mortgage, credit card, and auto 
securitisations. As for the seller’s interest, there is a striking difference between the 
maximum mean value of 37% (relative to outstanding securitisation) in credit card 
securitisations and that of 11% and 8% in commercial and industrial loan and home 
equity line securitisations, respectively. 
Finally, comparing the performance of securitised loans reported in the last panel 
of Table 6.3, we find the highest non-performing loan ratio of around 3% of outstanding 
securitisation in other consumer loan securitisations, while for the rest securitisations it 
ranges from a minimum of 0.2% in other loan and lease securitisations to a maximum of 
1% in mortgage and credit card securitisations. Interestingly, the statistics for the 
charge-off ratio are different and suggest two clusters: (i) credit card, auto, and other 
consumer loan securitisations with charge-offs of 1-2% of securitised loans; and (ii) the 
rest of securitisations with charge-offs of less than 1%. 
To summarise the securitisation statistics, we find that while mortgage and credit 
card securitisations have the highest outstanding securitisation balances as a percentage 
of total assets, the maximum credit exposure is retained in securitisations of other 
consumer loans, home equity lines, auto, and other loans and leases. Other consumer 
loan securitisations also have the highest value for credit-enhancing interest-only strips 
as a percentage of outstanding securitisation. This suggests the highest excess spread in 
securitisation structures of other consumer loans, which in turn might be the result of 
higher interest received from the underlying pool of loans and/or lower interest paid on 
the issued securities; the highest non-performing loans and relatively high charge-offs in 
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other consumer loan securitisations provide some supporting evidence for the former. 
As for the retained subordinated securities and provided standby letters of credit, the 
highest values are observed in other loan and lease securitisations. Further, in both other 
consumer loan and other loan and lease securitisations we observe the highest liquidity 
provisions. Finally, the highest charge-offs are found in credit card securitisations along 
with the maximum value for seller’s interest.  
6.3 Empir ical Specification 
To address the research questions of this study presented in section 6.1, we 
estimate the relationship between banks’ securitisation activities and insolvency risk 
controlling for a number of risk-relevant bank characteristics.  
6.3.1 Bank Risk 
Our primary measure of bank insolvency risk is a z-score, denoted by Z . The z-
score has become a popular measure of bank risk and has been widely used in the 
banking literature (see Beck, Hesse, Kick and Westernhagen, 2009; De Nicolo, 2000; 
Hesse and Cihák, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007; 
Michalak and Uhde, 2009; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Specifically, the z-score measures 
the distance from insolvency for a given bank combining bank profitability, 
capitalisation, and volatility of returns. Defining insolvency as a situation in which 
losses (negative profits) exceed equity capital, insolvency risk can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )EAP E P ROA EA F ROA drπ −∞− < = − < = ∫  
where π  is profits, E  is equity capital, 
 ( / )ROA Aπ=  is return on assets,  ( / )EA E A=  
is the equity capital to assets ratio, and ( )F ROA  is return distribution with first and 
second moments ROA
 
and 2ROAσ , respectively. 
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As shown by Roy (1952), assuming profits are normally distributed: 
2
22
1( )
( )
ROAP ROA EA
ZROA EA
σ− < < =+  
Therefore: 
ROA
ROA EAZ σ +=  
where ROA
 
is the average return on assets,
 
EA  is the average equity capital ratio, and 
ROAσ
 
is the standard deviation of return on assets.  
In other words, the z-score is an indicator of a bank’s probability of insolvency in 
the sense that it estimates the number of standard deviations that the bank’s profits have 
to fall below its expected value before its equity becomes negative. A higher z-score 
indicates that a bank is more stable, where the value of the z-score depends positively 
on the bank’s profitability and capital ratio and negatively on the variability of the 
bank’s profits. 
Additional measures include bank risk-adjusted return on assets and equity, 
denoted by RAROA  and RAROE , respectively. These are used in robustness tests 
calculated as: 
 
ROA
ROARAROA σ=  
ROE
ROERAROE σ=
 
where ROE
 
is the average return on equity and ROEσ  is the standard deviation of return 
on equity. 
127 
 
6.3.2 Secur itisation 
We consider securitisation activities of a bank as: (i) total outstanding securitised 
assets ( Sec ); (ii) maximum credit exposure arising from recourse or other credit 
enhancements provided to the bank’s securitisation structures ( SecExp ); (iii) 
commitments to provide liquidity to the bank’s securitisations ( LiqProv ); (iv) 
ownership (or seller’s) interest in the bank’s securitisation structures ( SellerInterest ); (v) 
maximum credit exposure arising from recourse or other credit enhancement provided 
by the bank to other institutions’ securitisations (OthersSecExp ); and (vi) liquidity 
support provided to other institutions’ securitisations (OthersLiqProvExp ).  
We also decompose the aggregate credit exposure, SecExp , by the form of 
underlying enhancement into: (i) credit-enhancing interest-only strips ( CEIOS ); (ii) 
retained subordinated securities ( SubSec ); and (iii) standby letters of credit ( SLC ). All 
the securitisation variables included in the model are scaled by total assets. 
6.3.3 Control Var iables  
We control for a number of additional bank balance sheet and income statement 
characteristics potentially affecting insolvency risk. Bank size ( Size ), measured as a 
natural logarithm of total assets, is included to control for any systematic differences 
across size classes, including funding and risk-management opportunities; we expect a 
positive relation between bank size and risk (Hesse and Cihák, 2007; Hirtle and Stiroh, 
2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
Next, we include bank liquidity in the form of cash and securities ( Liq ) and 
anticipate higher liquidity buffers to be associated with lower insolvency risk (Laeven 
and Levine, 2009). Trading assets (Trading ) are included to control for their potential 
risk-increasing effect due to their highly volatile nature. Both liquidity and trading 
assets are scaled by total assets.  
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To control for possible differences in riskiness of banks with different loan 
portfolio concentration, we introduce a four-loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (
HHILoan ); we expect loan portfolio concentration to be positively associated with risk 
(Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007; Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007). We also control for 
bank’s capitalisation introducing an equity capital ratio (Capital ) as lower capital has 
been shown to be associated with higher risk (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007; Mercieca, 
Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006).  
Further, we control for potential revenue diversification effect on bank risk using 
a two-part revenue Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHIRev ); diversification in revenue 
sources has been shown to be negatively associated with return volatility and insolvency 
risk (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Finally, following Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006), we include bank’s asset growth ( AssetGrowth ), in a linear and quadratic 
form, to control for differences between growing and contracting banks.56
6.3.4  Model Specification 
  
Our basic model is:  
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8
i t i i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
Z Sec SecExp SecLiqProv SellerInterest OthersSecExp
OthersSecLiqProv Size Liq HHILoan Trading Capital
HHIRev AssetGrowth Asse
α β β β β ββ γ γ γ γ γγ γ γ
=+ + + + + ++ + + + + + ++ + + 2 '
, ,i t t i ttGrowth Yearθ ε+ +
  
(6.1) 
where β , γ , and θ
 
are coefficient estimates, and 
,i tε
 
is the error term for bank i in 
quarter t ( 2
,
. . . (0, )i t i i dε σ ). The dependent variable, ,i tZ , is insolvency risk of bank i 
in period t; 
,i tSec  is total outstanding securitisation; ,i tSecExp
 
is securitisation exposure 
to the bank’s own securitisations;
 
,i tLiqProv
 
is liquidity provisions to the bank’s own 
                                                 
56
 See Appendix B for detailed construction of the variables. 
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securitisations;
 
,i tSellerInterest
 
is seller’s interest in the bank’s securitisations;
 
,i tOthersSecExp
 
is bank’s exposure to other institutions’ securitisations;
 
,i tOthersLiqProv
 
is bank’s liquidity provisions to other institutions’ securitisations;
 
,i tSize  is bank size; 
,i tLiq
 
is liquidity;
 
,i tHHILoan
 
is loan portfolio concentration; 
,i tTrading
 
is trading assets;
 
,i tCapital  is equity capital;
 
,i tHHIRev
 
is revenue diversification; 
,i tAssetGrowth
 
is asset 
growth;
  
and tYear  is year dummies capturing time effects. 
Our most expanded model, decomposing securitisation exposure by the form of 
underlying enhancement, is: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
Z Sec CEIOS SubSec SLC SecLiqProv SellerInterest
OthersSecExp OthersSecLiqProv Size Liq HHILoan Trading
Capital HHIRev A
α β β β β β ββ β γ γ γ γγ γ γ
=+ + + + + + ++ + + + + + ++ + + 2 '
, 8 , ,i t i t t i tssetGrowth AssetGrowth Yearγ θ ε+ + +  
(6.2) 
where 
,i tCEIOS
 
is credit-enhancing interest-only strips,  
,i tSubSec
 
is subordinated 
securities, and 
,i tSLC
 
is standby letters of credit. 
6.4 Empir ical Results 
6.4.1 Regression Data Set 
For the regression analysis, we build a data set from annual bank observations. 
Specifically, for each bank-year we: (i) calculate averages and standard deviations of 
variables over the four quarterly observations; (ii) calculate yearly z-score, risk-adjusted 
return on assets and equity based on the yearly averages and standard deviations; and 
(iii) construct a panel of BHC/year observations. As previously mentioned, we keep 
banks with at least 2 full years of data.  
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Figure 6.1 Distr ibution of Z-Score and Ln(Z-Score)  
 
Note: The graphs plot the distribution of Z-Score and ln(Z-Score) derived from the regression data set for the 2002-2007 period, where the z-
score of a bank is calculated yearly using the averages and standard deviations across four quarters of a year. 
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As shown in Figure 6.1 (left plot), the yearly z-score obtained for the sample is 
highly skewed; therefore, we use a natural logarithm of the z-score, which is normally 
distributed (right plot).  
We also winsorise all our dependent variables at 1% level to minimise the effect 
of outliers.57
Further, the examination of the relationship between the yearly z-score and 
securitisation variables suggests non-linear association. Therefore, in the regression 
analysis, we use a logarithmic form for all the securitisation variables.
 In the remainder of the essay, we use labels: (i) “z-score” referring to the 
1% winsorised natural logarithm of the z-score; (ii) “RAROA” referring to the 1% 
winsorised risk-adjusted return on assets; and (iii) “RAROE” referring to the 1% 
winsorised risk-adjusted return on equity.  
58
6.4.2 Primary Regression Analysis 
 
We now turn to the primary regression analysis of the relationship between banks’ 
engagement in securitisation activities and insolvency risk. We estimate the relationship 
using fixed effects regression model presented in equation (6.1).59 Table 6.4  presents 
the results of nested regressions estimations. 60
                                                 
57
 Winsorisation consists of replacing the data below the Nth percentile with the Nth, i.e., a 1% 
winsorisation implies replacing the data below 1st percentile with the 1st percentile data. 
58
 As there are zero securitisation observations in the data set, we use a natural logarithm of a unit plus 
the according securitisation measure. 
 The analysis is based on the full sample 
of 917 bank-years for 194 BHCs from 2002 to 2007. The obtained adjusted R-squared 
ranges from 12.1% in the restricted model presentation to 14.1% in the expanded 
model. 
 
59
 Appendix F reports the results of the Hausman specification test. 
60
 Appendix E reports the correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables. 
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Table 6.4 Effects of Secur itisation Structures on Bank Insolvency Risk 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Seci,t -0.48 -0.44 -0.59* -0.45 -0.46 -0.49 -0.48 
 (-1.129) (-1.054) (-1.830) (-1.072) (-1.094) (-1.163) (-1.158) 
SecExpi,t  -15.79**  -15.73** -15.98** -15.82** -16.03** 
  (-2.306)  (-2.308) (-2.379) (-2.348) (-2.397) 
CEIOSi,t   16.74     
   (0.613)     
SubSeci,t   -7.54     
   (-0.793)     
SLCi,t   -33.35***     
   (-5.089)     
SecLiqProvi,t    42.78* 42.68* 43.20* 48.07** 
    (1.874) (1.867) (1.891) (2.125) 
SellerInteresti,t     4.93 4.97 5.09 
     (0.789) (0.795) (0.805) 
OthersSecExpi,t      16.71*** 16.83*** 
      (14.895) (13.810) 
OthersSecLiqProvi,t       -56.28*** 
       (-3.330) 
Sizei,t -1.02*** -1.02*** -1.11*** -1.01*** -1.00*** -1.00*** -0.99*** 
 (-4.151) (-4.274) (-3.681) (-4.249) (-4.134) (-4.138) (-4.066) 
Liqi,t 1.55 1.35 -0.38 1.30 1.27 1.20 1.15 
 (1.498) (1.391) (-0.338) (1.348) (1.307) (1.230) (1.179) 
HHILoani,t 1.07 1.04 0.85 1.05 0.93 0.91 0.81 
 (1.203) (1.208) (0.792) (1.219) (1.037) (1.014) (0.901) 
Tradingi,t -4.54 -3.45 -5.05 -3.54 -3.58 -3.65 -2.53 
 (-1.011) (-0.713) (-0.850) (-0.745) (-0.762) (-0.782) (-0.545) 
Capitali,t 1.27 0.40 0.04 0.47 0.95 1.05 0.97 
 (0.720) (0.222) (0.014) (0.262) (0.465) (0.513) (0.476) 
HHIRevi,t 0.58 0.55 1.19 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.49 
 (0.793) (0.711) (1.283) (0.681) (0.697) (0.687) (0.635) 
AssetGrowthi,t 8.40*** 7.64*** 7.80** 7.69*** 7.81*** 7.91*** 7.70*** 
 (3.907) (3.475) (2.324) (3.499) (3.470) (3.513) (3.468) 
AssetGrowthi,t2 -80.88*** -75.04*** -71.00** -74.75*** -77.20*** -77.68*** -76.31*** 
 (-3.676) (-3.362) (-2.025) (-3.348) (-3.330) (-3.341) (-3.323) 
Yeart Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 19.11*** 19.36*** 20.81*** 19.25*** 19.02*** 19.08*** 18.97*** 
 (5.284) (5.432) (4.642) (5.414) (5.305) (5.313) (5.279) 
        
No. of Observations 917 917 766 917 917 917 917 
No. of of BHCs 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.132 0.146 0.133 0.133 0.138 0.141 
 
Note: The table presents the results of nested regressions of bank insolvency risk on securitisation variables. The dependent 
variable is a z-score (Z) measuring a bank's distance to default and calculated yearly as the bank's yearly average return on assets 
plus yearly average capital to assets ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on assets over the four quarters of the year. 
We use a natural logarithm of the z-score, winsorised at 1% level. The independent variables are computed as averages for each 
BHC over four quarters in a given year. We use natural logarithms for securitisation variables, which include:  (i) securitisation 
ratio (Sec); (ii) credit exposure arising from credit enhancements (SecExp); (iii) credit-enhancing interest-only strips (CEIOS); 
(iv) subordinated securities (SubSec); (v) standby letters of credit (SLC); (vi) liquidity provisions (LiqProv); (vii) sellers' interest 
(SellerInterest); (viii) credit exposure arising from credit-enhancing other institutions' securitisations (OthersSecExp); (ix) 
liquidity provisions to other institutions’' securitisations (OthersLiqProv). The control variables include: (i) bank size, measured 
as a natural logarithm of total assets (Size); (iii)  liquidity ratio (Liq); (iv) loan concentration, measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHILoan); (v) trading assets ratio (Trading); (vi) capital ratio (Capital); (vii) revenue concentration, measured by 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIRev); (viii) asset growth (Growth); and (ix) asset growth squared (AssetGrowth2) (see 
Appendix B for the definition and construction of the variables). Fixed effects regressions are run for the full sample of BHCs 
covering the period from 2002 to 2007 with exemption of column 3 where the regression is run for 2003-2007. Year dummies are 
incorporated in all regressions. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the BHC-level. *, 
**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The first column of Table 6.4 reports the estimation results of the model with total 
outstanding securitisation, capturing implicit recourse, and control variables. The 
coefficient on securitisation is found to be negative, however, not statistically 
significant. Therefore, we find no evidence of a significant effect of implicit recourse in 
securitisations on the soundness of originating banks. 
Examining the control variables, we find a positive association between bank size 
and insolvency risk (a negative effect on the z-score). This finding is consistent with 
previous studies (Hesse and Cihák, 2007; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). The 
effect of asset growth is found to be reducing bank insolvency risk, while the result is 
opposite for the asset growth squared. The latter is also reported by Mercieca, Schaeck 
and Wolfe (2007) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006). This finding might be interpreted as 
the asset growth being advantageous; however, the effect depends negatively on the 
level of the asset growth.  
Further, the evidence suggests that liquidity, capital, and both loan and revenue 
diversification have a risk-reducing effect, while trading assets seem to increase bank 
insolvency risk. These results confirm the expected associations and are consistent 
across all the models; however, the estimates are not statistically significant (with 
exception of model 3, which is a special case and will be discussed later in the section). 
The second column of Table 6.4 introduces securitisation exposure in the model; 
this raises the adjusted R-squared by 0.9% to 13.2%. The coefficient on the 
securitisation exposure emerges negative and statistically significant at 5% level. In 
other words, the exposure arising from retained interests in securitisation structures and 
constituting only 0.25% of total assets has a significant risk-increasing effect for 
originating banks.  
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We further expand the model in column 3 of Table 6.4 decomposing securitisation 
exposure by the form of retained interest into credit-enhancing interest-only strips, 
subordinated securities, and standby letters of credit. This model specification requires a 
caveat. Credit-enhancing interest-only strips are reported by banks starting from the 
second quarter of 2001, while the starting reporting date for subordinated securities and 
standby letters of credit is the first quarter of 2003. As this model specification is crucial 
in terms of this study, we drop the 2002 observations and estimate the model for the 
2003-2007 period. Examining the results, we find that in the 2003-2007 specification 
the coefficient on outstanding securitisation remains negative, but becomes statistically 
significant at 10% level; the estimates for the control variables remain unchanged. 
Looking at retained interests, credit-enhancing interest-only strips are found to have a 
negative but statistically insignificant effect on bank risk; the effect of subordinated 
securities is found to be risk-increasing, however, also statistically insignificant; most 
interestingly, the effect of standby letters of credit on bank risk is found to be positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level suggesting that this form of retained interest, 
which makes around 1% of total assets, significantly increases insolvency risk of 
originating banks. It is also worth noting that the 2003-2007 model specification has the 
highest R-squared of 14.6%. 
In the following columns 4-7 of Table 6.4 we control for the securitisation 
exposure arising from retained interests in the aggregated form to avoid losing the data 
for year 2002. The model in column 4 introduces banks’ liquidity provisions to their 
own securitisation structures. The effect of liquidity provisions on the z-score is found 
to be positive and statistically significant at 10% level; this suggests a risk-reducing 
effect of liquidity provisions, a result remaining consistent in all models where the 
variable is included. In column 5 of Table 6.4 we add seller’s interest in the estimation, 
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which is found to have a positive effect on bank risk; however, the estimate is not 
statistically significant.61
Finally, we test the risk effects of banks’ engagement in enhancing third-party 
securitisation structures in columns 6-7 of 
  
Table 6.4. First, in column 6, we test the 
effect of providing credit enhancements to other institutions’ securitisations, including 
standby letters of credit, subordinated securities, and other facilities. We find that credit-
enhancing interests in third-party securitisations have a negative effect on insolvency 
risk of the banks; the result is statistically significant at 1% level. This finding may be 
referred to a possible positive diversification effect that investing in other institutions’ 
structures might have on bank performance. Next, in column 7, we test the effect of 
liquidity support provided to other institutions’ securitisations. We find that liquidity 
provision commitments in third-party securitisation structures, in opposite, have a 
positive effect on bank risk decreasing the z-score; the estimate is significant at 1% 
level. 
Summarising the main results, we find interesting evidence on the effects that 
different forms of engagement in securitisation activities have on bank insolvency risk. 
Addressing the research questions formulated in section 6.1 in sequence: (i) we find that 
outstanding securitisation, representing possible implicit recourse provided to 
securitisation structures, does not have a significant effect bank insolvency risk; (ii) 
credit exposure, arising through interests retained in securitisation structures and 
constituting a much smaller percentage of total assets, in turn significantly reduces 
banks’ distance to default; among the three forms of credit enhancement examined, we 
find robust evidence of a significant risk-increasing effect of standby letters of credit; 
(iii) we find a risk-reducing effect for banks’ liquidity provisions to their own 
securitisation structures; (iv) seller’s interest is found to have no significant effect on 
                                                 
61
 Seller’s interest retained in mortgage, home equity line, and credit card securitisations. 
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bank insolvency risk; (v) the evidence suggests that credit enhancement provided to 
other institutions’ securitisations reduces insolvency risk; while (vi) liquidity facilities 
provided to other institutions’ securitisation structures tend to significantly increase 
bank insolvency.  
6.4.3 Robustness Tests 
We conduct a number of additional tests to verify the robustness of our results, 
which are presented in Table 6.5. 
Specifically, we first address a possible outliers concern by winsorising the z-
score measure at higher 2.5% and 5% levels and re-estimating equations (6.1) and (6.2) 
for each of the winsorisation levels. The results of the regressions are reported in 
columns 1-4 of Table 6.5. We find that all the coefficients remain qualitatively 
unchanged, except that for liquidity provisions which emerges statistically insignificant 
in 2003-2007 regressions (columns 2 and 4).   
We next use different measures for the dependent variable. Following Stiroh 
(2007), we use banks’ risk-adjusted return on assets and equity. We re-estimate 
equations (6.1) and (6.2), consistently winsorising the measures at 1% level. The results 
of the regressions are reported in columns 5-8 of Table 6.5. Looking at the RAROA 
regressions (columns 5 and 6), we find that the results for securitisation activities 
remain unchanged. This is also the case for the RAROE regressions (columns 7 and 8), 
except for the coefficient on the seller’s interest which remains negative, but becomes 
statistically significant in the 2003-2007 specification (column 8). 
Overall, the additional analyses confirm our main findings with the effects of 
banks’ engagement in securitisation activities found to be consistent and robust to the 
conducted tests. 
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Table 6.5 Robustness Tests for  the Effects of Secur itisation Structures on Bank 
Insolvency Risk 
  
  Z-Score(w025) Z-Score(w05) RAROA RAROE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Seci,t -0.36 -0.47 -0.14 -0.25 -0.92 -1.54 -0.11 2.70 
 (-0.891) (-1.479) (-0.396) (-0.853) (-0.210) (-0.274) (-0.020) (0.792) 
SecExpi,t -15.17**  -13.83**  -201.87**  -133.54**  
 (-2.276)  (-2.216)  (-2.121)  (-2.126)  
CEIOSi,t  19.91  19.23  -163.57  42.88 
  (0.727)  (0.758)  (-0.435)  (0.228) 
SubSeci,t  -5.95  -5.37  -123.02  -120.31 
  (-0.706)  (-0.654)  (-0.717)  (-1.336) 
SLCi,t  -32.14***  -27.73***  -482.53***  -175.87** 
  (-4.879)  (-4.557)  (-3.270)  (-1.989) 
SecLiqProvi,t 47.72** 27.69 46.59** 25.43 862.86* 775.87* 1,011.31* 718.97* 
 (2.268) (1.018) (2.338) (0.978) (1.797) (1.872) (1.858) (1.853) 
SellerInteresti,t 4.70 -3.51 4.11 -3.37 -34.34 -104.58 -63.26 -166.45* 
 (0.756) (-0.365) (0.707) (-0.377) (-0.643) (-1.272) (-1.207) (-1.967) 
OthersSecExpi,t 14.80*** 5.49*** 12.17*** 5.17*** 41.51*** 41.41* 56.94*** 52.73*** 
 (12.672) (2.741) (11.260) (2.817) (2.988) (1.776) (4.404) (2.641) 
OthersSecLiqProvi,t -59.05*** -109.94* -58.10*** -91.45 -1,309.8*** -3,210.4*** -913.3*** -2,043.9*** 
 (-3.467) (-1.796) (-3.481) (-1.640) (-9.385) (-3.117) (-6.520) (-3.308) 
Sizei,t -0.96*** -1.06*** -0.91*** -0.98*** -9.87*** -14.24*** -10.35*** -12.08*** 
 (-4.066) (-3.566) (-4.031) (-3.433) (-2.747) (-3.541) (-3.190) (-3.936) 
Liqi,t 1.14 -0.39 1.11 -0.33 22.17* 10.68 12.90 -7.34 
 (1.194) (-0.353) (1.198) (-0.306) (1.681) (0.780) (0.894) (-0.550) 
HHILoani,t -2.26 -5.16 -2.22 -4.96 33.14*** 30.90** 27.55*** 28.51** 
 (-0.487) (-0.893) (-0.504) (-0.896) (2.734) (2.127) (2.828) (2.597) 
Tradingi,t 0.81 -0.54 0.56 -1.09 7.13 24.19 56.89 44.35 
 (0.412) (-0.223) (0.305) (-0.489) (0.154) (0.350) (0.923) (0.606) 
Capitali,t 6.90*** 7.11** 5.72*** 6.02** -9.93 -57.00* -27.03 -58.06** 
 (3.188) (2.154) (2.831) (1.978) (-0.483) (-1.914) (-1.488) (-2.464) 
HHIRevi,t -70.15*** -63.66* -60.23*** -54.02* 10.27 14.55 4.66 9.28 
 (-3.131) (-1.835) (-2.858) (-1.674) (1.271) (1.527) (0.527) (1.307) 
AssetGrowthi,t 0.47 1.16 0.50 1.11 61.33** 81.09* 28.27 19.42 
 (0.606) (1.264) (0.656) (1.222) (2.353) (1.824) (1.272) (0.746) 
AssetGrowthi,t2 0.82 0.88 0.81 0.88 -600.98** -640.65 -538.17** -306.26 
 (0.917) (0.779) (0.931) (0.803) (-2.212) (-1.426) (-2.170) (-1.107) 
Yeart Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 18.64*** 20.20*** 17.87*** 19.06*** 129.46** 200.07*** 146.49*** 176.28*** 
 (5.300) (4.563) (5.295) (4.461) (2.410) (3.393) (2.929) (3.772) 
         
No. of Observations 917 766 917 766 917 766 917 766 
No. of BHCs 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.141 0.127 0.130 0.075 0.095 0.067 0.063 
 
Note: The table presents the results of additional analyses that test different dependent variables in the basic and expanded models (equations 
(6.1) and (6.2)). Columns 1-2 use a 2.5% winsorised z-score as the dependent variable (Z-Score(w025)); columns 3-4 apply a higher 
winsorisation level of 5% (Z-Score(w05)). Columns 5-6 use a risk-adjusted return on assets, winsorised at 1% level, as the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable in columns 7-8 is a risk-adjusted return on equity winsorised at 1%. The dependent variables in all the regressions are 
computed on a yearly basis using averages and standard deviations for each BHC over four quarters in a given year. The independent variables 
are averages of four quarterly observations in a year for each BHC. We use natural logarithms for securitisation variables, which include:  (i) 
securitisation ratio (Sec); (ii) credit exposure arising from credit enhancements (SecExp); (iii) credit-enhancing interest-only strips (CEIOS); (iv) 
subordinated securities (SubSec); (v) standby letters of credit (SLC); (vi) liquidity provisions (LiqProv); (vii) sellers' interest (SellerInterest); 
(viii) credit exposure arising from credit-enhancing other institutions' securitisations (OthersSecExp); (ix) liquidity provisions to other 
institutions’' securitisations (OthersLiqProv). The control variables include: (i) size, measured as a natural logarithm of total assets (Size) ; (iii)  
liquidity ratio (Liq); (iv) loan concentration, measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHILoan); (v) trading assets ratio (Trading); (vi) 
capital ratio (Capital); (vii) revenue concentration, measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIRev); (viii) asset growth (Growth); and (ix) 
asset growth squared (AssetGrowth2) (see Appendix B for the definition and construction of the variables). Fixed effects regressions are run for 
the full sample of BHCs from 2002 to 2007 in the basic model (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and from 2003 to 2007 in the expanded model (columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8). Year dummies are incorporated in all regressions. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at 
the BHC-level. *, **,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
In this essay we used US bank holding company data for the period from 2002 to 
2007 to estimate the relationship between banks’ off-balance sheet securitisation 
structures and insolvency risk. In doing so, we particularly focused on credit 
enhancement and liquidity support provided by banks to their own as well as third-party 
securitisations.  
First, we find that credit enhancement provided by originating banks to their own 
securitisation structures has a significant positive effect on insolvency risk of the banks. 
Second, examining credit enhancement by the form of underlying facility, we find that 
among credit-enhancing interest-only strips, subordinated securities, and standby letters 
of credit, the latter have the greatest positive association with bank insolvency risk. In 
contrast, liquidity provisions are found to have a significant risk-reducing effect. 
Finally, examining credit and liquidity support provided by banks to third-party 
securitisation structures, we find that credit enhancing third-party securitisations reduces 
insolvency risk, while liquidity provisions are found to be highly positively associated 
with bank insolvency. 
According to the European Central Bank Financial Stability Review (ECB, 2009), 
policy-makers acknowledge the potential benefits of securitisation in credit risk transfer 
and diversification and aim at reviving the securitisation market by introducing more 
standardised and simple securitisation structures reducing the dependence and 
involvement of the originator in the transactions. In this regard, our results contribute to 
a deeper understanding of the risks arising from banks’ securitisation activities, 
including securitising assets as well as enhancing third-party securitisations, and have 
direct implications for the ongoing discussions on how to redesign the securitisation 
model and restart the market. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The past two decades witnessed significant developments in global securitisation 
markets. This was driven by the numerous benefits offered to the market participants, 
strong encouragement by regulators based on the perception that securitisation 
strengthens the banking system as a whole through credit risk transfer and 
diversification, and favouring macroeconomic conditions.  However, along with the size 
of the market, the level of innovation and complexity of transactions has also increased. 
This, coupled with the incentive structure of the securitisation model, opacity of 
information on the securitised products, and associated excessive reliance on external 
credit ratings based on model assumptions, posed challenges for the appropriate 
assessment of risks by investors, regulators, credit rating agencies, and originators 
themselves, thereby increasing the fragility of the financial system. 
The risks inherent in the securitisation process have unfolded during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis has shown that the “originate and distribute” model 
introduced by securitisation created a lack of transparency and assessment of credit risk, 
as well as adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Originators lacked incentives to 
screen and monitor borrowers, as lending decisions were made with the assumption that 
the risks of such transactions would be passed onto outside investors. Credit rating 
agencies were less willing to monitor properly on a continuing basis the performance of 
securitised assets and effect timely credit rating downgrades. Investors lacked incentives 
to conduct due diligence in the risk assessment of securitised products relying 
excessively on credit ratings and thus failing to play an effective disciplining role in the 
process. Finally, regulators failed to comprehend the potential threat to the financial 
stability arising from the regulatory capital and accounting arbitrage through 
securitisation and the excessive use of structured finance by banks for funding 
introducing a new element of volatility and instability into the model of banking 
institutions, and consequently provide due regulation and supervision. 
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The financial market turmoil of the past two years has also shown that a relatively 
contained problem in the bank securitisation market can spread to other financial 
markets and freeze considerable parts of the financial system. This contagion effect 
further magnifies the importance of understanding banks’ engagement in securitisation 
activities by regulators and market participants, the benefits and risks inherent, and the 
potential financial system implications.  
Against this background, this thesis attempts to provide valuable insights into 
bank securitisation activities. It comprises empirical research on the effects of 
securitisation presented in three essays.  
In the first essay we analyse the effects of securitisation on performance of US 
commercial banks during the pre-crisis period from 2002 to 2007. The theoretical 
predictions are that securitisation should lead to lower funding costs, lower credit risk 
exposure, and higher profitability.  First, testing the hypotheses in the univariate 
analysis of securitisers and non-securitisers, we find that securitising banks do tend to 
be more profitable institutions, but with higher credit risk exposure and a higher cost of 
funding compared to non-securitising banks. To assess the causal securitisation effect, 
we further focus on the first-time securitisers and attempt to estimate their 
counterfactual performance, or the performance these banks would have had had they 
not securitised. Using a propensity score matching approach, we build a sample of non-
securitisers with ex-ante similar securitisation likelihood and use their ex-ante 
performance as the counterfactual performance of the first-time securitisers.  The 
analysis suggests that the first-time securitisers would have comparable cost of funding, 
credit risk, and profitability had they not securitised. Consequently, we conclude that 
securitisation as a funding, risk management, and profitability improvement technique 
does not seem to outperform alternative techniques possibly used by adequately 
matched non-securitising banks. This evidence raises important questions about the 
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motives for and the ultimate value of banks’ increasing securitisation activities over the 
past decade. 
In the second essay we investigate the impact of securitisation on the credit-risk 
taking behaviour of US bank holding companies during the period from 2001 to 2007. 
In a panel data regression analysis, we first we find  a significant negative impact of 
securitisation on bank credit risk taking, suggesting that banks with a greater amount of 
assets securitised are more risk-averse in their activities. Examining securitisation by 
the type of underlying assets, we find that the negative relationship between 
securitisation and risk taking is primarily driven by securitisations of mortgages, home 
equity lines of credit, and other consumer loans; among these, credit risk taking is 
associated most negatively with securitised home equity lines of credit. Securitisations 
of all other types of assets seem to have no significant impact on bank credit-risk taking 
behaviour. We explain these findings by the banks’ credit risk exposure to securitised 
assets retained through explicit and/or implicit recourse provided in the transactions. If 
the proposed “recourse hypothesis” is correct, the credit risk-reducing effect of 
securitisation might be offset by banks’ greater risk arising from the securitised pool. 
Therefore, the net impact of securitisation on the riskiness of issuing banks is 
ambiguous and will depend on the structure of transactions, in particular, on the relative 
magnitude of credit support provided by banks.  
We examine credit and liquidity support in the third essay. Specifically, using the 
sample for US bank holding companies, we empirically estimate the relationship 
between insolvency risk and different forms of credit enhancement and liquidity support 
provided by banks to their own and other institutions’ securitisation structures. First, we 
find that credit enhancement provided by originating banks to their own securitisation 
structures has a significant positive effect on insolvency risk of the banks. Second, 
examining credit enhancement by the form of underlying facility, we find that among 
credit-enhancing interest-only strips, subordinated securities, and standby letters of 
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credit, the latter have the greatest positive association with bank insolvency risk. In 
contrast, liquidity provisions are found to have a significant risk-reducing effect.  
Finally, examining credit and liquidity support provided by banks to third-party 
securitisation structures, we find that credit enhancing third-party securitisations reduces 
insolvency risk, while liquidity provisions are found to be highly positively associated 
with insolvency risk of the banks. 
In summary, the evidence is consistent across the three studies. We find that 
securitisation might have a risk-reducing effect as banks with greater outstanding 
securitisation chose asset portfolios of lower credit risk. However, we also find that 
interests retained by originating banks in connection to the securitised assets tend to 
significantly increase bank insolvency risk and may, therefore, offset the beneficial 
effects of securitisation. This in turn is consistent and partially explains the finding that 
securitisation seems not to have improved performance of banks in the lead-up to the 
crisis.  
Taken together, the evidence leads us to conclude that securitisation as structured 
by the banks seems to have been used for funding, rather that as a risk management or 
performance improvement technique. Further, it suggests that securitisation might have 
had  have beneficial effects on originating banks; however, these effects seem to be 
offset by the originating banks’ excessive involvement in transactions. 
Relating these findings to current developments in the market, several sets of 
measures have been proposed to address weaknesses in the securitisation process in 
response to the lessons of the financial crisis. The proposals refer to the regulatory 
capital framework as well as the structural weaknesses revealed by the crisis. Among 
the proposed changes in the regulatory framework are higher risk weights on 
securitisation exposures retained by originators and hence higher minimum capital 
requirements; while the structural changes include introducing more standardised and 
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simple securitisation structures and reducing the dependence and the involvement of the 
originator in the transactions. Therefore, the findings of this research may be 
particularly valuable for the ongoing discussions of the weaknesses of the securitisation 
process and the changes in the securitisation model needed to restart the market.  
The research could be further enhanced by analysing the European securitisation 
market. Specifically, by conducting a comparison of the securitisation behaviour of 
European banks and examining whether the structural model and, consequently, the 
effect of securitisation differ due to differences in accounting standards and regulation. 
This research would contribute to the continuing search for a consensus in regulation 
and accounting standards for securitisation across the markets. 
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Appendix A Commercial Bank Data Definition and Construction 
Variable Definition Construction (Call Report Data Items) 
  
  
Balance Sheet Structure   
Total Assets Total Assets RCFD2170 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid Assets/Assets Ratio (RCFD0081 + RCFD0071 + RCFD1754 + RCFD1773)/RCFD2170 
Loan Ratio Loans/Assets Ratio RCFD1400/RCFD2170 
Deposits/Assets Ratio Deposits/Assets Ratio RCFD2200/RCFD2170 
Equity/Assets Ratio Equity Capital/Assets Ratio RCFD3210/RCFD2170 
  
  
Loan Portfolio Composition   
Real Estate Loan Ratio Real Estate Loans/Assets Ratio RCFD1410/RCFD1400 
C&I Loan Ratio  Commercial and Industrial Loans/Assets 
Ratio 
(RCFD1590 + RCFD1766)/RCFD1400 
Consumer Loan Ratio Consumer Loans/Assets Ratio RCFD1975/RCFD1400 
Other Loan Ratio Other Loans/Assets Ratio (RCFD1400 - RCFD1410 - RCFD1766 - RCFD1590 - RCFD1975)/RCFD1400 
Loan HHI Loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (RCFD1410/RCFD1400)^2 + (RCFD1590 + RCFD1766/RCFD1400)^2 + 
+RCFD1975/RCFD1400)^2 + ((RCFD1400 - RCFD1410 - RCFD1766 -RCFD1590-
- RCFD1975)/RCFD1400)^2 
  
  
Regulatory Capital   
Tier I Leverage Ratio Tier I Leverage Ratio RCFD7204  
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio RCFD7206 
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio RCFD7205 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  (continued on next page) 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (Call Report Data Items) 
  
  Cost of Funding   
Interest Expense/Liabilities Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratio RIAD4073/RCFD2948 
  
  
Risk Characteristics   
NPL Ratio Non-Performing Loans/Assets Ratio (RCFD1407 + RCFD1403)/RCFD1400 
RWATA  Ratio Risk-Weighted Assets/Total Assets Ratio RCFDA223/RCFD2170 
Charge-Off Ratio Net Charge-Offs/Loans Ratio RIAD4635/RCFD1400 
Allowance Ratio Allowance for Loan Losses/Loans Ratio RCFD3123/RCFD1400 
Loan Loss Provision Ratio Provision for Loan Losses/Loans Ratio RIAD4230/RCFD1400 
  
  
Operating Performance   
Return on Assets Net Income/Total Assets RIAD4340/RCFD2170 
Return on Equity Net Income/Equity Capital RIAD4340/RCFD3210 
Net Interest Margin Net Interest Income/Total Assets RIAD4074/RCFD2170 
Interest Income/Net Operating 
Revenue 
Interest Income/Net Operating Revenue RIAD4074/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079) 
Noninterest Income/Net 
Operating Revenue 
Non-Interest Income/Net Operating 
Revenue 
RIAD4079/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079) 
Revenue HHI  Revenue Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (RIAD4074/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079))^2 + (RIAD4079/(RIAD4074 +  
+RIAD4079))^2 
 Note: Variables used in chapter 4. Commercial bank data items are taken from Federal Reserve’s Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports). 
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Appendix B Bank Holding Company Data Definition and Construction 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
 
  
Balance Sheet Structure   
Total Assets Total Assets BHCK2170 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid Assets/Assets Ratio (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773)/BHCK2170 
Loan Ratio Loans/Assets Ratio BHCK 2122/BHCK2170 
Loans/Deposits Ratio Loans/Deposits Ratio BHCK3516/(BHCK3517 + BHCK3404) 
Trading Assets/Assets Ratio Trading Assets/Assets Ratio BHCK3545/BHCK2170 
Deposits/Assets Ratio Deposits/Assets Ratio (BHCK3517+ BHCK3404)/BHCK3368 
Equity/Assets Ratio Equity Capital/Assets Ratio BHCK3210/BHCK2170 
 
  
Loan Portfolio   
Real Estate Loan Ratio Real Estate Loans/Assets Ratio BHCK1410/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
C&I Loan Ratio Commercial and Industrial 
Loans/Assets Ratio 
(BHCK1763 + BHCK1764)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Consumer Loan Ratio Consumer Loans/Assets Ratio (BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Other Loan Ratio Other Loans/Assets Ratio (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123 - BHCK1410 - BHCK1763 - BHCK1764 - BHCKB538 -       
BHCKB539 - BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Loan HHI Loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (BHCK1410/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123))^2 + ((BHCK1763 + BHCK1764)/ 
(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123))^2 + ((BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + BHCK2011)/ 
(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123))^2 + ((BHCK2122 + BHCK2123 - BHCK1410  - 
BHCK1763 - BHCK1764 - BHCKB538 - BHCKB539 - BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 +     
BHCK2123))^2 
 
  
Regulatory Capital   
Tier I Leverage Ratio Tier I Leverage Ratio BHCK7204 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio BHCK7206 
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio BHCK7205 
   
   
   
  (continued on next page) 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
 
  Operating Performance   
Interest Income/Net Operating 
Revenue 
Interest Income/Net Operating 
Revenue 
BHCK4074/(BHCK4074 + BHCK4079) 
Revenue HHI Revenue Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (BHCK4074/(BHCK4074 + BHCK4079))^2 + (BHCK4079/(BHCK4074 +                     
BHCK4079))^2 
Interest Margin Net Interest Income/Total Assets BHCK4074/BHCK3368 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net Income/Total Assets BHCK4340/BHCK3519 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net Income/Equity Capital BHCK4340/BHCK3368 
 
  
Risk Characteristics   
RWATA Ratio Risk-Weighted Assets/Total Assets 
Ratio 
BHCKA223/BHCK2170 
Non-Performing Loan (NPL) 
Ratio 
Non-Performing Loans/Assets Ratio BHCK5524 + BHCK 5525 + BHCK 5526 - BHCK3505 - BHCK 3506 - BHCK 3507)/ 
BHCK 3368 
NPL/Loans  Ratio Non-Performing Loans/Loans  Ratio (BHCK5525 + BHCK5526 - BHCK3506 - BHCK3507)/BHCK3516 
Charge-Off Ratio Net Charge-Offs/Loans Ratio (BHCK4635 - BHCK4605)/BHCK3516 
Loan Loss Allowance Ratio Allowance for Loan Losses/Loans 
Ratio 
BHCK3123/BHCK3516 
Loan Loss Provision  Ratio Quarterly Provision for Loan 
Losses/Loans  Ratio 
BHCK4230/BHCK3516 
Z-Score (Z)  Z-Score  
RAROA  Risk-Adjusted Return on Assets  
StdDevROA Standard Deviation of Return on Assets  
RAROE Risk-Adjusted Return on Equity  
StdDevROE  Standard Deviation of Return on 
Equity 
 
StdDevNPL Standard Deviation of Non-Performing 
Loan Ratio 
 
   
  (continued on next page) 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
 
  Securitisation   
Sec/Assets Ratio Securitised Assets/Total Assets Ratio (BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710+  
BHCKB711)/BHCK2170 
SecExp Ratio Credit Enhancements/Total Assets 
Ratio 
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +    
BHCKB717 + BHCKB718 + BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + 
BHCKC397 + BHCKC398 + BHCKC399 + BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 +   
BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/BHCK2170     
SecExp/Sec Ratio Credit Enhancements/Securitised 
Assets Ratio 
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 +  BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +   
BHCKB717 + BHCKB718 + BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + 
BHCKC397 + BHCKC398 + BHCKC399 + BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + 
BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + 
BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
CEI Ratio Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only 
Strips/Total Assets Ratio 
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +    
BHCKB717 + BHCKB718)/BHCK2170    
CEI/Sec Ratio Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only 
Strips/Securitised Assets Ratio 
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +    
BHCKB717 + BHCKB718)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
SubSec Ratio Subordinated Securities/Total Assets 
Ratio 
(BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 +    
BHCKC398 + BHCKC399)/BHCK2170 
SubSec/Sec Ratio Subordinated Securities/Securitised 
Assets Ratio 
(BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 +    
BHCKC398 + BHCKC399)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
SLC Ratio Standby Letters of Credit/Total Assets 
Ratio 
(BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 +    
BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/BHCK2170 
SLC/Sec Ratio Standby Letters of Credit/Securitised 
Assets Ratio 
(BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 +    
BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
   
  (continued on next page) 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
 
  
LiqProv Ratio Liquidity Provision 
Commitments/Total Assets Ratio 
(BHCKB726 + BHCKB727 + BHCKB728 + BHCKB729 + BHCKB730 +    
BHCKB731 + BHCKB732)/BHCK2170 
LiqProv/Sec Ratio Liquidity Provision 
Commitments/Securitised Assets Ratio 
(BHCKB726 + BHCKB727 + BHCKB728 + BHCKB729 + BHCKB730 +    
BHCKB731 + BHCKB732)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
SecNPL/Sec Ratio Past Due Securitised Assets/Securitised 
Assets Ratio 
(BHCKB740 + BHCKB741 + BHCKB742 + BHCKB743 + BHCKB744 +    
BHCKB745 + BHCKB746)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
SecChargeOffs/Sec Ratio Net Charge-Offs on Securitised 
Assets/Securitised Assets 
(BHCKB747 + BHCKB748 + BHCKB749 + BHCKB750+ BHCKB751 + BHCKB752 + 
BHCKB753 - BHCKB754 - BHCKB755 - BHCKB756 - BHCKB757 - BHCKB758 - 
BHCKB759 - BHCKB760)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
SellerInterest Ratio Seller's Interest/Total Assets (BHCKB761 + BHCKB762 + BHCKB763 + BHCKB500 + BHCKB501 + 
BHCKB502)/BHCK2170 
SellerInterest/Sec Ratio Seller's Interest/Securitised Assets (BHCKB761 + BHCKB762 + BHCKB763 + BHCKB500 + BHCKB501 + 
BHCKB502)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + 
BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
OthersSecExp Ratio Credit Enhancements to Other 
Institutions' Securitisations/Total 
Assets 
(BHCKB776+ BHCKB777+ BHCKB778 + BHCKB779 + BHCKB780 + BHCKB781 + 
BHCKB782)/BHCK2170 
OthersSecLiqProv Ratio Liquidity Provision Commitments to 
Other Institutions' Securitisations/Total 
Assets 
(BHCKB783 + BHCKB784+ BHCKB785+ BHCKB786+ BHCKB787+ BHCKB788 + 
BHCKB789)/BHCK2170 
   
   
   
  (continued on next page) 
159 
 
Appendix B (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
 
  
-Mort-  Mortgage  
-HEL-  Home Equity Line  
-CC- Credit Card  
-Auto-  Auto  
-Cons- Consumer  
-CI- Commercial & Industrial  
-Oth- Other Loan and Lease  
   
Note: Definition and construction of variables used in chapters 5 and 6. Bank holding company data items are taken from FR Y-9C forms. 
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Appendix C Correlation Matr ix for the Determinants of Bank Credit Risk 
Taking  
 
  
 
Seci,t-1 Size i,t-1 Loan i,t-1 Cap i,t-1 ROA i,t-1 ChOff i,t-1 
       Seci,t-1 1 
     
       Size
 i,t-1 0.1396 1 
    
 
0.0000 
     
       Loan
 i,t-1 -0.0728 -0.2103 1 
   
 
0.0000 0.0000 
    
       Cap
 i,t-1 0.0643 -0.0600 -0.1324 1 
  
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   
       ROA
 i,t-1 0.0617 0.0172 0.0151 0.6023 1 
 
 
0.0000 0.2323 0.2942 0.0000 
  
       ChOff
 i,t-1 0.0636 0.0973 0.0182 0.3873 0.7237 1 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.2055 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
      
Note: The table presents pairwise correlations for explanatory variables used in the regression of bank 
credit risk taking (equation (5.1)). Statistical significance (p-value) is presented under the coefficients. 
For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix B. 
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Appendix D Hausman Specification Test for the Determinants of Bank 
Credit Risk Taking  
  Coefficients Difference S.E. 
  FE RE     
  (b) (B) (b-B) SqRt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
     Seci,t-1 -0.0046 -0.0032 -0.0014 0.0014 
Size
 i,t-1 0.0118 -0.0003 0.0121 0.0016 
Loan
 i,t-1 -0.1177 -0.0045 -0.1132 0.0084 
Cap
 i,t-1 0.0160 0.0279 -0.0120 0.0247 
ROA
 i,t-1 -0.1292 -0.0377 -0.0915 0.0325 
ChOff
 i,t-1 -0.1751 -0.1632 -0.0118 0.0594 
          
 b = Consistent under Ho and Ha 
  B = Inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
 Test:  Ho:  Difference in coefficients not systematic 
     chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 chi2(6) = 222.77 
   Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
   
    
Note: The table report the results of the Hausman specification test for regression of bank credit risk 
taking (equation (5.1)). Hausman specification test compares fixed effects versus random effects 
estimates; under the null hypothesis, the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in 
the model and can be treated as random (see Hausman (1978)).The statistically significant difference (H0 
is rejected) is interpreted as evidence for applying the fixed effects model.   
     
  
Appendix E Correlation Matr ix for  the Effects of Secur itisation Structures on Bank Insolvency Risk 
  Sec SecExp CEIOS SubSec SLC SecLiqProv Seller Interest OthersSecExp OthersSecLiqProv Size Liq HHILoan Trading Capital HHIRev AssetGrowth 
                 
Sec 1                
 
                
SecExp 0.22 1               
 
0.00                
CEIOS 0.15 0.54 1              
 
0.00 0.00               
SubSec 0.32 0.59 0.22 1             
 
0.00 0.00 0.00              
SLC 0.1 0.73 0.01 0.06 1            
 
0.01 0.00 0.77 0.12             
SecLiqProv 0.01 0.06 0 0.18 -0.01 1           
 
0.77 0.09 0.95 0.00 0.73            
Seller Interest 0.28 0.38 0.29 0.68 -0.01 -0.01 1          
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.70           
OthersSecExp 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1         
 
0.91 0.70 0.77 0.75 0.85 0.86 0.86          
OthersSecLiqProv -0.01 0 -0.01 0 0 0.07 0.01 0.02 1        
 
0.68 0.90 0.81 0.97 0.90 0.04 0.73 0.62         
Size 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.2 -0.05 0.13 1       
 
0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00        
Liq -0.1 0.04 0.16 -0.09 0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.16 1      
 
0.00 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.61 0.04 0.03 0.44 0.08 0.00       
HHILoan 0.16 0.07 0.07 0 0.05 0.08 0.05 0 -0.08 -0.3 0.07 1     
 
0.00 0.04 0.03 0.99 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.88 0.02 0.00 0.04      
Trading 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.11 0 0.13 0.55 -0.14 -0.19 1    
 
0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.86 0.01 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Capital 0.04 0.1 0.09 0.2 -0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 -0.13 -0.05 1   
 
0.25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.39 0.00 0.38 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.17    
HHIRev -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.1 -0.01 -0.04 -0.44 0.12 0.24 -0.21 0.15 1  
 
0.00 0.03 0.57 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.85 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
AssetGrowth 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.09 0 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.1 -0.11 0.1 0.1 -0.08 -0.07 1 
 0.20 0.47 0.06 0.77 0.01 0.99 0.02 0.79 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02  
                                  
Note: The table presents pairwise correlations for explanatory variables used in the regression of bank insolvency risk (equation (6.2)). Statistical significance (p-value) is presented under the coefficients. For the definition and 
construction of the variables see Appendix B. 
  
Appendix F Hausman Specification Test for the Effects of Secur itisation 
Structures on Bank Insolvency Risk  
  Coefficients  Difference S.E. 
  FE RE     
  (b) (B) (b-B) SqRt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
     
Seci,t -0.7238 -0.4378 -0.2860 0.2276 
SecExpi,t -15.2056 -17.0811 1.8755 2.7892 
SecLiqProvi,t 59.8677 30.9199 28.9478 23.4479 
SellerInteresti,t 4.9574 1.1877 3.7698 5.7734 
OthersSecExpi,t 16.4452 9.0911 7.3541 3.7868 
OthersSecLiqProvi,t -59.2418 -34.6074 -24.6345 25.0951 
Sizei,t -0.7165 0.0995 -0.8160 0.1568 
Liqi,t 1.3821 1.2884 0.0938 0.7509 
Tradingi,t -5.7973 -5.9396 0.1424 3.7737 
Capitali,t 1.5679 -0.4113 1.9792 1.7463 
AssetGrowthi,t 8.7366 7.4834 1.2532 0.8392 
AssetGrowth2i,t -83.7147 -62.1525 -21.5622 8.7363 
HHIRevi,t 0.7584 0.0231 0.7354 0.4383 
HHILoani,t 1.4160 -0.3056 1.7217 0.7372 
          
 b = Consistent under Ho and Ha 
  
B = Inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
 
Test:  Ho:  Difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
     
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
  
chi2(6) = 50.52 
    
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
   
          
Note: The table report the results of the Hausman specification test for regression of bank insolvency risk 
(equation (6.1)). Hausman specification test compares fixed effects versus random effects estimates; 
under the null hypothesis, the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model 
and can be treated as random (see Hausman (1978)).The statistically significant difference (H0 is rejected) 
is interpreted as evidence for applying the fixed effects model.  
 
 
  
  
Appendix G Determinants of Secur itisation Probability by Year  for  2002-2007 
Year 2002 Coef StdErr z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Sizei, t-1 0.221 0.063 3.500 0.000 0.097 0.345 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 -0.864 1.296 -0.670 0.505 -3.403 1.676 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 1.290 1.225 1.050 0.292 -1.111 3.690 
C&I Loans Ratioi, t-1 0.593 0.613 0.970 0.334 -0.609 1.794 
Consumer Loans Ratioi, t-1 1.331 0.563 2.360 0.018 0.227 2.435 
Other Loans Ratioi, t-1 1.183 1.088 1.090 0.277 -0.949 3.315 
Loan HHIi, t-1 -0.051 0.689 -0.070 0.941 -1.401 1.299 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.719 0.790 -0.910 0.363 -2.267 0.830 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.888 2.499 -0.360 0.722 -5.786 4.010 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 0.458 0.891 0.510 0.607 -1.288 2.204 
Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 -1.165 4.779 -0.240 0.807 -10.531 8.202 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 -13.798 10.234 -1.350 0.178 -33.857 6.260 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 -6.812 10.569 -0.640 0.519 -27.525 13.902 
State Dummies  Yes 
     Pseudo R2 0.197 
     Log Likelihood -139.546 
     No. of Observations 4288 
     
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets for year 2002. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All bank-specific 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
  
Appendix G (continued) 
Year 2003 Coef StdErr z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Sizei, t-1 0.221 0.063 3.500 0.000 0.097 0.345 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 -0.864 1.296 -0.670 0.505 -3.403 1.676 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 1.290 1.225 1.050 0.292 -1.111 3.690 
C&I Loans Ratioi, t-1 0.593 0.613 0.970 0.334 -0.609 1.794 
Consumer Loans Ratioi, t-1 1.331 0.563 2.360 0.018 0.227 2.435 
Other Loans Ratioi, t-1 1.183 1.088 1.090 0.277 -0.949 3.315 
Loan HHIi, t-1 -0.051 0.689 -0.070 0.941 -1.401 1.299 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.719 0.790 -0.910 0.363 -2.267 0.830 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.888 2.499 -0.360 0.722 -5.786 4.010 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 0.458 0.891 0.510 0.607 -1.288 2.204 
Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 -1.165 4.779 -0.240 0.807 -10.531 8.202 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 -13.798 10.234 -1.350 0.178 -33.857 6.260 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 -6.812 10.569 -0.640 0.519 -27.525 13.902 
State Dummies  Yes 
     Pseudo R2 0.120 
     Log Likelihood -202.558 
     No. of Observations 4154 
     
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets for year 2003. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All bank-specific 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Year 2004 Coef StdErr z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Sizei, t-1 -0.044 0.097 -0.460 0.648 -0.233 0.145 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 -0.151 1.725 -0.090 0.930 -3.533 3.230 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 -0.648 1.748 -0.370 0.711 -4.074 2.778 
C&I Loans Ratioi, t-1 -0.184 0.857 -0.220 0.830 -1.864 1.496 
Consumer Loans Ratioi, t-1 -3.755 2.415 -1.560 0.120 -8.488 0.977 
Other Loans Ratioi, t-1 -3.581 4.470 -0.800 0.423 -12.342 5.180 
Loan HHIi, t-1 -0.436 1.133 -0.390 0.700 -2.657 1.784 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.433 1.249 -0.350 0.729 -2.881 2.016 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 3.609 4.064 0.890 0.375 -4.356 11.574 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 -4.754 3.234 -1.470 0.142 -11.092 1.584 
Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 25.551 27.717 0.920 0.357 -28.774 79.876 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 1.632 5.392 0.300 0.762 -8.936 12.200 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 20.271 15.014 1.350 0.177 -9.157 49.698 
State Dummies  Yes 
     Pseudo R2 0.082 
     Log Likelihood -129.811 
     No. of Observations 3956 
     
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets for year 2004. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All bank-specific 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Year 2005 Coef StdErr z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Sizei, t-1 0.377 0.069 5.430 0.000 0.241 0.512 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 1.693 1.982 0.850 0.393 -2.193 5.578 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 2.683 1.895 1.420 0.157 -1.031 6.396 
C&I Loans Ratioi, t-1 0.696 0.745 0.930 0.350 -0.764 2.156 
Consumer Loans Ratioi, t-1 0.281 0.853 0.330 0.742 -1.391 1.952 
Other Loans Ratioi, t-1 1.541 1.383 1.110 0.265 -1.170 4.252 
Loan HHIi, t-1 0.329 0.790 0.420 0.677 -1.219 1.876 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.218 0.926 -0.240 0.814 -2.034 1.597 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 2.775 3.226 0.860 0.390 -3.548 9.098 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 -1.514 1.854 -0.820 0.414 -5.147 2.119 
Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 41.289 26.068 1.580 0.113 -9.804 92.382 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 2.714 2.339 1.160 0.246 -1.871 7.299 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 -31.310 12.354 -2.530 0.011 -55.523 -7.096 
State Dummies  Yes 
     Pseudo R2 0.201 
     Log Likelihood -149.443 
     No. of Observations 4081 
     
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets for year 2005. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All bank-specific 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Year 2006 Coef StdErr z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Sizei, t-1 0.058 0.081 0.720 0.471 -0.100 0.217 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 2.260 1.855 1.220 0.223 -1.375 5.896 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 2.042 1.904 1.070 0.283 -1.689 5.774 
C&I Loans Ratioi, t-1 -1.008 1.416 -0.710 0.477 -3.783 1.767 
Consumer Loans Ratioi, t-1 -5.138 2.916 -1.760 0.078 -10.853 0.576 
Other Loans Ratioi, t-1 -1.474 3.330 -0.440 0.658 -8.001 5.053 
Loan HHIi, t-1 -0.987 1.471 -0.670 0.502 -3.870 1.896 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -0.629 1.111 -0.570 0.572 -2.807 1.550 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 1.268 3.026 0.420 0.675 -4.664 7.200 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 -0.833 1.325 -0.630 0.530 -3.430 1.765 
Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 -35.511 31.137 -1.140 0.254 -96.538 25.516 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 -18.918 14.554 -1.300 0.194 -47.444 9.607 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 -13.215 11.036 -1.200 0.231 -34.844 8.415 
State Dummies  Yes 
     Pseudo R2 0.096 
     Log Likelihood -134.745 
     No. of Observations 3576 
     
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets for year 2006. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All bank-specific 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Year 2007 Coef StdErr z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Sizei, t-1 0.146 0.059 2.500 0.012 0.032 0.261 
Liquidity Ratioi, t-1 -0.332 1.108 -0.300 0.765 -2.504 1.841 
Loan Ratioi, t-1 -1.015 1.158 -0.880 0.381 -3.285 1.255 
C&I Loans Ratioi, t-1 0.878 0.660 1.330 0.183 -0.414 2.171 
Consumer Loans Ratioi, t-1 0.895 0.717 1.250 0.212 -0.510 2.300 
Other Loans Ratioi, t-1 -2.670 2.949 -0.910 0.365 -8.450 3.109 
Loan HHIi, t-1 1.224 0.657 1.860 0.062 -0.063 2.512 
Deposits/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -1.414 0.808 -1.750 0.080 -2.999 0.170 
Equity/Assets Ratioi, t-1 -1.478 2.376 -0.620 0.534 -6.134 3.178 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratioi, t-1 -1.503 1.289 -1.170 0.244 -4.030 1.023 
Interest Expense/Liabilities Ratioi, t-1 0.876 19.500 0.040 0.964 -37.344 39.095 
NPL Ratioi, t-1 -17.216 10.062 -1.710 0.087 -36.938 2.506 
Return on Assetsi, t-1 -18.069 9.059 -1.990 0.046 -35.824 -0.315 
State Dummies  Yes 
     Pseudo R2 0.113 
     Log Likelihood -210.161 
     No. of Observations 3931 
     
Note: The table presents the probit regression estimates of the likelihood to securitise assets for year 2007. The 
dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitisers and zero for non-securitisers. All bank-specific 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
 
